

JPRS 82896

17 February 1983

Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2709

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

17 February 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2709

CONTENTS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UAE-Saudi Security Agreement (WAKH, 27 Jan 83)	1
PDRY Chairman Inspects Naval Base in Algeria (Aden Domestic Service, 1 Feb 83)	5
Briefs OPEC Fund Loans	6

ARAB AFRICA

ALGERIA

Economic, Social Conditions for 1982 Reviewed (REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 31 Dec 82-6 Jan 83)	7
Economic Situation Examined, by Yacine Ould Moussa Social Situation Reviewed, by Y. Sassi	

EGYPT

Mubarak 1 February Answers to Canadian Deputies (AL-AKHBAR, 2 Feb 83)	24
Prime Minister Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din Interviewed (MENA, 4 Feb 83)	30

Minerals, Technology Discussed in GDR Minister's Trade Talks (MENA, various dates)	35
Soelle Arrives	
Trade Relations Promoted	
Minister Ends Visit	
Interview With Foreign Ministry Official Al-Baz (Usamah al-Baz Interview; Radio Monte Carlo, 5 Feb 83) ..	37
Briefs	
Message to Somali	41
'MAY' Editor Dismissed	41
Indian Commander Visits	41
Finnish Foreign Official	41
MOROCCO	
Energy Needs Predicted To Be 80 Percent Met by Year 2000 (MAROC SOIR, 26 Nov 82)	42
SUDAN	
Sudanese-Egyptian Cooperation (SUNA, 14 Jan 83)	48
Domestic Situation Examined (ARABIA, Jan 83)	49
Briefs	
Drainage Project	50
Coordination Committee Suggested	50
Business, Mass Media	50
Railways Modernization	50
Economic Cooperation Discussed	51
Nile Basin Project	51
Integration Projects	51
Agricultural Modernization	52
Egypt Visit	52
TUNISIA	
Progressive Islamists: A New Trend (Maidani Bensalah; LAMALIF, Dec 82)	53
Report on Mzali Talks With Mario Soares (Tunis Domestic Service, 4 Feb 83)	59
Briefs	
Socialist International Talks	60

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

IRAQ

Progress of Gulf War Reported (Jacques Duplouich; LE FIGARO, various dates)	61
Heavy Fighting Continues in Border Areas Economic, Political Effects of War Considered	

ISRAEL

Terrorism Advisor Discusses Divisions Within PLO (Rafael Eytan Interview; YOMAN HASHAVU'A, 19 Nov 82)	70
Greater Accomplishment Seen in Informal Agreements With Arabs (Flyakim Ha'atsni; NEQUDA, 3 Dec 82)	74

JORDAN

Farmers Plagued by Wild Boars (Hani Nasr Allah, Mazin Abu Zubayd; AL-DUSTUR, 25 Dec 82)	79
--	----

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Various Reports on Hijacking Noted (Various sources, various dates)	86
'Aden Radio' Reports More on Hijacking Commando Plane Rejected Gunfire Exchanged Hijacked Passengers Arrive Hijackers Surrender	
Briefs Gulf Industrial Cooperation	89
PDRY-Vietnamese Protocol	89

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Reactions to Three Years of War Discussed (Claude Lorieux; LE FIGARO, 28 Dec 82)	90
Highlights of Three Years of War Interpreted (ISLAMIC WORLD DEFENCE, Jan-Mar 83)	93

Rebel Leader Ghafur Gives Ideas for Peace Settlement (Francois Sergeant; LIBERATION, 26 Dec 82)	99
Developments of Three Years of Resistance Evaluated (Jean-Patrick Voudenay; LIBERATION, 23 Dec 82)	101
Bandit, Terrorist Activities Attributed to Mujahidin (KABUL NEW TIMES, 12 Jan 83)	106
Schoolchildren Kidnaped Public Facilities Destroyed Hospital Plundered, Schools Burned Family Victimized	
Increase in Agricultural Production Foreseen (KABUL NEW TIMES, 12 Jan 83)	112
Improved Water Distribution Sought (KABUL NEW TIMES, 13 Jan 83)	114
Transport Workers Hail New Gains (KABUL NEW TIMES, 15 Jan 83)	116
Ulema Council Issues Declaration for Returnees (KABUL NEW TIMES, 17 Jan 83)	118
Briefs AA Guns Missing From Base	121

INDIA

'INDIAN EXPRESS' Views Air Defense Against F-16 (Ravi Rikhye; INDIAN EXPRESS, 12 Jan 83)	122
New Development in Khalistan Movement Reported (B. K. Tiwari; INDIAN EXPRESS, 5 Jan 83)	126
Newspaper Scores PRC Film Documentary on Life in Tibet (Dilip Ganguly; AFP, 19 Jan 83)	128

IRAN

Statistics Given on Iraq's Military Losses (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 30 Nov 82)	129
Reaction to Rajavi-'Aziz Meeting Reported (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	132
Clerical Regime 'Frightened' by Leftist Infiltration (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	134
Ex-Tudeh Member Says Moscow Has No Plans To Unseat Mullahs (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	136

Scarcity, Production, Import, Consumption of Drugs Discussed (ETTELA'AT, 28 Nov 82)	138
Iran Said To Be 'Acting Against OPEC on Behalf of U.S. Position' (Mas'ud Tabataba'i; AL-DUSTUR, 20 Dec 82)	142
Western Journalists Assailed as 'Intellectual Slaves' (Ali Zulfiqari; TEHRAN TIMES, 23 Jan 83)	145
Circular Specifies Duties of State Organs (Tehran Domestic Service, 27 Jan 83)	148
Modarres Labeled as 'Teacher of Freedom' (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 1 Dec 82)	155
Montazeri on Experts, Export of Revolution (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	157
Signs of Growing Rift With Moscow (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	158
Khomeyni's Agents Likened to Hitler's Fifth Column (QIYAM-E IRAN, 29 Oct 82)	160
'Spine Chilling Story' Told by Iranian Prisoner (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 20 Jan 83)	163
Tour in 'Palaces of Vileness, Treason' Described (ETTELA'AT, 30 Nov 82)	165
Navy Considered 'Marching Along Islam's Right Line' (ETTELA'AT, 28 Nov 82)	169
Sarcheshmeh Plant Reports Increased Copper Production (Mohsen Hashemian; SOBH-E AZADegan, 4 Jan 83)	172
Briefs	
Minister Says No Corruption	175
Pakistan To Return Fleeing Iranians	175
European Lawyer Fired	175
Tabatabai Arrested	176

PAKISTAN

Investment Mission Due in April (DAWN, 28 Jan 83)	177
Mazari Calls for Elected Government (DAWN, 31 Jan 83)	178
Land Reform Termed First Step for Helping Small Farmer (Editorial; DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	180

Energy Crisis Analyzed; Wrong Economic Priorities Blamed (DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	182
Skeptical Views on Sixth Plan Expressed (M. Ziauddin; DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	184
Goods Transport--Railways' Share Seen Declining (Salim Alvi; DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	186
Pakistan's Exports: Facts, Figures Discussed (Azmat Ansari; DAWN, 25 Jan 83)	189
Minister Rules Out New Press Laws (DAWN, 28 Jan 83)	191
Ombudsman's Appointment Discussed; Any Quick Results Ruled Out (Editorial; DAWN, 28 Jan 83)	192
Ghafoor Criticizes Ombudsman's Appointment (DAWN, 31 Jan 83)	194
Students Occupy University Building for 2 Hours (DAWN, 28 Jan 83)	195
Students Lock University Building (DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	196
Students Disrupt Traffic (DAWN, 31 Jan 83)	197
Three More Cement Plants Planned (DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	198
Punjab To Spend 104 Million Rupees on Rural Education (DAWN, 30 Jan 83)	199
Plan To Explore Baluchistan Coal Resources Approved (DAWN, 31 Jan 83)	200
Neglect of Cultural Heritage Criticized (Editorial; DAWN, 31 Jan 83)	201
Briefs	
Shariat Courts To Start	202
Plea for Enquiry	202
Coeducation Ends in Sialkot	202
Trade Deficit Rise Reported	203
Remittances 2.4 Billion Rupees	203
PPP Leader Ailing	203

SRI LANKA

Police Personnel Attracted to Jobs in Middle East (B. C. Perera; THE ISLAND, 25 Jan 83)	204
Most Officials To Disclose Assets, Liabilities (Kenneth Amarasekera, Delrine Viljeratne; SUN, 27 Jan 83)	205

UAE-SAUDI SECURITY AGREEMENT

GF281600 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1950 GMT 27 Jan 83

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 27 Jan (WAKH)--The text of a UAE-Saudi Arabi agreement on security cooperation and the extradition of criminals was published in Abu Dhabi today in Number 119 of the Official Gazette issued for January 1983.

The agreement is in two parts: Part I deals with security cooperation between the two countries, and Part II deals with the extradition of criminals.

Part I of the agreement comprises three sections. Article 1 of Section 1 states that the two countries have agreed to organize regular meetings between officials of their border posts in adjacent areas on their border to coordinate information and cooperation. The two countries will set up a followup committee made up of security officials in the interior ministries of the two countries. The committee will meet once a year or whenever necessary.

Article 2 prohibits border patrols from crossing the border of the two countries for a distance more than 20 km to apprehend those who are being pursued, and that the latter should be handed over to the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The principle of immediate extradition will be in force if arrest is effected by officials of the state [word or words indistinct] and that state had taken part in the pursuit.

Article 3 defines the method of extraditing fugitives and the handing over of their possessions and the method of transport to the nearest post in the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The vehicles used in the pursuit should have official plates and should not be more than three while the number of members of the patrol taking part in the pursuit should not exceed 12 and must be lightly armed. Hot pursuit should stop on arriving at the nearest town, village or beduin encampment. The authorities of the two countries will be notified as soon as the pursuit is over, regardless of the fact whether the results are positive or negative. The notification will be in the form of a process-verbal signed by the two sides.

Section 2 of Part I of the agreement deals with combatting infiltration. It states that the two countries will make efforts to combat infiltration across their border by adopting deterrent measures against those whose participation in the infiltration is proven.

Article 2 of Section 1 refers to the need to adopt official measures to combat infiltrators. The state which the unidentified infiltrator has entered has the right to deal with them if they had originally infiltrated from the other state, with an infiltrator who enters one state from the other (direct) or is referred to the other state which he had entered (indirect).

Section 3 of Part 1 deals with combatting crime. Article 1 of this section provides that the two sides will exchange the names of those who have been convicted for serious crimes as well as the names of suspects and those who are under surveillance and who have been allowed to travel, particularly on the occasions in which this is necessary. Each side will communicate to the other any information it has on any criminal actions that have been committed, or are planned to be committed, in the other side's territory or abroad. There will be close contacts between officials of the respective investigation offices.

Article 3 of Section 3 states that the competent authority of each country will inform its counterpart in the other country of the new crimes that occur, the method of their perpetration and the measures taken to investigate and suppress them. The two sides will also exchange information on developing the methods of combatting crime, the regulations and research of their respective interior ministries and books, magazines and publications published in the two states.

Each side will inform the other of the conferences and seminars that are held and that lie within the competence of their respective interior ministries, particularly in the field of combatting crime and road safety, within a period of not less than 1 month prior to the time such conferences and seminars are scheduled to be held so that the other side will be able to participate if it so desires.

Article 4 of Section 3 states that each side will safeguard the secrecy of the information and will not pass it to a third party except with the consent of the other side.

Part II of the agreement deals with the extradition of criminals and contains 5 articles.

Article 1 states that the extradition of criminals is a duty if the crime committed is of the type that requires punishment, penalty or reprimand, or if it was committed in the country requesting extradition or outside the two states, and the laws of the state requesting extradition demand that the criminal be tried in its territory.

Article 2 refers to the crimes for which extradition is prohibited. These are political crimes, crimes committed in the territory of the country that is being asked to extradite, crimes committed by members of the diplomatic corps who enjoy diplomatic immunity or any other person who enjoys immunity in accordance with international law, as well as crimes that are still under investigation in the country that is being asked to extradite or in the state in which the crime has taken place when the state is other than that which is requesting extradition.

Article 11 stipulates that the wanted person should not be tried by the state demanding his extradition except for the crime for which his extradition was sought and the crimes he commits after his extradition. He may be tried for other crimes not stated in the extradition demand if the wanted person consents to this, or if he has the opportunity to leave the territory of the state to which he has been extradited and has not made use of this opportunity within a period of 30 days then it will be possible to try him for other crimes.

Article 12 states that the state seeking extradition will foot all the expenses incurred by its extradition demand and the expenses of the extradited person's return if his innocence is proven.

Article 13 calls on the two states to cooperate in the search and apprehension of criminals and to extend the necessary facilities with regard to the exchange of information through direct contacts or official visits.

Article 14 specifies a period of 30 days for receiving the wanted person beginning with the date on which the notification of the extradition order was cabled to the state demanding extradition. Otherwise, the state from which extradition is sought has the right to free the wanted person whose extradition cannot be demanded once again for the same crime.

Articles 15 and 16 specify that the term of the agreement is 5 years and that it will come into force 1 month after the exchange of the ratified documents of the agreement concluded between the two states.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PDRY CHAIRMAN INSPECTS NAVAL BASE IN ALGERIA

01010840 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 0330 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, inspected the High Naval Institute (?in Isma'il Province in Abu Ribyah Governorate) yesterday within the framework of his visit to the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

At the institute, he was received by representatives of the province and the National Liberation Front Party, [words indistinct], the military units commander, Algerian Popular Council chairman, and the naval institute director, teaching staff and students.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad inspected the institute and listened to a detailed explanation by the institute's officials about the practical and theoretical course work. At the end of the visit, the secretary general presented a symbolic gift to the institute director. The gift was a miniature of Hadra Mawt Province.

It is worth noting that the naval institute prepares naval officers at all levels, captains, and crew for naval ships. Since it was established, the institute has been supplying Algeria with 80 percent of its naval cadres. A number of students from African and developing countries study at the institute.

Algerian President Chadli Bandjedid hosted a luncheon in honor of Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and the delegation accompanying him yesterday. As part of the bilateral meetings between both countries' officials, Brother Salih Munassar al-Suwayli, member of the Political Bureau and State Security Committee chairman, met with Brother Sulayman (?Boushmay), member of the NLF Central Committee and party foreign relations committee chairman. They discussed a number of issues pertaining to party cooperation. The 1983-1984 party cooperation protocol is scheduled to be signed between the fraternal YSP and NLF today.

Brother 'Abd al-Qadir (Bayt al-Mal), candidate-member of the Central Committee, industry minister and oil and minerals committee chairman, met separately with Belkadem Nabi, Algerian energy and petrochemical industries minister, and Ait-Messaoudene industry minister [title as heard]. In both meetings, aspects of cooperation between the PDRY and Algeria in energy, oil and industry and means of developing them were discussed.

CSO: 4400/176

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OPEC FUND LOANS--Vienna, 20 Jan (INA)--OPEC's International Development Fund has decided to give loans and grants to seven developing countries this year amounting to about \$70 million. A spokesman for the fund told INA that agreements were signed yesterday granting loans and grants to Jordan, Pakistan, Burma, Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, Honduras and Benin. The spokesman explained that of these loans Jordan will obtain \$10 million to build a power plant in Aqaba, Burma \$7 million to build an electricity power project and Honduras \$7.25 million to build a sea port. Pakistan will obtain 15 million, Madagascar \$5 million and Papua New Guinea \$5.7 million to finance power production projects in their countries. The fund will give Benin a loan of \$5.5 million to finance a power project. This is in addition to a \$1.02 million grant to meet its commitments to the former general international fund. It is noteworthy that most of the loans given to the aforementioned countries are interest-free and under easy payment terms. [Text] [IN26193] Baghdad INA in Arabic 1514 GMT 20 Jan 83]

USC: 176

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR 1982 REVIEWED

Economic Situation Examined

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 984, 31 Dec 82-6 Jan 83 pp 22-29

[Article by Yacine Ould Moussa: "A More Controlled Approach"]

[Text] As the year ends, it is time again to assess a balance. The national and international events which marked the development and performances of our country's economic activity in 1982 are many and complex. It is therefore not easy to strike a balance and to isolate positive and negative items, as economic phenomena--being interdependent and affecting the realization of planned objectives--will to a large extent determine the performance level of national economy during any given year.

1982 assumes special importance because it marked a turning point in the implementation of the 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan.

If we were to recall the main objectives of the Five-Year Plan, we should first mention that achieving equilibrium in fundamental economic sectors and meeting social needs were its two major aims. Also, during the past three years, and especially during 1982, an effort was made to rationalize and reorganize the country's production structures: some restructuring took place and measures were taken to adapt these structures to the decentralization and democratization policy followed by the Nation in guiding and providing impetus for the development process.

In this context, we must now not only draw a balance of the technical and economic performances of our production apparatus, but also assess the efforts made to improve the conditions and manner in which the objectives set in the 1982 plan-year were achieved. Therefore, we must not only evaluate the performances of our economic system, but also consider how it operates in organizing, managing, regulating, controlling and monitoring our country's development.

We must also take a look at what is going on around us in the world so as to appreciate what has been accomplished in one year, economically and socially, in an environment marked by international crisis, attempts at hegemony and the desire to crush Third World countries through the collapse of their raw material prices and the multiplication of tariff and non-tariff barriers.

With these few precautions, we shall now attempt to assess our country's economic balance for one year, through the most significant economic categories.

The gross domestic production, gas and oil not included, showed a rate of growth of about 7.2 percent in 1982. This rate is about the same as that for 1980 and 1981. Compared with the Plan objective--a rate of growth of the gross domestic production of the order of 10 percent--these 7 percent appear to be below the anticipated rate, but we should point out that, considering the simultaneous reorganization of the domestic economy together with the effects of the world economic crisis (which does affect us), a 7 percent rate of growth of the gross domestic production, gas and oil not included, is in itself an appreciable and interesting performance which we might well compare with those of countries having capacities similar or superior to ours.

As far as investments are concerned, we can say that 1982 was marked by an acceleration in the rate of implementation, which amounted to close to 10 percent, not including the Echleff prefabricated project. This in fact demonstrates, on the one hand, that there was an improvement in implementation capacities at local level and, on the other hand, that better use was made of national implementation means. We wish to point out that, in spite of identified deficiencies in implementation means at local level, over 50 percent of all investment programs were initiated, managed and implemented by local collectivities and governorates whose prerogatives and responsibilities with respect to economic and social development have been increased and strengthened so as to provide a concrete and effective content for national development and regional promotion.

Overall, the 1982 investment program amounted to over 98 billion Algerian dinars, i.e. less than 50 percent more than at the close of 1981 operations.

To fulfill this program, an additional effort was made to provide implementation means, and the latter were increased by close to 24 percent with respect to 1981.

As far as 1982 plan-year investments are concerned, we can say that 80 percent of the objectives set were achieved, and that the credits used amounted to 80 billion Algerian dinars out of the 98 provided for in the 1982 plan. This is an honorable performance, even though the various sectors of our domestic economy show different rates of completion of the programs that had been assigned to them: 61 percent for implementation means, 62 percent for regional development, 73 percent for economic infrastructures, 85 percent for agriculture and water-supply, and 88 percent for transportation.

The building and public works sector showed an improved rate of growth (10 percent in real terms) thanks to the equipment effort which continued through 1982.

Although appreciable results were obtained with respect to investment implementation, this rate and the implementation level remain below plan provisions. This is due to the persistence of constraints resulting from the quantitative and qualitative inadequacy of the personnel supervising local and regional

Table 1. Development of Gross Domestic Production - 1981-1982
(In Millions of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982 in current prices</u>	<u>Increase, Percent</u>	
			<u>in volume</u>	<u>in current prices</u>
Agriculture	11,740	13,419	+ 3	+ 14.3
Water-supply and energy	2,580	2,890	+ 12	+ 12
Oil and gas	60,980	59,005	+ 1.6	- 3.2
Mines and quarries	740	755	+ 11.5	+ 2
Processing industries	18,940	21,740	+ 10	+ 14.8
Oil-related public works	4,100	3,772	- 6	- 8
Transportation, trade and services	38,370	44,509	+ 7	+ 16
Total	156,346	169,346	+ 5.11	+ 8
Customs duties and taxes	9,670	10,654	+ 7	+ 10
Gross domestic production	166,500	180,000	+ 5.2	+ 8.1

Table 2. Development of Importations - 1981-1982
(In Millions of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Importations</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>Forecast for the Close of 1982</u>
Foodstuffs	9.1	9
Industrial consumer goods	4.6	6
Intermediate goods	17.4	18
Durable goods	16.8	15
	47.5	48

Table 3. Development of Gross Domestic Production (Oil and Gas Not Included)-
1981-1982 (In Millions of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Production</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982 in current prices</u>	<u>Increase, Percent</u>	
			<u>in volume</u>	<u>in current prices</u>
Gross domestic production, oil and gas not included	105,520	120,995	+ 7.2	14.7
Material production, oil and gas not included	57,480	65,832	7.4	14.3

Table 4. Forecast Investments and Expenditures - 1982 (In Millions of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1982 Budget</u>	<u>Year End</u>
Industry	36,800	28,950
Agriculture, water-supply	7,705	6,593
Transportation	2,447	2,164
Implementation means	5,800	3,520
Economic infrastructures	10,164	7,988
Social infrastructures	19,690	15,581
Administrative infrastructures	995.5	734
Data processing	167.5	120
Regional development	10,900	6,800
Miscellaneous	3,100	5,500
Subtotal	97,769	77,950
Prefabricated structures		1,250
Total	97,769	79,200

enterprises. In addition, it is not always possible to achieve optimum project maturation and implementation conditions when new projects are started or old ones completed.

Thus, 140 billion Algerian dinars were allocated to new programs in 1982, which intensified the drain on the country's implementation capacity and increased the backlog volume (360 billion Algerian dinars by the end of 1982) without for all that completing the portfolios of priority projects already set by the Plan.

Considering the level of use of program credits--58 billion Algerian dinars in 1980, 67 billion in 1981 and 77 billion in 1982--the completion rate of planned programs must be accelerated if all objectives are to be achieved by the end of the Five-Year Plan; this can be done through improved assessment methods, rational use of implementation means and increased regard for our national development requirements.

Requirements and Production: An Indispensable Match

Investments are not an adequate measure of the effort undertaken in 1982. Production is a fundamental component of the balance in that it essentially determines the extent to which we cover our economic and social requirements and is also an indicator of our sensitivity to international economic conditions. The priority objective of the Five-Year Plan is to achieve equilibrium in the country's basic sectors so as to consolidate our economic independence and base our development on autonomous and reproducible national capabilities.

What was the gross domestic production of the various economic sectors?

In 1982, the gross domestic production amounted to 180 billion Algerian dinars, compared with 166.5 billion in 1981, i.e. an 8 percent increase in current prices and a 5.8 increase in volume.

Oil and gas not included, the gross domestic production amounted to about 121 billion Algerian dinars, i.e. a 14.7 percent increase in current values over 1981, and a 7.2 percent increase in material volume over 1981, whereas the rate anticipated in the Plan was 10.4 percent in volume.

What did cause this discrepancy between the annual plan prevision and actual production? It was caused by performance differentials between sectors: the increase for processing industries was 10 percent instead of 14 percent; for mines and quarries, 1.5 percent instead of 18 percent; for agriculture, 3 percent instead of 5 percent.

What did cause the overall increase in gross domestic production from 1981 to 1982? It is due for 48.7 percent to material production (oil and gas not included) for 41.5 percent to services (including customs duties and import taxes), and finally for 9.8 percent to oil and gas. From 1980 to 1981, these rates were respectively about 38 percent, 43 percent and 20 percent.

Therefore, if one excepts oil and gas, the growth of the gross domestic production was generated to 58 percent by material production (46 percent in 1981) and for 46 percent by services.

These are, therefore, the overall results.

As far as agriculture is concerned, we must first say that unfavorable weather conditions affected crops, especially cereals which showed a 22 percent decline over 1981: 17 million quintals in 1982 and 21 million quintals in 1981

Therefore, the growth of agricultural production--around 3 percent--is due to a large extent to an increase in animal production: 19 percent for meat, 2.8 percent for milk, and 14 percent for eggs.

The agricultural sector assumes a strategic position in the national development policy insofar as problems such as national development, development of the country's resources, agricultural production and food dependence must find immediate and radical solutions through the strengthening and consolidation of our country's agricultural potential.

At a press conference held on 12 December 1982 at the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Mr Salim Saadi pointed out that, prior to 1979, a diagnosis of the agricultural sector revealed a series of deficiencies, namely the disorganization of the socialist production apparatus, the dilapidated state of agricultural infrastructures, the aging of our arboricultural assets, the aging of our labor force, the increasingly marginal profitability of the private sector and, finally, a constraining environment. After the Central Committee's May 1980 session, which was devoted to agriculture, numerous measures were applied to reorganize the production apparatus, improve the environment, stimulate production and supervise agricultural operations. In addition, farmland restructuring, the adoption of a management system,

the appointment of qualified cadres to production units, the decentralization of controls through an increase in governorate powers, and the aid given to small farmers provided a positive impetus for our agriculture which nevertheless still suffers from some problems: squatters (close to 100,000 families who paralyze the sector and waste its resources); water supply (there was a decrease in irrigated surfaces, which was made worse by the delay in dam construction, so that our present water-storage capacity is 50 percent below what it was at the time of independence). Another handicap is hindering agricultural development: industrial and domestic water requirements are a serious competition for farms, as excessive pumping to large urban areas dries up agricultural wells. In addition, the development of parasitic activities, the obsolescence of agricultural and water-supply structures and the labor shortage now call for radical measures based on national options involving all of the country's economic sectors; only then will it be possible to reduce to a tolerable level the effects of foodstuff imports on our foreign trade balance.

1981 has shown, in agriculture, that reorganization and incentive measures are dependent upon the competence and commitment of decision-makers in this sector and outside this sector, in improving small farmers' living and working conditions, in arousing new agricultural vocations, and in creating consistent and efficient conditions to sustain agricultural production and advance the rural world as a whole. There is no other way to increase agricultural production by more than 3 percent and to reduce the effects of food importations.

With respect to gas and oil, our main source of export revenues, in terms of value added and in current prices, their share in gross domestic production decreased markedly:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Percent of Gross Domestic Production</u>
1979	30.5
1980	36.8
1981	36.6
1982	32.8

This decline is due to the variations of oil prices on the world market, but we should point out that gas relayed oil quite satisfactorily, both with respect to export prices (+ 13 percent) and to production.

Let us consider industrial production (gas and oil not included): it accounted for about 16.5 percent of the gross domestic production growth. In value, it represented 3,125 million Algerian dinars in 1982 (a 14 percent increase over 1981). Most of it is due to the processing industries (2,800 million Algerian dinars) followed by the water-supply and energy sector with 310 million Algerian dinars, and the mines and quarries sector with 15 million Algerian dinars.

With respect to material volume, growth was also uneven: a 10 percent increase for processing industries, 12 percent for water-supply and energy, 1.5 percent for mines and quarries.

The 1982 annual plan anticipated a 15 percent rate of growth, but a rate of 10 percent is an appreciable performance, considering the rapid increase in demand and the reorganization of production structures.

The total production of the building and public works sector, in terms of value added, amounted to 23.25 billion Algerian dinars, compared with 19.3 billion in 1981, i.e. plus 20 percent in value and plus 10 percent in material volume. This rate of 10 percent happens to be the rate provided for in the plan for this important sector, which provides a basis for all development and all operations aiming at tightening the weave of the country's social and economic fabric. The equipment effort and the availability of building materials have encouraged growth in the building and public works sector on which considerable demands are placed to realize social, administrative and economic infrastructure programs and to solve the housing shortage, which remains the focal point of all measures taken to encourage rational national development.

After this rapid overview of production and the uneven performances of the various sectors, we shall now assess our foreign balances.

In this respect, out of the 58 billion Algerian dinars allocated for an overall importation program (prefabricated structures not included), 48 billion were used as follows: 9 billion for foodstuffs, 6 billion for industrial consumer goods, 18 billion for raw materials and semifinished products, and 15 billion for payments.

In 1982, our foreign trade showed a positive balance of 11 billion Algerian dinars, compared to 13.75 billion in 1981. In 1979 and 1980, foreign trade had shown a positive balance of respectively 4.1 and 10.9 billion dinars. All this demonstrates the solidity of our foreign trade, which benefited from restrictions on the use of foreign resources intended to decrease our debt. Our country's foreign debt decreased and is fully under control, all the more so as the policy arrived at consists in using export revenues only to cover our development needs.

As far as production is concerned, the process of matching production and demand was further studied to provide our country with resources of its own, sufficient to generate and maintain its efforts to build up its economy and society.

Such a balance, however, does not reflect only the results achieved in investment and production, but also the conditions and manner of operation of our environment which, in 1982, entered an important stage in its reorganization and adaptation to qualitatively new demands in our development process.

Consolidation of a Reorganization

Apart from economic performances, 1982 was marked by the reorganization of our production apparatus and our technical and administrative environment. Thus, the process of national and regional planning was reinforced in 1982 by the outcome of studies on this subject which had started in 1981. In this context, various evaluation and monitoring instruments were implemented

such as the annual plan, the production plan, and investment planning, in order to control our development and provide for a consistent, unified and overall implementation of the country's development policy.

As a result, local collectivities and governorates will assume effective responsibility in managing and providing impetus for public affairs and the social and economic promotion of our regions.

In this respect, the way is paved, but the results achieved do not yet measure up to the scope of responsibilities and missions of the various levels in charge of managing, planning and monitoring our country's construction. 1982 was not only marked by an increased awareness of this process; it also brought about a series of legislative, financial and organizational measures aiming at a judicious distribution of efforts and responsibilities between local and central authorities with respect to the implementation of development programs.

There is no doubt that 1982, in spite of some imperfections, was marked by the concertation and coordination of regional and sectorial programs at all levels and in all fields, throughout all decision-making centers involved in implementing the Plan.

In this respect, decentralized planning at regional level was an essential prerequisite in controlling the initiation and implementation of planned programs. In the same manner, production plans now form the basis for provisions and a yardstick for realizations. These plans are prepared at all economic levels: enterprises, governorates and at national level. Mostly, these production plans are useful in determining financial, supply, job creation and income distribution aspects.

In this respect, the content of the program plan and its implications with respect to its implementation conditions will have to be studied more closely so as to make it easier to monitor and control economic activity. As far as monitoring the implementation of production plans is concerned, the organization of the system to be used and the responsibilities of the various planning levels were described in a circular dated May 1982. This system will be consolidated and strengthened in 1983 to show the degree of utilization of the production tool and the adaptability of domestic production to the actual requirements of the Algerian market as well as to control economic fluidity.

Measures were also taken to adapt and alleviate public investment procedures. In May 1982, the council of ministers approved a report which made it possible to determine the constraints resulting from regulations and to isolate a number of operations likely to simplify and rationalize public investment procedures. These legal provisions will be perfected and promulgated in 1983.

Another facet of the reorganization undertaken in 1982 deals with enterprise restructuring. Restructuring schemes for many economic sectors were prepared, approved and decreed by the authorities. The organic stage will be completed in 1983. The upgrading of productive work, specialization, the separation of production, realization and distribution functions guided regional reorganization operations, and special attention was given to the implementation of

coordination structures, both at sector level and in central supervising administrations; the latter also experienced a reorganization of their relations with the economic entities for which they are responsible. This reorganization, therefore, rests on a dual base: sectorial decentralization and regional decentralization. Accompanying measures and measures concerning asset transfers, headquarter transfers and operational financing for new enterprises were studied to ensure that all necessary and sufficient conditions are met for the restructuring and reorganization of the economic apparatus. 1983 will be marked by the implementation of the enterprises financial restructuring program; its objective is to provide them with capital and to control them on the basis of objectives and limited elements.

In the agricultural sector, land restructuring was completed: 3,000 new units were created over 2.8 million hectares. These viable units are staffed by 1,500 managing engineers, 500 higher technicians, 1,500 middle-level technicians, 4,000 accountants and 1,300 mechanics-fleet heads.

Land restructuring and office reorganization will in the future make it possible to free producers from all constraints and will stimulate production and productivity, as agricultural activity as a whole will be better controlled and better supported.

1982 was also marked by an overall examination of the pricing system, taking into account the part prices are expected to play, viz.: to protect the citizens' purchasing power, decentralize enterprises and ensure that they are self-sufficient and efficient, and act as a lever in orienting production and domestic consumption.

A new pricing system was adopted by the government. Its aim is to keep production costs under control and maintain the citizens' purchasing power through the creation of an equalization fund deriving its resources from compensatory taxes on luxury and non-essential products.

As far as this sector is concerned, the People's National Assembly passed laws concerning artisans and regulating private investment in our country. Following decisions made by the Central Committee at its November 1981 session, regulations concerning the organization and supervision of the private sector's contribution to the national development were adopted. This political and legal clarification will now enable the private sector to make an effective and efficient contribution in meeting social needs and building the country.

Finally, 1982 was marked by a tentative reflection on the overall reorganization of our tax system to ensure greater social equity, a better geographical distribution of activities, to encourage production and improve tax yields and tax-fraud control.

This reflection is all the more necessary as what is at stake is the future financing of economic operations and services through internal resources, saving export resources to finance development programs.

Clearly, this overview of the performances of our production apparatus and of the measures adopted to improve its organization and the interplay of its

various structures involved in management, planning, production and control, does not adequately reflect the density and impact of the operations carried out in 1982.

The national conference on development which took place on 1-2 December 1982 and was chaired by President Chadli Bendjedid, has made it possible to measure the efforts and correctives required to improve the performances of our economic apparatus, implement the Five-Year Plan and prepare the next plan under the most favorable conditions, in the light of past experience and the results obtained until now. We must say that the method adopted, that of dialogue, concertation and coordination, has borne fruit. Certainly, complacency has never been a good way to solve problems, but we should point out that the results obtained in 1982 are honorable, even if we all feel that we have not yet reached the utmost limit of our potentialities, capabilities and possibilities. It is possible to do better and produce more. But then, we come to the limit of technicist views which see a development process as a collection and mechanical implementation of production factors.

Development also involves society, culture and, above all, man, the source of all riches and all changes. Our National Charter provides that the ultimate end of development is man.

But it is man again who is at the basis of development and its success in transforming society to reflect our people's aspirations.

In this respect, 1982 has shown the limitations of a mechanical view of development and revealed the fundamental part played by man in guiding his fate and his promotion. Thus, we may believe that 1983 will increase the part played by man through his commitment, his abilities and his faith in the ideals and choices of the Algerian Revolution.

Social Situation Reviewed

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 984, 31 Dec 82-6 Jan 83 pp 30-34

[Article by Y. Sassi: "Working For Well-Being"]

[Text] Some figures speak for themselves and are far more eloquent than any statement of intentions. Sixty billion dinars for Housing, 42 billion for Education and Basic Instruction, 16 billion for social infrastructures, and close to 10 billion for community equipment: of the total 400 billion dinars allocated to investments under the third plan, an impressive 128 billion will go to social programs. This fantastic figure gives a clear idea of the place and importance assumed by social questions in the Algerian development policy.

For those who may need it, let us recall the first lines of the general report on the 1980-1984 Plan: "The objective of the Five-Year Plan is to carry out all operations necessary to ensure that the people's fundamental social needs are satisfactorily covered by 1990." The importance of the resources allocated, therefore, is merely the obvious result and final expression of a well thought-out policy the priority objective of which is to improve the Algerian citizen's living conditions.

Regional facts will confirm it. In Bechar and Adrar, remarkable efforts were made in 1982 to ensure better supplies to the population, and several thousands of households benefited from the electrification program. Eight hospitals are under construction in the Chlef governorate. In the Skikda and Bouira governorates, the drinking-water supply situation has considerable improved. Sidi El Houaria in Oran, the Casbah in Algiers, and the country's other ancient city districts are being renovated. In Saida, 247 km of national roads were completed in 1981 and 1982. Roads also account for 35 percent of the investments programmed for the Bejaia governorate...

This list could go on and on; our country's social landscape is undergoing a mutation which is both enormous and multidimensional.

Daily needs were one of the primary concerns of authorities in 1982. Housing, transportation, education, basic instruction, water supply, health and, generally speaking, all social and cultural affairs were the privileged sectors in which the state concentrated its investments. This accounts for the boom experienced by social sectors.

Housing: Increased Optimism

Thus, a far greater number of housing units were completed during the first three years of the Five-Year Plan than under the preliminary plan and the two Four-Year Plans. Of course, the housing shortage is not going to end tomorrow. To catch up with a backlog estimated at close to one million housing units is not an easy task. Yet, without boasting of that famous 100,000 housing unit, 1982 was marked by considerable results.

The seven central governorates (Blida, Chlef, Algiers, Tizi-Ouzou, Jijel, Bouira and Medea) accomplished almost as much as the entire country did in 1980. On the whole, therefore, the year was marked by a real expansion in housing construction. There are even some who believe that the goal of 100,000 housing units is no longer a distant prospect, but something that could be reached soon, a near certainty. Increased sales, the rise in the number of current building projects, the better use made of investments and labor, the use of prefabricated elements and increased citizens' participation through private construction projects and land reserve developments are as many elements conducive to optimism.

Housing is an eminently social production and we should realize that there is more to it than just numbers. In this respect, we should point out that we are beginning to break with the tradition of dormitory towns. Most of the projects completed in 1982 included the required infrastructures and equipment. The new towns which have sprung all over the country truly deserve the name of "living environment," as they provide the essential prerequisites for modern living, and as their architecture is better adapted to our country's cultural context.

Rural housing is also undergoing a complete mutation. Socialist agricultural villages are now being scaled down to exclude gigantic proportions that would be detrimental to agriculture and would in time destroy the rural equilibrium and lifestyle. But this did not slow down construction in rural areas. Quite

to the contrary! We are far from the 25,000 rural housing units of 1979, the 11,000 of 1980 and the 17,000 of 1981. Early in October 1982, forecasts for the close of the year, for the Chlef, Guelma, Blida, Tizi-Ouzou, Skikda and Tiaret governorates alone, to mention only a few, were respectively 6,700, 4,080, 3,070, 3,000, 2,330 and 2,120 rural housing units. In this connection, we should point out that individuals played a large part through private construction projects. This is a tangible proof of the huge potential that remains to be tapped in this respect.

One Fourth Of the Population At School

Our youth, which represents a large layer of the country's population, also represents an immense potential. Indeed, 56 percent of the Algerian population is under 20. We are therefore justified in saying that, quantitatively and qualitatively, our youth is an inexhaustible source of wealth for the nation--and they have already proved it on many occasion. Far ahead of mining, agricultural, forestry and other resources, there is Man. He is the ultimate end of development, as well as its instrument and generator. Indeed, the whole development policy now being implemented rests on him.

This was shown at the start of the 1982-1983 school and academic year which proved to be an event of truly national importance. We cannot say less, knowing that one fourth of the Algerian population (5 million people) are students. There are 4,780,000 young children in the basic school system, 257,000 students in the general secondary cycle, another 27,000 in technical schools, 161,000 receiving job training, and 100,000 students in higher-education institutions: that is quite a lot of people on school, high-school and university benches. We wish to emphasize the magnitude of these figures, as they testify to the efforts accomplished.

During the new school year, education--as represented by basic, secondary and higher schools--will also receive the major part of State budget allocations. Allocations were substantially increased in two areas: development of basic education and development of scientific research. Last year's results were already more than appreciable!

At the time of independence, there were no more than 1,300 teachers; there are now approximately 150,000 in the basic cycle. In addition, the Algerian school system is fully autonomous and no longer dependent on foreign assistance for the preparation of textbooks and educational programs or for the Algerianization of the basic cycle. The student is therefore working with Algerian textbooks, an Algerian curriculum and an Algerian teacher whose many qualities should be recognized considering the constraints with which he must cope daily.

Within three years, 90 schools were added to the previous capacity of the secondary school system, and institutes and university centers multiplied. Several millions of free textbooks were distributed last year to first-cycle students, and close to 600,000 university textbooks were produced during the same period.

We may therefore well say that the school system has become a privileged sphere for the Algerian citizen's promotion. Schools, high-schools and

universities have undergone profound revolutions. Civics and religion, physical education, drawing and music are disciplines which have been recently introduced and which generate, develop and reinforce moral sense and poise as well as the love of beauty and knowledge in the young child. All the efforts made until now were aimed at a single goal: to educate our youth, supervise, guide and orient it so it will become an advanced bridgehead, a powerful spearhead in our struggle against economic, social and cultural underdevelopment.

The total electrification of the country and the optimum coverage of drinking water requirements are two other main lines of the government's present policy. The deadline for the completion of the country's power-supply network was set at 1990 in the National Charter. We should note that, even among industrialized countries, very few have dared to be so ambitious. In France, for instance, the power-supply network was started in the last century, but it was completed only in 1966.

Early in December, at a meeting chaired by Mr Chadli Bendjedid, the Council of Ministers adopted a series of decisions that will achieve a more even distribution of the benefits of electricity by speeding up electrification in the governorates least privileged in this respect. As a result, the 1983 objectives were set at 6,550 km of power lines, compared with 4,900 km completed in 1982.

The latter figure alone represents 50 percent of all that was achieved from 1962 to 1978.

In 1984 alone, 7,800 km of power lines are scheduled to be built. Clearly, rural areas will be the first to benefit from these large projects. By the end of 1984, no governorate should have an electrification rate below 70 percent; that was decided. In addition, no effort will be spared to achieve a 95 percent electrification rate by 1987.

In addition, an emergency program was applied in 1982 to solve the problems of all kinds which may result from drinking water shortages. In the water-supply sector, top priority was given to supplying drinking water to the people throughout the country. As a result, the major concern of officials in this sector was to reduce the considerable discrepancies existing between governorates.

Local drinking water supply programs experienced considerable and decisive changes. Thus, investments for these programs amounted to up to one billion dinars in each of the years 1980 and 1981. This marked trend was also apparent in 1982 and should continue until the end of the Five-Year Plan.

A vast program is now in progress; it includes: the Keddara dam project with a total capacity of 145 million cubic meters, in the Algiers area; the periodic transfer of Hammam Bouziane water (47,500 cubic meters per day) and the construction of the Hammam Grouz dam (16 million cubic meters per year) to be completed in 1984, both of which will supply Constantine; 9 additional wells to tap the Bouteldja water table (17,000 cubic meters per day) and the Mexenna dam project in the Annaba area; and the Djorf Torba water-supply project

Table 1. Development of Social Expenditures (In Billions of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Social Security Operations	4.6	5.4	7.3	8.3
including:				
Insurance	1.2	1.5	1.9	2.2
Family allowances	1.6	1.8	2.3	2.4
Pensions	1.3	1.6	2.2	2.8
State Operations	5.4	6.9	9.3	10.6
including:				
Grants and scholarships	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.7
Mujahedins' pensions	1.2	1.7	2.0	2.7
Price support	1.9	2.3	3.8	4.2
Public Enterprise and Governorate Operations	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Total	11.0	13.5	17.8	20.2
Percentage of Gross Domestic Production	7.9	8.1	9.9	10.2

(Source: ALGERIE ACTUALITE)

Table 2. Electrification Figures

<u>Items</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Results</u>
Length of power lines	1962-1978	9,880 km
	1979	2,270 km
	1980-1982	11,500 km
Centers electrified	Prior to 1979	1,445 centers
	1979	216 centers
	1980-1982	1,411 centers
Households connected	1962-1978	263,000 households
	1979	43,320 households
	1980-1982	219,431 households
Investments (Millions of Dinars)	1979	264
	1980	424
	1981	594
	1982	1,000

(43,500 cubic meters per day) to meet the needs of Bechar and the surrounding area.

Special attention is given today to the water supply in southern urban areas. It is impossible to promote and intensify development in the southern part of the country without that vital resource, water. As a result, the five governorates of Adrar, Bechar, Laghouat, Ouargla and Tamanrasset will benefit from an ambitious drilling program that should guarantee them a consistent water supply making better use of their underground water tables.

A balanced national development is no longer just an idea. For the planner and for the fieldman, it is now a reality which is slowly taking shape. At the highest level, authorities are strongly motivated to achieve this goal. Thus, on 27 June, the Council of Ministers examined and approved a national development plan which revolves around five main lines of action:

- harmonious distribution of the active population throughout the country;
- organization of town planning and urban development;
- optimum mobilization of water resources and increased development of agricultural potentialities;
- protection of the environment in its broadest sense, i.e. in all its social, economic and cultural aspects;
- reformulation of the railroad, road, port and aeronautic infrastructure network.

Breaking the isolation of huge underprivileged areas, opening the door to development and regional balance, these are objectives and principles which can be effectively and efficiently achieved or applied only if there exists a consistent and free-flowing system of communication routes which can also contribute to the penetration of progress and the advancement of the rural world. In passing, let us mention that 60 percent of SNTR's [National Highway Transport Company] activities are oriented toward the southern part of the country.

Crossing the country from east to west through the vast and bare high-plateaux areas, and nearly 1,200 km long, the railroad now under construction will connect Tebessa to Maghnia through Oum-el-Bouaghi, Batna, Barika, M'Sila, Tiaret, Mascara and Sidi Bel Abbès.

Actually, it will provide a backbone for regional development. For that reason, projects located on the High Plateaux will be given priority when financial and material means are allocated. Indeed, these new projects, which will generate jobs in the future, must be judiciously distributed over the national territory and their economic and social impact must be carefully thought out. "If the objectives of the Algerian Revolution are human promotion and equality of all citizens, they will be achieved only if all inequalities of opportunity among Algerian citizens, no matter where they live, are removed," the National Charter clearly states.

The decentralization and restructuring of enterprises have already changed authorities to favor regional realization enterprises. Over 400 regional realization enterprises were created during the first three years of the Five-Year Plan in fields as varied and complementary as building and public works, transportation, water supply, site development, electrification, forestry, engineering and design organizations, etc., so as to better adhere to the requirements of regional balance and local development. In 1982, 155,000 new jobs were created. Also, the government will devote the impressive amount of 71 billion dinars to the creation of 160,000 jobs in 1983. Obviously, these figures are not satisfactory if we compare them to the projected 3 million jobs to be created during the period 1980-1990. All the same, compared with the past 20 years, these are record figures. Overall, the job-creation rate is still higher than the demographic growth rate.

Social Well-Being = Healthy Economy

Vocational training and apprenticeship are also the order of the day. As a result of the prefabricated building program, many vocational training centers were built very rapidly. A commendable initiative: several hundreds of physically handicapped people--most of them spastic or hearing-impaired--were admitted to adult vocational training centers to facilitate their social integration. In addition, 30,000 young people (instead of 40,000 as planned) were placed as apprentices in the entire country. This figure is low, which is understandable since it is the first year. Nevertheless, it seems that the permanent services created along the People's Communal Assembly need to be more strongly motivated.

In the labor world, the social climate improved markedly in several enterprises and production units. As a result, production at certain units increased by 15 to 20 percent. We could mention SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] in Annaba, SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] (battery plant) at Oued Smar, the Rouiba agricultural material unit, the National Metal Company in El-Harrach, the National Steel Company in Reghaia, SONELEC in Tizi-Ouzou, and SONAREM [National Prospecting and Mine Exploitation Company] in Mostaganem. The attempt at broadening the legislative and regulation field initiated by the General Worker Statute is beginning to bear fruit. The creation of minimum overall salary levels, the indexation of salaries on production, the increase in civil service and agricultural salaries, the adjustment and standardization of indemnities for nuisances, assembly-line work and continuous service, the integration of interim and temporary personnel, and finally the workers' sharing in company profits are as many crucial points which the legislature took the trouble to approach in the most appropriate manner in order to provide new impetus to production and productivity and encourage more efficient and sustained development efforts. A healthy economic apparatus is the tacit result of the well-being of the masses.

Similarly, the salaries of 2,400,000 workers were recently increased. That is 80 percent of all workers! They represent 10 percent of the aggregate salaries. A total of 5 billion dinars will considerably improve the purchasing power of

those at the bottom of the social and professional ladder. This measure will also reduce the present salary spread and bring about greater social justice.

This year, close to 4 billion dinars were allocated to support the citizens' purchasing power, whereas our food imports amounted to 11 billion dinars in 1980, the overall importation program amounting to 55 billion dinars. This cannot go on forever; the State cannot go on spending large amounts which are then misappropriated by adventurers and speculators of all kinds at the expense of social stability and the citizens' purchasing power. More still, it goes against the very spirit and ideal of social justice which motivated these financial appropriations in the first place. Is that really a perennial solution that will not endanger the prosperity of future generations?

Did not President Chadli clearly state that "we cannot go on living politically off the glorious martyrs of the Revolution and economically off our energy resources."

If development no longer boils down to a single cold and pure economic dimension, if the government is to make truly large-scale efforts in the social sector, if the State's major concern is for the citizens' legitimate expectations, then the Algerian people must unite and roll up their sleeves to meet the challenge of development. More than just a necessity, it is a prerequisite for our success.

9294
CSO: 4519/126

MUBARAK 1 FEBRUARY ANSWERS TO CANADIAN DEPUTIES

PM071013 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 2 Feb 83 p 3

["Text" of President Husni Mubarak's answers to the questions of Canadian members of parliament during a joint session of the Canadian foreign affairs and defense committee on 1 January in Ottawa]

[Text] Question: In your opinion, what role is there for Canada to play in the Middle East peace process?

Answer: Canada has supported all the peace moves from President al-Sadat's bold initiative, to the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty. Canada supported all these steps, not to mention its position on Jerusalem and other matters. The issue is not restricted to the big powers or the superpowers. I believe that Canada could play an effective role through its numerous friendships in Israel. It could play an important role through public opinion there.

Question: Do you see any encouraging signs regarding suspension of the building of Israeli settlements which are completely in conflict with the call for understanding with the Palestinians?

Answer: The question of settlements has been creating many difficulties since the peace process began. We had an agreement with the United States that all settlement activity would stop. As we know, the building of settlements should have stopped.

Question: Are you optimistic?

Answer: I prefer to say I hope instead of using the word optimistic.

Question: What role is Egypt playing in urging Jordan and the Palestinians to join in the negotiations as a single delegation and on the basis of the Reagan initiative?

Answer: We have been holding contacts with Jordan on the peace process as a whole. These contacts were intensified after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. We have also been holding contacts with the Palestinians, and these contacts also increased after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. We are trying to persuade Jordan

to persevere. Jordan is convinced of the Reagan initiative but the Reagan initiative has only limited time left. This is why we are encouraging Jordan to join the negotiations expeditiously so as not to give the United States any pretext for abandoning its commitment. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, we are awaiting the 15 February meeting of the Palestine National Council [PNC] which is expected to make a decision on this matter. If it does not, the situation would become more complex because we would lose the opportunity available until the end of this year and the problem would become more difficult to tackle because the United States will be preoccupied with the presidential elections.

Question: Some people maintain that one of the obstacles preventing a solution is the refusal of Israel's neighbors to recognize it.

Answer: Israel's neighbors are Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. How could Syria, or any other state, recognize Israel when the latter has been occupying the West Bank for 15 years? We advocate mutual recognition. We in Egypt, for example, recognized Israel after signing a peace treaty with it. We want Israel to treat its neighbors as we have treated Israel. Israel, however, does not want to recognize the Palestinians as people or as a homeland. Can you imagine people without a homeland, without land, without rights and without anything? How could we expect them to be peaceful under these circumstances? Israel is the one in a position to take the first step. Israel exists and nobody can deny this fact, but unless the Palestinian problem is solved, Israel will not be able to establish peace, not even by force. This is my opinion.

Question: Who do you think should take the first step, since simultaneous mutual recognition is difficult in practice? How do you view this matter?

Answer: Israel has declared repeatedly that it would not recognize the organization [PLO] as an organization, but the Arab world considers the organization to be the sole spokesman of all the Palestinians. We would like to see the United States initiate a dialogue with the Palestinians but the United States makes this conditional on a prior recognition of Israel by the organization. The Palestinians consider this to be the only card in their possession. However, an agreement between Jordan and the Palestinians would facilitate commencement of the negotiations.

Question: Do you suggest or support a Jordanian unilateral participation in the negotiations if the Palestinians do not agree on a link with Jordan?

Answer: If the Jordanians manage to join the negotiations without the Palestinians, they could negotiate the recovery of territory on the basis of the conditions which prevailed before 1967, but would the Israelis agree? That is the question.

Question: The population explosion is still a problem in Egypt. What efforts are you making to solve it?

Answer: It is one of our problems but it is not the main problem. Some people consider this massive increase in population to be a national asset if we train and prepare the people and send them abroad, like sending 5 million immigrants to you here in Canada (laughter) for example. We are studying this problem at all levels. We will hold a conference on this subject at the end of July. We have varying views on this issue, as I have said.

Question: Here in Canada, have you encountered obstacles or reluctance to supply you with a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes, similar to those obtained from the United States and France in the past?

Answer: I discussed this matter with the prime minister yesterday and we will resume discussion of such cooperation with Canada.

Question: Mr President, allow me to compliment you on the confidence your answers reflect. My question is: What is your reply to Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin's claim that the Reagan initiative constitutes a departure from Camp David?

Answer: This is an important question because I have indeed heard this from the Israelis. Ever since we signed the treaty with Israel at Camp David we have been trying to solve the entire problem in accordance with Camp David, in accordance with the peace framework we signed at Camp David. Since President al-Sadat passed away Israel has been saying that it would not accept a venue other than Jerusalem for the resumption of the negotiations. We did not agree to that because the status of Jerusalem is still disputed and because all past negotiations were held elsewhere. When the late President al-Sadat met with Menahem Begin in Sharm ash-Shaykh--that was the day the first argument over the venue occurred--Begin promised that the negotiations would continue as before, not in Jerusalem. We mentioned this in our contacts with Menahem Begin and I asked what had happened to make them insist on Jerusalem. I consider this condition to be an excuse used by Israel to prevent the resumption of the negotiations. As far as the Camp David agreement is concerned, it is considered the only document signed by Israel and the only document to which Israel is committed so far. The Reagan initiative announced on 1 September is a development of Camp David not a substitute for it, but they just want to make excuses and pretexts for not negotiating. The words Camp David cause distinct sensitivity in the Arab world. The Reagan initiative does not deviate at all from Camp David but the Israeli Government does not want to solve the problem. It wants the years to pass while they continue to build settlements to create a fait accompli by filling the West Bank with settlements. This is what complicates the issue more than ever before.

Question: What would happen if no solution is found to this problem?

Answer: A failure to solve the Palestinian problem means failure to solve the Middle East problem because the latter is only a result of what happened to the Palestinians. This issue is still unsettled only because Israel denies the Palestinians all their rights.

Question: By legitimate rights do you mean a Palestinian state? If so then it would certainly pose a threat to Israel. What is to guarantee Israel's security when there is an independent Palestinian state on its borders?

Answer: This point was raised when President al-Sadat began negotiating with Israel, but what state can threaten without an army, especially, and more significantly when such a state is linked to Jordan? This is why a link with Jordan means reassurance for Israel. However, I only see peace as the real guarantee of Israel's security. This means solving the problem with the Palestinians instead of denying them their rights. Because of the lack of such a solution, Israel's security has remained unfulfilled for over 30 years.

Question: What is your opinion of the Fes conference resolutions? Is the restoration of unity in the Arab ranks important?

Answer: This is a very delicate question. I will answer it briefly. We Arabs have a habit of agreeing and disagreeing, quarrelling and making up as members of the same family. That is nothing strange. With President al-Sadat's peace initiative we penetrated the entire problem, and Israel had to respond or face a crisis. Had the Palestinians come and joined the Mena House conference, there would have been no problem of Palestinian representation today. We did not attend the Fes conference. Those who attended are the ones responsible for the implementation of their initiative. I wish that they had managed to do something as far as implementation is concerned. It would indeed be wonderful if they could, but how? I would have been able to answer your question if we had attended the Fes conference but, like you, I only read about the resolutions.

Question: To what extent are you suffering from the Arab boycott of Egypt?

Answer: You can see that we are not suffering psychologically or economically. We have economic cooperation with the whole world, including the Arabs. Do not worry about us. (laughter) All it means is that ambassadors are missing here and there.

Question: What advice do you have for Canada?

Answer: Canada is a big and advanced country. It does not need my advice.

Question: Your speech included a call for declaring the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons. What do you mean by the Middle East?

Answer: You know that the Middle East cannot be exactly defined, but we understand it to include the Arab world and some other areas such as Sudan, Somalia and Africa [as published]

Question: How does a declaration making the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons accord with expanding use of nuclear energy and reactors?

Answer: Nuclear energy is legitimate if it is used for peaceful purposes and cannot be diverted to military purposes. The danger lies in what can be diverted to military uses. That is why we signed the Vienna agreement on the nonproliferation of atomic weapons, but Israel has still not signed it.

Question: You have said that the organization [PLO] only holds one card in its hand, namely recognition of Israel, and you have urged mutual recognition. But who should take the first step?

Answer: They should do it simultaneously.

Question: Both the Soviet Union and the United States are supplying the region with arms. How do you view the risk of a major confrontation between them in the Middle East?

Answer: I do not believe that there is a possibility of that happening at present, because the Soviets have no bases in the region, except perhaps in Libya, whereas the United States has bases in the Mediterranean region. What happens is that, when one of the two powers establishes a new base for itself, the other power's main preoccupation becomes that of finding a similar base. This is what creates tension, and this is why we do not allow any bases in our country. As the late President al-Sadat said, we offer only facilities for the sole purpose of helping the Arab and Islamic states when necessary and at their request. This is still our policy. We will not provide bases for anyone, because this would be tantamount to inviting the other power to seek a base nearby. We avoid this kind of tension.

Question: (inaudible) [as published]

Answer: Do you think that when Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin came here, when he was flying over the Pyramids, he told those around him that Jews built them for the Egyptians (the president was joking)?

The Egyptians made up many jokes about this.

Question: Before putting my question I just want to say that I wish we could express ourselves in your language as you express yourself in ours. My question is this: does Egypt believe that there is a role for it to play in ending the Iraqi-Iranian war, or could the Arab League do it? Do you believe that Islamic extremism in Iran constitutes an obstacle in the way of ending this war?

Answer: First of all, we have no diplomatic relations with Iran at present, but if Iran, and Iraq, agreed to our playing such a role, we would be willing to intervene and mediate between them. When we help Iraq we do not help it to invade another state but to defend its international borders. There is nothing we can do at present except urge them to stop the bloodshed and the attrition and to focus their attention instead on their people and their people's progress. War only makes the poor poorer and adds to the wealth of those who supply the arms.

This is true of all wars. As regards the Arab League, we do not currently attend their meetings. They convene and adjourn without results. They contradict themselves. For example, Syria helps Iran. I do not want to state that the others help Iraq, but they are all Arab League members.

Question: In one of your speeches you said that the world spends much more on armament than on combating poverty. Are you prepared to fight poverty?

Answer: We in Egypt are doing everything we can to encourage the peace process so that peace may prevail instead of all these funds spent on armament making the poor states poorer and the rich states richer.

Question: What would happen if a Palestinian state were set up and the Israeli settlements continued to exist on the West Bank?

Answer: What we are hoping and working for now is a state linked to Jordan, not a fully independent state.

CSO: 4500/81

PRIME MINISTER FU'AD MUHYI AL-DIN INTERVIEWED

NC041020 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0840 GMT 4 Feb 83

[Text] Paris, 4 Feb (MENA)--Egyptian Prime Minister Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din has emphasized that the Palestinian issue has been and continues to be among the primary concerns of Egypt, which has offered and is still offering a great deal in this regard.

In an interview with AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI magazine published in Arabic in Paris, the prime minister urged the Arab world to make speedy decisive, firm and unequivocal decisions to confront [Li Muwahahat] U.S. President Ronald Reagan's initiative.

In this regard Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed that once the month of March passes, it will be difficult for the U.S. administration to devote itself to the issue. He said that the result of unsettled stands on the Palestinian issue will be that it will face further complications because if the Arabs miss the train of the Reagan initiative and we enter the whirlpool of the elections, then they will lose a great deal.

In his interview, Dr Fu-ad Muhyi al-Din said: It is necessary that the U.S. administration give us pledges now. Let us immediately tell them that we agree on discussions and dialogue and that it is absolutely unimportant to waste time on secondary issues such as a Jordanian delegation or a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Let us begin the dialogue in one form or another with the other side, that is, the principal side, because what is important is to obtain the land before its landmarks are lost.

In his interview, the prime minister pointed out that recognition of Israel will confront the European world and the United States with their responsibilities.

He emphasized that failure to utilize the next 2 months means more difficulties will be added to the pains the Palestinian people have experienced and are experiencing.

On the aims of President Husni Mubarak's recent visit to Washington within the framework of his current tour, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said: Our moves have one strategy, the president's visits abroad, the reception of leaders in Egypt and

the Egyptian foreign minister's moves in many states of the world all converge on one course and one strategy regarding the Palestinian people's cause, the right to self-determination and the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the area.

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed that Egypt regards Reagan's initiative as a gain whose positive aspects must be utilized and employed during this phase despite the fact that Egypt has observations [mulahazat] about it that can be subject to dialogue and debate in the future.

The prime minister pointed out in this respect that nobody expects the United States to put forward a completely positive plan for it to put forward initiatives that provoke a debate and a dialogue by the Arab side with the other side in the hope of reaching a final plan that is acceptable to the various parties.

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said: I tell the Arabs, leave differences aside, achieve solidarity and hurry. Time might slip by and you might not be able to catch up with it again. I do not mean the Camp David train but the train of solidarity. You can call it a train as you wish. If the Fes train surges forward in a serious and powerful manner, it will achieve results.

I tell the Arabs: Combine the Reagan initiative with the Egyptian-French initiative, the Fes conference initiative and Camp David and reach a solution because all of them have realistic and positive aspects. The important thing is for you to work realistically.

On Arab-Egyptian concerns, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said that the Palestinian issue, the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the Iraq-Iran war are all urgent problems before us. He emphasized that these problems are interlinked in light of a world strategy that has its plans and dimensions and that efforts must be made to solve them according to genuine Arab principles due to the fact that they all form an interlinked question.

On the secret aspects of the Egyptian move regarding the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed in his interview with the AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI magazine that Egypt, since the first minute, made a leading and positive contribution to halt and contain this aggression. He said that this contribution was evident in Egypt's move in the world arena--specifically in the European and U.S. arenas--and in the nonaligned arena. He said that the secret contacts which Egypt carried out have not ceased; the movement of contacts and consultations is still continuing. Contacts with the United States have not ceased for the sake of confronting this aggression in view of the fact that it is the only state that can influence the Israeli decision. The prime minister explained that the Egyptian stand played a role in the declaration of the Reagan initiative after participating in creating a new U.S. public opinion that urged the Reagan administration to formulate the initiative. He said that these achievements have dimensions which we hope to exploit in an effective manner before we miss the train.

On whether the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations will result in the withdrawal of the Israeli forces in light of Egypt's experience in negotiating with Israel, Dr Muhyi al-Din emphasized that the negotiations will be difficult; but, if the Israeli side felt that there is behind Lebanon a supportive Arab state then the negotiations will be fruitful for the Lebanese side. He said that Lebanon will face critical conditions if it is not bolstered by a supportive Arab force.

Regarding Egypt's role on prompting the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon, the prime minister said: We have announced that we will not begin negotiations with Israel before a timetable for an Israeli withdrawal is announced. In this context he affirmed the need for the withdrawal of the other foreign forces from Lebanon to enable its government to regain its sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said: Our policies on Lebanon have been known since the very first day. We have said "raise your hands off Lebanon." This means that we did not support the entry of the Syrian forces into Lebanon--a matter that harms Lebanon more than it serves it.

On whether there is Syrian-Israeli coordination in Lebanon, the prime minister said that this is a strange topic and a long pause is necessary regarding it. A large number of Syrian forces were some meters away from the Israeli forces and no fight took place between them even by mistake. He added that this is a strange matter but the strangeness is eliminated when we take into consideration the factor of coordination.

On Egyptian-Arab relations, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din emphasized that President Husni Mubarak had again revealed Egypt's Arab image when he stressed Egyptian-Arab openness which stems from a historical, hereditary, constitutional depth.

He said that with regard to Arab solidarity and, indeed, objective joint Arab action, what is preoccupying us is how to achieve this; for it is the basis of a solution of the Arab nation's problems on the various levels and it is the way that leads to the achievement of the aims, the aspirations and the future.

He added: Our contacts are strong with all the Arab states with the exception of one state with which we have no contact namely, Syria.

On the reasons for not translating these Egyptian-Arab contacts into diplomatic relations, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed in his interview with the magazine AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that this depends on the wish of the Arab states themselves.

He said that despite the fact that some of them manifest apprehension or reservations, we are open to all.

He pointed out that there is no disappointment about the Arab states' hesitation to resume diplomatic relations but there are anticipated timetables and specific programs in this respect.

Regarding Egypt's relations with Iraq, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said that there are "good relations" between the two countries--that is, if we may use this expression.

He added that Egypt's stand on the Iraqi-Iranian war has been a principled one since the first moment of the war. We have supported Iraq as much as we could.

Replying to a question on the possibility of Egypt's intervention in this war, the prime minister emphasized that there is no intention of sending Egyptian forces to the Iraqi front for strategic reasons.

On the role which Egypt can play to end the war between the two countries, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din said: If our relations with Iran would permit us to mediate, we would have exerted efforts together with those who are making efforts.

He expressed the hope that the mediation endeavors that are being made by various sides would intensify in order to halt the bloodshed which is not in the interest of either the Arab and Islamic nation or the area's security.

He asserted in this respect that a well-balanced rational stand must be taken to end this war which has been going on for over 2 years and is exhausting the two countries.

On whether Camp David was responsible for the current Arab divisions, the prime minister said: Camp David did not lead us to these divisions, on the contrary. He added: There are many in the Arab world today who are well aware that the only solution the Arab nation has been able to achieve has been Camp David since all Sinai has been returned to Egypt, Tabah will soon be returned and then there is autonomy.

Dr Muhyi al-Din was asked whether there was an alternative now before Egypt that it is not attempting to achieve with the Arab nation. He said: What has been regrettably put forward has been slogans and oral oneupmanship--a perturbing matter.

In his interview the prime minister welcomed PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to visit Cairo any time he wishes. He said: 'Arafat does not need an invitation for he is welcome and Egypt is his country.

Replying to a question on the possibility of 'Arafat visiting Cairo not by way of the government but "at the invitation of an opposition party, for example," Dr Fu'ad Myhyi al-Din affirmed that the logic is that 'Arafat visits Cairo officially and the government must have priority concerning the visit before any other party, even if it were the ruling majority party.

In his interview with AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI magazine, the prime minister referred to 'Arafat's recent meeting with three Israeli personalities. He said that the real effect will be achieved through an official meeting between the PLO and Israel.

On whether the idea of a Palestinian government in exile still stood, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din explained that the idea was put forward at a certain period but that it is not put forward now either by the Palestinian side or by any other side.

Regarding Egypt's relations with the two major powers and what had been reiterated recently on the reduction of U.S. aid to Egypt, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed that the United States did not reduce its aid, not even one dollar, but on the contrary military aid to Egypt was increased last year. He added that diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union still exists despite the withdrawal of the two ambassadors from both countries and he said that the charge d'affaires of both countries were still in them. He added that there was no problem and that there were no current contacts aimed at returning the ambassadors.

Replying to a question on Egyptian-Israeli relations today, the prime minister explained that relations have not been frozen between them although tourism and the economic sector were affected after the Israeli aggression on Lebanon and the Sabra and Shatila massacres. He added that the aggression had created a kind of psychological condition which contributed toward the nonactivation of relations in the manner which was expected when these relations began. He indicated that Cairo linked the return of the Egyptian ambassador to a timetable that fixed an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Replying to a question on opening the files on corruption in Egypt and the trial of 'Isamat al-Sadat and his family, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din affirmed that the subject has no political background.

He said: The information that has reached us in this connection was not known in the past. When the people submitted complaints, these were investigated and the information was confirmed. Therefore, it was not possible to keep quiet about it.

Asked whether Arab governmental funds will contribute to the Egyptian 5-year [development] plan, the prime minister emphasized that the Arab states are not paying even one piaster. He added: We have not asked and will not ask for anything.

CSO: 4500/81

MINERALS, TECHNOLOGY DISCUSSED IN GDR MINISTER'S TRADE TALKS

Soelle Arrives

NC040712 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2240 GMT 4 Feb 83

[Text] Cairo, 4 Feb (MENA)--GDR Foreign Trade Minister Horst Soelle this evening arrived in Cairo at the head of a delegation for a 4-day visit to Egypt.

Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, who met the GDR minister at the airport, stated that he will hold talks with Soelle on the possibility of increasing the volume of Egyptian exports to the GDR.

He said that the discussions will also deal with the possibility of exporting new kinds of Egyptian commodities and products for the purpose of creating a new market for them in the GDR. Agreement will also be reached on all the aspects of trade cooperation and on the exchange of expertise and products between the two countries.

Trade Relations Promoted

NC051336 Cairo MENA in English 1200 GMT 5 Feb 83

[Text] Cairo, 5 Feb (MENA)--Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Dr Musafa al-Sa'id conferred today with visiting East German Minister of Foreign Trade Horst Soelle and his accompanying delegation on means of promoting bilateral trade relations.

The two sides agreed to form a technical committee to lay down the appropriate framework for developing relations between Egypt and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The volume of trade between the two countries amounted to 62 million pounds in 1982. The main Egyptian exports to East Germany are cotton, textiles, rice, citrus fruit and medical herbs, while newsprint, equipment and machines are among the main GDR exports to Egypt.

The visiting delegation had arrived here yesterday on a four-day visit to Egypt for talks with a number of economy officials.

Minister Ends Visit

NC071024 Cairo MENA in English 0910 GMT 7 Feb 83

[Text] Cairo, 7 Feb (MENA)--Horst Soelle, minister of foreign trade in the German Democratic Republic, left here this morning for home, winding up this four-day visit to Egypt.

He had talks with Industry and Mineral Wealth Minister Fu'ad Abu Zaghlal on the possibility of consolidating technical cooperation between Egypt and the GDR in the fields of industry and mineral wealth.

The talks have also covered the German contribution to a number of the five-year plan projects, the German Government's participation in conveying industrial technology to be used in Egypt.

The talks have, as well, covered means of holding training programmes for Egyptian technicians working in the joint industrial ventures, in addition to increasing the volume of Egyptian exports to Germany.

The minister was seen off at the airport by Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id and staff of the GDR Embassy in Cairo.

CSO: 4500/81

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AL-BAZ

JN051930 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1720 GMT 5 Feb 83

[Interview with Dr Usamah al-Baz, Egyptian Foreign Ministry first undersecretary and director of the president's office for political affairs, by Radio Monte Carlo correspondent Huda Taqfiq; place and date not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Dr al-Baz: You have followed the president's visits to the various capitals, including the United States. As you said, the Lebanon issue, the Middle East and the Palestinian issue were the main topics of discussion. Has a new attitude emerged with regard to the question of the handling of the Lebanon issue?

[Answer] The new factor which has now surfaced is that the U.S. administration and the leaders of Canada, the United Kingdom and France are convinced of the importance of the time factor. We, however, should not forget that the local circumstances in the Middle East are still the same as before the visit. But the leaders of these states are convinced of the need to accelerate the achievement of a solution to the situation as soon as possible, because the situation is ceaselessly deteriorating and increasingly aggravating. Therefore, there should be a decisive stand to ensure an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and a commencement of negotiations over the Palestinian issues. The United States is supposed to be basically concerned with this stand. This stand should, however, not be confined to the United States, but the European countries should have their role in this stand, because these countries are concerned with the Middle East situation and are aware of the history of the conflict and of the nature of the situation. These countries are also aware of the fact that the repercussions of any tension in the region would affect the security and stability in Europe.

[Question] In light of the frank talks you have had, what way is there that can possibly end the deadlock facing the Lebanese negotiations?

[Answer] There must be a more active U.S. position to end this deadlock. The United States must present ideas to bridge the wide gap between the Lebanese and Israeli positions, because Israel is making impossible demands, knowing in advance that these are unacceptable to the Lebanese side. Now that the positions of the two sides have become well known, it is imperative for the U.S. side to make a move and present U.S. proposals to narrow this gap and achieve

an equitable formula that would end the state of war between the two countries, would ensure security for both of them and not for one side only, and would guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty and the power of the Lebanese legitimate authority to practice its responsibilities throughout Lebanon without any Israeli intervention.

[Question] In an interview with British Television--in which you also participated--Yitzhaq Moda'i' claimed that Lebanon is incapable of defending itself or of ensuring Israel's security.

[Answer] This is a false pretext. Lebanon could handle all this if it were left alone. It is the foreign intervention and its repercussions that prevent Lebanon and the legitimate authority from discharging its tasks and safeguarding Lebanon's security and stability. Over the years circumstances have confirmed that foreign and external interventions have been the source of tension. However, we believe that Lebanon, if it were left alone, would be capable of maintaining security and stability and of fulfilling its international commitments toward all neighboring countries, both on the political and military levels. As for the political standpoint, all political functionaries in Lebanon are fully convinced of the need to create an atmosphere of stability and security throughout Lebanon and of [words indistinct] Militarily, we believe that the Lebanese army is capable of discharging all these tasks especially if the friendly states support the Lebanese military capabilities.

[Question] Concerning the Palestinian problem, we think that the Palestine National Council is the focus of attention now. Can we also believe that Yasir 'Arafat can control the situation?

[Answer] The issue is not controlling the situation but a Palestinian insistence to continue moving and not to freeze. We think that the majority of the Palestinian brothers are of the view that such a freeze should not be allowed because Israel's demands will escalate and the Arab position will deteriorate. The building of settlements will continue in every area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The settlements now number 134, and are spreading like cancer in all these territories. It is not in the national or pan-Arab interests of the Palestinians to continue this situation. The best way of confronting this is to face Israel at the negotiations table with its responsibility, with the illegal nature of its actions and with the need to stop any settlement activities.

[Question] What is the U.S. views concerning the composition of the delegation to the negotiations?

[Answer] The issue does not concern the U.S. views alone; there is the Arab desire to reckon with. We believe that Palestinian participation will be necessary. And since the current circumstances do not allow independent Palestinian participation in the negotiations--this may also be preferred by the Palestinian participation within the Jordanian delegation. This does not mean that Palestine should negotiate through Jordan but that there should be a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation; that this delegation will present a unified Arab demand. In this case, there will be two Arab delegations: the first, joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and the other an Egyptian delegation. The two delegations will work in complete coordination to put the Arab position at its strongest point.

[Question] We heard Douglas Hurd ask in London: A Jordanian delegation supported by the PLO?

[Answer] We think that there must be active Palestinian participation and not mere Palestinian support or inherent participation. We think that there is no Arab side which can be authorized by the Palestinian people to speak in their name. Thus, Egypt has always refused to talk in the name of the Palestinian people. There must be active Palestinian participation through Palestinians who can express the Palestinian position directly.

[Question] How can we view the priorities of the future moves?

[Answer] In our view the priorities come in the following manner:

First, we must reach a consensus of views among the various Palestinian groups so that a stand can be reached which represents the mainstream of the Palestinian people. Then comes the formula through which the Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement or coordination may be expressed. We must know what such a formula will be like. The United States must then obtain an Israeli promise to stop the Israeli settlement activities. These activities must stop. Then, negotiations may start on establishing a provisional or phased rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip preparatory to entering a new phase of negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

[Question] You said that the United States is confident that it can bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli and other forces from Lebanon. On what basis has the United States built this confidence?

[Answer] On the basis of the U.S. contacts with the Israeli Government. Israel has always assured the United States that it has no expansionist ambitions in Lebanon, and hence, Israel's demands will be confined to obtaining certain security guarantees or arrangements. Since Israel cannot claim to have territorial ambitions there, its withdrawal from Lebanon will be inevitable. All its needs is something in exchange for this withdrawal. We have repeatedly made it clear to the U.S. side that this something cannot be defined by Israel but through negotiations and within the limits agreed on by the Lebanese people.

There are specific limits that could be acceptable or unacceptable to the Lebanese people. We believe that it would be possible to draw up an agreement to end the state of war, to guarantee specific security arrangements and to begin a peace process between the two neighbors without both reaching a complete normalization of relations, because this usually comes in stages. It must be made clear that the Israeli presence should not continue in Lebanon after the withdrawal.

[Question] Dr Usamah: At a time when the United States is saying that it will obtain an undertaking from Israel regarding the freezing of settlements, we heard Begin say that the settlements are vital for Israel and that Israel will not freeze the settlements.

[Answer] The United States is saying that it will try and do its utmost to obtain such an undertaking. The United States, however, cannot specify in advance whether it can obtain this undertaking. The United States believes that there

can be no progress in the situation unless Israel agrees to that. But as for the Israeli prime minister's statement which gives the Israeli traditional position that rejects any restrictions on the Israeli will to plant settlements on the Palestinian soil, this is something expected in advance. We do not expect the Israeli prime minister to submit to the U.S. right or to the Arab right to impose an undertaking on Israel not to build settlements. This is a difficult matter that needs much effort on the U.S. part. These U.S. efforts should be supported by the Arabs.

[Question] Dr al-Baz: President Husni Mubarak has received messages from Jordan, the PLO and Lebanon. Can we expect him to hold contacts with these sides after his talks?

[Answer] Actually, President Mubarak is acquainting many Arab sides with the outcome of his talks. We did not receive message directly from the PLO before the visit. The president did actually receive messages from His Majesty King Husayn of Jordan and Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil.

It is natural for the president to brief the Arab leaders, with whom he has contacts, on the outcome of his talks. This will take place within the next few days.

[Question] Will he send envoys?

[Answer] It has not yet been decided whether this will take place through envoys or through messages.

[Interviewer] Thank you.

CSO: 4500/81

EGYPT

BRIEFS

MESSAGE TO SOMALI--Cairo, 5 Feb (MENA)--Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Butrus Ghali tonight met with Somali ambassador in Cairo, Hussein Hasan Farah. Dr Ghali conveyed to him an oral message from President Husni Mubarak to Somali President Siad Barre. [Text] [NC052034 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2005 GMT 5 Feb 83]

'MAY' EDITOR DISMISSED--People's Assembly speaker Dr Sufi Abu Talib has withdrawn his resignation after the ruling [National Democratic] Party complied with his request to dismiss Ibrahim Sa'dah, chief editor of the weekly MAY, from his post because of his articles in which he criticized Dr Sufi Abu Talib and described him as "unbalanced" [al-mahzuz]. A few days ago Ibrahim Sa'dah had complained to authorities in the ruling party and the government that he was no longer able to carry out his journalistic work in the party paper because of the ruling party's contradictory policies and guidelines. He said that sometimes the paper is given instructions to attack the left or the opposition in general and the following day it receives instructions to the contrary. Sabri Abu al-Majd has been chosen to be the chief editor of the newspaper MAY after Salah Muntasir, managing editor of AL-AHRAM, declined the post. Certain "circles" of the ruling party proposed the appointment of Ibrahim al-Wardani or Tharwat Abazah but the proposal was turned down by officials. [Text] [PM041341 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 26 Jan 83 p 1]

INDIAN COMMANDER VISITS--The commander of the Indian Air Force left Cairo today at the conclusion of a visit to Egypt lasting several days. The Indian visitor and delegation accompanying him called on air force commander Maj Gen Muhammad 'abd al-Hamid Hilmi. They also visited some air force bases and some instruction installations in the air force. [Text] [NC062012 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 6 Feb 83]

FINNISH FOREIGN OFFICIAL--Cairo, 5 Feb (MENA)--Doctor Butrus Ghali, state minister for foreign affairs, discussed today with Richard Mueller, director of the political department at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the situation in the Middle East in the light of results of the talks of President Husni Mubarak in the United States, Canada, Britain and France. They also discussed the conditions of the nonaligned movement in the light of results of meetings of the nonaligned coordination bureau held recently in Nicaragua. Preparation of the nonaligned summit to be held in New Delhi on March 7 were also discussed. [Text] [NC051558 Cairo MENA in English 1523 GMT 5 Feb 83]

CSO: 4500/81

ENERGY NEEDS PREDICTED TO BE 80 PERCENT MET BY YEAR 2000

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 26 Nov 82 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Energy Sources"]

[Text] The existence of interdependence between the energy sector and the various branches of the economy is an undeniable fact.

Since the beginning of the century, consumption of primary energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric power) has undergone a prodigious growth.

In 1980, world energy consumption reached 6.95 billion TEP (oil equivalent tons) against 6.78 billion TEP in 1978. Consumption these days is characterized by a preponderance of oil products (45 percent), coal (28 percent), gas (24 percent), and the rest is made up essentially of hydroelectric and nuclear energy.

In Morocco, total energy consumption presently exceeds 4.6 million TEP: oil products make up an approximately 83 percent share, coal 9 percent, and hydroelectric power 8 percent on average.

The cost of imported energy products has risen from 3,961,186,000 dirhams in 1980 to 6,124,352,000 dirhams in 1981, which is an increase of 54.5 percent.

Taking into account the impact of crude oil imports on the balance of trade and the necessity of autonomy in energy product supplies, Morocco has implemented an energy policy based on eight lines of development:

- The equipment of the existing hydroelectric power potential

- Intensification of oil and gas prospection

- Development

- Increased extraction of solid fuels: coal, uranium, lignite

- The introduction of nuclear energy

The development of renewable energies

The rationalization of energy consumption and encouragement toward energy saving.

Rural electrification.

If the necessary means are put to work in good time, this national energy plan should make 83 percent energy independence feasible by the year 2000.

Oil Prospection

The search for hydrocarbons in Morocco goes back to the start of the century, indeed, almost non-existent until 1928. It was not until 1929 that oil prospecting produced the discovery of two traces of oil during drilling operations at Djbel Tselfat and Ain el-Hamra in the Gharb.

The drilling program that ran from its start in 1947 until 1956 resulted in the discovery of the Oued Béhi field, made up of small deposits all along the oued [wadi]. This field, now running out, has already produced 1.3 million tons.

In 1957, SCP [Moroccan Petroleum Company]'s efforts to extend its activity into the west central part of Morocco were rewarded by the discovery of oil and [as published] Haricha in the foothills of the Rif.

In 1975, oil prospecting experienced a renewed impetus through the achievement of medium depth wells, which permitted the discovery of gas and sometimes condensates, although in very small quantities, in the Jurassic layers. And it was not until 1981 that the discovery of the most important field took place: the one at Essaouira. The latter is still being subjected to thorough study, as are the fields at Fechoula, northeast of Meskala, Jeer, southeast of Meskala, Sidi Ghalem, and Toukimt, of which the reserves amount to 660 million cubic meters of gas.

Among the sedimentary basins prospected so far may also be mentioned the Gharb basin. Indeed, in addition to the Sidi Kacem deposits, of which the oil is now exhausted, it is worth mentioning the fields at Douar Jaber and Ksiri, which are now producing between 30 and 35 million cubic meters of gas, as well as the sandy, gas-saturated layers discovered in 1980-1981.

As a result of the interesting discoveries in the Eassaouira basin, a drilling program at Meskala was designed with a view to a better knowledge of this basin and a more precise definition of the field and its resources, particularly, [words omitted] already executed.

The definite reserves already revealed by the exploratory wells alone amount to 4.3 billion cubic meters of gas and 1.2 million cubic meters of oil.

It is to be noted in this connection that if the wells planned for the next 2 years show the same characteristics as the wells already drilled, the probable reserves would amount to about 15 billion cubic meters of gas, or the

equivalent of 15 million tons of oil. In addition, taking into account the entire area of the basin, which amounts to 300 square kilometers, estimates of the overall reserves may be assumed to be 420 billion cubic meters of gas and 130 million tons of oil.

Besides the time factor, this requires important financial resources, which thus far have proven inadequate in comparison with those provided for the same area by other countries finding themselves in the same situation, such as France, Tunisia, Spain, and Italy. That is why Morocco is appealing for foreign loans and international cooperation. To this end, the World Bank in 1980 granted a loan of 50 million dollars intended to fund the oil prospecting program and the completion of 17 wells and 3,400 kilometers of seismic [words omitted]

Additional negotiations are under way, on the one hand with the World Bank, for a second loan of 117 million dollars intended for the purchase of equipment and the drilling of additional wells, including two for the expansion of the reservoir, and on the other hand, with international companies working in oil research, especially the ESSO [Standard Oil], Albion, Union, Texas, CONOCO [Continental Oil], TEXACO [Texas Oil], Total, and WAINOCO [expansion unknown] companies.

Thus, contacts have already been initiated with the Kuwaiti company [as published] for the completion of 10 wells in the Estaouira and Doukkara basins, the high plateaus, and boudnib [translation unknown].

It appears from the results of the research performed so far that the expenditures made up to this time are a sure way of bringing oil exploration to a successful conclusion, both off-shore and on-shore, especially in the Rif and its foothills, the high plateaus, west central Morocco, the southern Atlantic trench, and the Saharan provinces.

Coal

Coal is destined to play a predominant role in meeting the world's energy needs for decades to come.

This conviction regarding the revival of coal has been acutely felt throughout the world ever since the second oil crisis. The future of this substance beyond the next two decades, during which it is destined for an important rise, is all the more certain in that it resides in improvement over its traditional use. Liquefying and gasification techniques are well known these days.

With an output of nearly 3 billion tons, coal supplied a little over 25 percent of the energy consumed throughout the world in 1980.

It can supply between half and two-thirds of mankind's future needs during the next three decades. Coal production will then be increased 2.5 to 3 times over the same period. About 60 percent of the present coal output is used in thermic power stations, 20 percent for the production of industrial value, and the remaining 20 percent in iron and steel working.

With regard to trade, in 1980 trade in coal amounted to only 10 percent of that in oil. By horizon 2000, according to a report published under the sponsorship of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), production will reach 9 billion tons and exports 2 to 3 billion tons.

Solid energy substances, such as coal and lignite, in particular, deserve particular attention considering the impact that development of the nation's potential in the various substances might have on the country's energy future.

Indeed, the only field being operated in North Africa is situated in the Northeast of the country, 60 kilometers southwest of Oujda. It is a vast synclinorium that extends for 25 kilometers from North to South, in a roughly East-West band 4 kilometers wide. The sides are vertical with sharply inclined strata, whereas the northern slopes are plateaus with shallow fissures.

Jerada coal is an anthracite with the following specifications:

4 to 7 percent volatile substances

4 to 7 percent ash

Up to 1.6 percent sulphur, a PCI [lower heat Capacity] on the order of 8,000 kilogram calories.

The productive seam comprises three layers, A, B, and C, of 40 to 60 centimeters for layers A and C, and 70 to 90 centimeters for layer B.

The geological resources evaluated for this field vary from 162.3 million tons, according to the most optimistic calculations, to 78.8 million tons according to the most pessimistic of estimates. Exploitable reserves are estimated at 80 percent of geological reserves.

Production has gradually developed, rising from 15,000 tons in 1932 to 414,000 tons in 1974, 710,000 tons in 1979, and 680,000 in 1980, with a peak of 720,000 tons in 1978.

Despite the difficulties of the site, the basic yield has exceeded 1,000 kgHP [kilogram horse power]; however, these yields are still relatively low compared to those of European mines, because of the problematic configuration of the field and the reliability of the ore.

The mine workforce exceeded 6,000 workmen in 1980.

Jerada's output consists of 80 percent of fine coal destined to supply the Jerada thermic power station, which provides 30 percent of the nation's electricity, while grades 6-10 and 10-80 are destined respectively for certain sugar refineries and domestic heating, with an annual consumption of about 50,000 tons.

As for exports: they have been 89,485.7 tons, worth 5,370,099 dirhams, or nearly 12 percent of output; our main customers being Tunisia, Romania, England, Italy, and Belgium.

Today mining has become more than ever a necessity for the improvement of both production and productivity. To achieve this, a chopping machine was installed in October 1981 to assure, under normal operating conditions, an output of 120,000 tons a year, and thus bring the basic yield toward the end of the present program: 1,450 kg-hp, or an increase of 34 percent compared to 1981.

The goal of the CDM [Credit Bank of Morocco] being to assure an output of 1 million tons at the end of the present five-year plan [as published].

In addition, in its development plan, the CDM is anticipating a gradual mechanization of coal extraction, both on the slopes and on the plateaus, as well as the opening of a new site, site 6, to the west of site 5, located 5 kilometers from the Hassibla pit-head, for an additional output of 1 million tons around 1990, which of itself creates new jobs. This mechanization will also make it possible to improve working and safety conditions, and to assure a better yield.

Despite all these efforts, the nation's coal production is still very inadequate in terms of the country's constantly growing energy needs. Indeed, imports for the nation's industry will amount, according to the ONE [National Electricity Office], to 780,000 tons in 1984 and 880,000 tons in 1986, and for the cementworks, in the event of full reconversion, to 700,000 tons.

At present coal prices (62 to 100 dollars a ton), the gains in foreign currencies and the yearly savings that may result for us on coal imports amount to 15 to 40 percent of our oil expenditures.

Thus to further increase Moroccan coal production, a plan for prospecting for additional coal fields in promising zones has been implemented; it concerns in particular the high plateaus, the Draâ valley, and the Tindouf basin, where potential deposits, according to the recent geological studies, exist at depths exceeding 600 meters greater than the one at Jerada.

At the same time as the outlays made for the development of the Jerada mine and the prospecting, other efforts have been made to broaden the field of cooperation with the specialized institutions that have the technical and technological capabilities of a level to help Morocco achieve its goals in this field; thus, besides the countries with which our country has strengthened cooperation in this domain, such as France, Romania, Poland, and Belgium, the World Bank has been made aware of projects in this area. Contacts have been established for this purpose, to define actions for a possible participation by this institution.

Lignite

Although they have been modest, the outlays made for prospection for this material have made it possible to uncover a deposit of 65 million tons in the Fez region. However, the reserves in the west N'ja, its low thermal power, and the anticipated cost price per ton of lignite extracted currently permit anticipation only of a limited capacity project resulting in a non-competitive cost price per kilowatt-hour. For that reason, it has been recommended that a more thorough study of this field be made, for a better

evaluation of the reserves, on the one hand, and on the other, to bring up to date the feasibility study on a power station of appropriate size, and finally, systematic prospecting for lignite will be carried out in other favorable regions.

12149

CSO: 4519/97

SUDANESE-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION

Khartoum SUNA in English No 4370, 14 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] Khartoum, Jan. 14 (SUNA)--In a speedy response to implement what have been agreed upon during Vice-President Joseph Lagu's recent visit to Egypt, a delegation from the Egyptian Engineering Corps arrived here yesterday, SUNA learned.

Vice-President Joseph Lagu will leave next Sunday for the Southern Region accompanied by the Commissioner-General of the Jonglei Canal projects James Agith, the Egyptian Ambassador H.E. Ahmad 'Izzat Abd-al-Latif and the visiting delegation.

They will first visit the proposed site of a bridge on River Sobat, Upper Nile Province, which the Egyptian Armed Forces would construct. They will also visit, same day, the Jonglei Canal site before arriving Juba.

On Monday, the Vice-President and the accompanying delegation will proceed by cars to Nimule to see the sites of hospital and a guesthouse which the Egyptian Armed Forces intend to construct therein.

On Tuesday morning, they will leave Nimule for Juba again to see a site for the proposed Port Said hotel, which the Arab Contractors Co. will construct.

Lagu and the accompanying delegation will return to Khartoum next Wednesday.

It is worth noting that Egyptian Deputy Premier and Defence Minister Field-Marshal Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu-Ghazalah has ordered the immediate move of the delegation to the Sudan.

Furthermore, Lagu received at his office yesterday morning the Egyptian Ambassador H.E. Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Latif who discussed with him the arrangements for the proposed visit to the Southern Region.

CSO: 4500/77

DOMESTIC SITUATION EXAMINED

London ARABIA in English No 17, Jan 83 pp 47-48

[Text]

Scenes of student protest are now very familiar to Sudanese. Since 1969, students have regularly taken to the streets of Khartoum and the other major cities to demonstrate against the rule of Jaafar Numeiri. The regime has weathered these recurrent protests, just as it has survived no less than four armed insurrections – including a communist coup attempt in which the rebels held the capital for three days.

Last November's student protests were comparatively muted. They were limited to the capital, whereas last January's demonstrations mobilised students from every educational institution in the Northern Region. The protesters ranged from university students to seven-year-old pupils, in even remote villages. This time, significantly, Khartoum university remained calm – despite the hundreds of schoolboys who tried to incite their elder brothers to join the protest.

The government countered quickly with its by now standard response of closing the schools, but the protest's causes were hardly exorcised by this simple gesture. Officially, the closures were because the already chaotic public transport system had ground to a standstill as Khartoum's petrol supplies ran out.

Petrol is now rationed to one gallon a day. The government has even forbidden motorists to queue at petrol stations before 4 pm, so that state employees will not be tempted to leave work early to make sure of their ration.

The 31 per cent devaluation of the Sudanese pound was at the behest of the IMF, which also advocated a 40 per cent cut in public spending and the ending of all subsidies, notably those on petrol, sugar and flour. Last June, the IMF withdrew its support for the debt rescheduling agreement reached earlier in 1982, after Sudan had fallen \$32m behind on interest payments on rescheduled debts.

The fund suspended its standby credit, which was necessary to meet further repayments, and thus the country found itself with debt-service obligations of \$1bn and less than

Sudanese £40m of foreign reserves in June.

The basis of the austerity measures brought in to dampen imports and stimulate exports, however, has already been questioned. A gallon of petrol sells on the black market at between S£5 (in Khartoum) and S£20 (in the Southern Region), against the official price of S£2. No price increase is likely to reduce consumption, since it is already so severely rationed: a gallon a day is scarcely enough to take a motorist to work and back, let alone allow the commercial use of vehicles.

Petrol is the main item on Sudan's import bill. Demand for imported cars, which are very expensive, is inelastic. Many Sudanese economists are now worried that the devaluation will hit domestic growth rates before it stimulates export sales, and that the imports bill will soar along with the domestic cost of debt servicing. Sudan, they say, already exports all it can.

Rumours of an impending devaluation sent the dollar rocketing to S£1.60 and then S£1.80 in early November. Now it sells for S£2.10 on the official free market, compared with the government's S£1.30 price.

As regards the rest of the IMF package, no one knows where the 40 per cent cut in public expenditure can be made. Most government spending has been either in the productive sectors or in health and education, which are already squeezed.

The country's prospects are therefore bleak. The slow over repayments has already revealed that Sudan's foreign debt is nearer \$8bn than the previously declared \$5.3bn. The chaos in Sudan's credit arrangements is such that not even the central bank really knows how much Sudan now owes.

Meanwhile, the Numeiri government's firm hold on power is due less to positive support than to the poor standing of a divided and discredited opposition. No changes or reforms in government structure can be expected before the regime realises the urgency of the fight against corruption and enlists popular support. So the slide continues.

BRIEFS

DRAINAGE PROJECT--Medani, Jan. 13 (SUNA)--Experts from a Federal German Company specialized in construction of drainage arrives here during this month to study Wad Madeni tow drainage project and prepare a model map of the town, SUNA learned. An agreement has recently been concluded between the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the said company for execution of the project. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4369, 13 Jan 83 p 3]

COORDINATION COMMITTEE SUGGESTED--Khartoum, Jan. 13, (SUNA)--National Information and Guidance Minister Dr Muhammad 'Uthman Abu-Saq yesterday discussed with members of the Sudanese Businessmen Association and the mass media leaderships possible means for coordination between the Association and the mass media, SUNA learned. President of the Association Fath-al-Rahman al-Bashir said relations between the mass media and the association had always been cordial except for very little misconception about the private sector. He said 99% of investments during the past decade were made by the association with the aim of achieving development while foreign investments only counted for 1% and aimed exclusively at profit-making. Some leaderships of the mass media said relations between the association and the mass media were less than satisfactory due to lack of information. They proposed the formation of a joint committee to help provide data and statistical information. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4369, 13 Jan 83 p 3]

BUSINESS, MASS MEDIA--Commenting on the speakers view points, Dr Abu-Saq expressed the ministry's readiness to respond positively to achieve the desired cooperation. He announced the formation of a coordinating committee to be chaired by SUNA General Manager Mustafa Amin. The committee would work out plausible foundations to realize coordination between the association and the mass media, said Dr Abu-Saq. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4369, 13 Jan 83 p 4]

RAILWAYS MODERNIZATION--Atbara, Jan 13 (SUNA)--Board Chairman and Director-General of the Railway Corporation Engineer Muhammad Abd-ul-Rahman Wasfi met yesterday with a visiting delegation of the Indian Railway Company for Technical and Economic services, SUNA learned. Wasfi told SUNA after the meeting that he had discussed with the delegation the company's proposals for reorganization of Sudan Railways, modernization of its equipment and introduction of modern technology for maintenance of locomotives and rails. He added that the delegation had agreed to train twenty of the Corporation's personnel in

the Indian training centres at the expense of India. The visiting delegation arrived in Atbarah yesterday on a one-day visit where he met with the Corporation's Deputy Director General and the Administrative Director for Planning and Economic researches. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4369, 13 Jan 83 p 4]

ECONOMIC COOPERATION DISCUSSED--Khartoum, Jan. 13 (SUNA)--Meetings of the 27th session of the Arab countries' Chambers of Commerce, Industry and agriculture hosted by the Sudanese Businessmen Association under the auspices of President Numayri will be held here February 4-9, SUNA learned. Chairman of the Sudanese Businessmen Association Fath-al-Rahman al-Bashir declared in press statements that those meetings, which will be attended by more than 200 members representing all the Arab countries, organizations and economic associations and the Arab League, will discuss a number of topics including the actual Arab economic cooperation during the past period, modernization of the Agricultural Sector in the Arab countries, importance of Arab agricultural integration and means of realizing it. The meetings will also discuss promotion of the Arab Stock markets and its role in encouraging the circulation of Arab moneys and the role of the Arab Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the Arab Social life in addition to metal industry and its role in realizing Arab economic integration beside ways of promoting the financial and administrative means in the Arab nation, al-Bashir said. By hosting these meetings the Sudan will gain much, especially in the economic, investment and political fields, al-Bashir said adding that invitations to the meetings had also been extended to Arab businessmen and investors for discussion of mutual cooperation. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4369, 13 Jan 83 p 6]

NILE BASIN PROJECT--Khartoum, Jan. 14, (SUNA)--State Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture Sughayrun al-Zayn was back here Wednesday from Kinshasha where he and Egyptian Irrigation Minister Abdel-Hadi Samahah held talks with Zairean officials on the Nile basin hydrological survey project. The talks which lasted from Jan. 7-11 included consolidation of technical cooperation between Sudan, Egypt and Zaire plus bolstering relations with all other Nile basin states. Zaire expressed keenness to be active member of the project and affirmed that her concern for the project stems from the principles proclaimed by Badlouite declaration signed June 7th, 1981 when the presidents of Sudan, Zaire and Uganda agreed to hold a summit to discuss the establishing of an organization for the exploitation of the Nile resources. The Sudanese, Egyptian and Zairean sides agreed to hold a ministerial conference of the Nile Basin states to prepare for a summit meeting which will be preceded by meetings of experts to prepare the studies and working papers needed. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4370, 14 Jan 83 p 1]

INTEGRATION PROJECTS--Khartoum, Jan. 14, (SUNA)--First Vice-President Major-General 'Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib received at his office yesterday the visiting Egyptian Higher Education Affairs delegation. The meeting discussed the assistance Egypt is extending to the Sudan in the fields of education as well as integration between the Sudanese and Egyptian Universities and higher institutes. Furthermore, Education and Guidance Minister Dr 'Uthman Sayyid Ahmad, who attended the meeting, told SUNA that a meeting is scheduled to be convened in Cairo next February to discuss the affairs of research and scientific integration between the universities of the two countries. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4370, 14 Jan 83 p 2]

AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION--Khartoum, Jan. 19 (SUNA)--A Committee assigned for modernizing the irrigated agricultural sector has started assessing the modernization programme. The modernization programme includes the Gezira project and the Blue Nile, the White Nile and New Halfa Corporations. The programme started at two stages in May 1980, and in July 1981. The first stage, the cost of which had amounted to \$76 millions, is about to be completed, but the implementation of the second stage is due to continue for five years. It is cost estimated at \$620 millions. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4375, 19 Jan 83 p 2]

EGYPT VISIT--Khartoum, Jan 16 (SUNA)--Transport and Communication Minister Khalid Hasan 'Abbas leaves here this morning for Cairo on a five-day visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt. In a statement to SUNA, 'Abbas said that he would conduct talks in Cairo with his Egyptian counterpart Sulayman Mutawalli on means of promoting the activity of the Nile Valley River Transport Corporation, a joint venture established in 1976 for the transportation of passengers and cargo between Wadi Halfa and the High Dam. He added that they would also review implementation of the recommendations adopted by the 8th meeting of the Joint Technical Committee for Transport and Communications, convened in Cairo during the period 8-11 of last May, which include the permitting of the private sector to contribute to the transportation of passengers and cargo between Wadi Halfa and the High Dam. Abbas further said that they would also review other joint projects proposed by his Ministry and its Egyptian counterpart. The Minister is accompanied during the visit by River Transport Board Chairman 'Abd-al-Rahman Sayyid Ahmad Barbar. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English No 4372, 16 Jan 83 pp 1-2]

CSO: 4500/77

PROGRESSIVE ISLAMISTS: A NEW TREND

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 141, Dec 82 pp 19-22

[Expose by Maidani Bensalah, as recorded by M.J.: "A New Trend in Tunisia: Progressive Islamism"]

[Text] What is the nature of the Islamist Movement in Tunisia, what are its genesis, its evolution? What is the meaning of the emergence within this Movement of a trend which questions some of its basic positions, although it is still marginal and represents only a minority?

We asked one of the members of that trend, Mr Maidani Bensalah, to expound his analysis and his point of view on these questions. This testimony from an insider shows where the majority of the Islamist movement and the progressive Islamist trend now stand: the latter is still searching for an identity and has been waiting for a long time for the authorization to publish a magazine that will be called 15/21 (referring simultaneously to the 15th century of the Hegira and to the 21st century).

After it became independent, Tunisia lived through a period during which it was socially and culturally too closely connected to Western culture. The government's relations with traditional religious circles were aimed at subjugating and silencing them, rather than at promoting new cultural and religious structures on a reformed basis. Certainly, the reform of the personal statute and the advancement of education were significant, but, actually, they were not given a sound basis and this brought about an identity crisis in a society in which family ties and social relations were increasingly disintegrating.

Identity Crisis

The failure of Ben Salah's socialist experiment in the late 1960's increased the vacuum: that political vacuum was also cultural (the failure of this experiment was due to government centralization, excessive economic planning,

disregard for sociological facts and rejection of grass-roots democracy; in fact, what we had was a bureaucratic State capitalism, not a socialization of property).

It is on this background that, early in the 1970's, a very simple and at first hardly noticed Islamic preaching movement appeared. It was headed by educators, like Rachid Ghannouchi, and by a lawyer, Abdelfattah Mourou (leaders of the Islamic Tendency Movement, both now in jail). Several of them came from the South--let us note in passing that this region still bears the marks of Islamism and Arab nationalism, but not that of Marxism, due to the vitality of traditions. At first, the activity of the nascent movement was limited to giving lectures in mosks. No one expected these lectures to draw large crowds or be as successful as they were, paradoxically, especially among the young and among women, i.e. the very categories on which the government, through teaching and reforms, relied most for support. This clearly showed that a break had occurred between the government and its "rank-and-file." The Movement leaders were much surprised, as they had felt sure that Arab societies had become "jahiliyah" (non-Islamic).

This was one of the basic ideas of the movement: true Islam had deviated, nothing authentic remained of it; culturally, society had become "jahiliyah." Islam, which is a way of life, is the only alternative because it brings solutions at all levels of social life. The Movement had to follow the example of the Prophet and his first companions: it had to start from an initial group, the Jamaa, which would then expand to include all society. This implied that they would first isolate themselves from this deviated society: in this, the influence of Sayyid Qutb's ideas can be recognized. The Movement had no direct ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, but the ideas of their theoreticians had a great impact on it. The Muslim Brothers are an extension of the Salafist movement, and they have left their mark on all the religious literature, their writings being quantitatively predominant.

Criticism of Deviances

Therefore, the initial Jamaa first invested the mosks, which were empty for the Zaytunah fuqaha had grown old and the regime had increasingly isolated the Mosk. The mosks had become devoid of soul and fervor. The Movement brought back this religious fervor, and its criticism of deviances in the Islamic world immediately found an echo. Then, its magazine, AL MARIFAH, played an important part in spreading these ideas, which were new in Tunisian society. In less than 7 years, its circulation increased from 3,000 to 25,000. In addition, the Movement was orienting its efforts toward high schools. Islamist teachers were making special efforts both to educate and to help high school students. Their understanding attitude did much to predispose students in their favor. This is how the Movement eventually managed to have mosques opened in schools (since 1973-1974). These mosques have attracted large crowds.

The Movement also acted in another, specifically Tunisian way: Islamist marriages. When a young man wanted to get married, they would find him a fiancée that would accept the Islamist way of life, conforming to Islamist

standards and demands. The ceremony was then organized, without wine or music, without mixing of the sexes. Verses or poems were read in front of the large audience: leaders of the Movement would present its points of view. These marriages had become a true social curiosity and attracted many people, especially since marriage in Tunisia had become almost laic and westernized.

The Movement was reasserting traditional values. Considering that the reform of the personal statute is far from having been accepted by men, many of whom oppose the liberties and rights granted to women (at work and in society as a whole), this reasserting of traditional values was in agreement with the state of mind of large layers of society. Even women from modest backgrounds welcomed the Movement's exhortations to return to a more traditional role of women. These women even accepted the principle of polygamy. I would like to state right now that our trend differs with the Movement on the question of polygamy which we believe was the product of a well-defined historical epoch and should therefore be considered as a variable, not as an invariant, in Islamic doctrine; today, polygamy is a threat to family integrity, and that integrity is precisely our constant goal.

The Movement, therefore, was not preaching a new society, but a return to traditional society. In view of the crisis that had been generated by the government's groundless reforms and by the increase in social inequalities, this objective of the Movement was in agreement with the aspirations of the larger part of society. This is why it reduced everything to a set of moral problems. If there is a crisis, the Movement said, it is primarily a moral crisis. This analysis was simple and attractive to the masses: they stressed that imitation of the West was at the source of this moral crisis; they stressed the crisis of the West itself, as evidenced by suicide, family disintegration, sexualism, etc.; they fought against the inferiority complex toward the West; and in every case Islam was presented as an alternative. They also criticized Marxism and its failures and presented it as a product of Zionism! The failure of the Arab Marxist left had brought us at the time to a state of hysterical hatred for Marxism and progressivism. We were saying that Islam was against class struggle, an idea that was considered to be "jahiliyah," and we were preaching solidarity between social categories, property not being a problem per se (Zakat alone was required, and employers' love for their employees).

Economic Crisis and Iran

This set of concepts--defense of the traditional family organization, defense of ancestral moral values, defense of a social order reconciling the interest of the various categories--remained undisputed and predominant within the Movement until 1976. An evolution became noticeable about that time, as a result of the conjunction of various factors.

First, there was the creation of a magazine, AL-MUSLIM AL-MUASIR (published in Lebanon), the level of which was to decline later on but which, in its first issues, raised essential questions. It pointed to certain weaknesses in the Islamist approach and called for a critical interpretation of our ancestral

heritage. It created a sensation, for instance, when it stated that "a Muslim can lean to the right or to the left" and that Muslims do not form an absolutely homogeneous Umma. These ideas raised a veritable tempest among Islamists, all the more so as, contrary to what had been the case before, they were not coming from outsiders but from Islamist militants and leaders.

In addition to this debate, we were faced with the following fact at home, in Tunisia: our Movement was finding an increasing audience, but we did not have any profound and true impact. The events of 26 January 1978 were to force us to face this fact. These events showed us that struggles were going on in Tunisia, socio-economic class struggles. These events found us quite unprepared and some of us in the Movement began to understand that we were living on the fringe of society, that we did not understand what life was like and what it was all about and, as a result, that we could not provide a true alternative. It then became evident to us that the problem of the masses is not whether to pray or not, but to pray and be in possession of their rights, free from all exploitation and violation of their fundamental liberties.

At that moment, another factor came into play: the Iranian Islamic revolution, which also took us by surprise.

It first brought us the very notion of revolution, which does not exist among the Muslim Brothers. According to Hasan al-Banna, revolution means "fitna" (disorder, rioting) and "fitna is worse than murder." According to that leading Islamist thinker, we may only advise the Prince, we may not encourage the masses to rise up. The Iranian revolution demonstrated the failure of the Muslim Brothers' movement which has been active since 1928 and has never achieved any political or even cultural change in Sunni Arab countries. The Iranian revolution brought us slogans, ideas which had been considered contrary to Islamic thought, such as political democracy, the elimination of feudalism and privileges, anti-imperialism, etc. We are speaking of course of the early Iranian revolution; its subsequent evolution would require a different analysis.

Therefore, these various internal and external factors brought about an evolution within the Movement, which resulted in debates and, after a year of disputes, the Movement split up and a new trend was created, that of Progressive Islamists. The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) remains a majority (its leaders and 70 of its militants are in jail, having been sentenced to 2-10 years; all democratic forces demand their release).

A Political Party?

The MTI's evolution led it to form a political party. We believe that it was a mistake, for a party must be an instrument to gain power, and the Movement is not now at this actual stage. Indeed, it does not yet have a clear and articulated political strategy. Its reasoning still shows some confusion between religion or the sacred and plain politics: when they tell the people that political democracy is a notion contrary to Islam, they mix up a reference to religion and the sacred with a political statement based on transient

conditions. As for us, we believe that we must draw the line between the sacred Text and its interpretations, which are the province of al-Ijtihad, or else we will end up regarding politics as sacred, which would often have negative effects.

While MTI is orienting itself toward political organization, our trend is oriented mainly toward the ideological education and theoretical effort which we believe to be necessary to any new attempt at a revival. We must place ourselves in the present historical perspective to reinterpret the Koran, the Hadith, the Arab-Islamic heritage and Western thought. There can be no revolution without revolutionary thinking, and the latter has no value unless the masses accept it. This is why we have chosen cultural action. This does not mean that we isolate ourselves from political life; we follow it, we support positive, progressive elements, but this is not our main concern.

The Islamist Movement in Tunisia has evolved in its base. We believe that this is also due to the fact that the Salafist, Wahhabite thought has not deeply penetrated the Arab Maghreb, for historical reasons and especially because we are so close to the West, because of our critical sensibility and because we have a certain propensity to rationalism. For these reasons, it would be a mistake to consider that the Tunisian Islamist Movement is similar to that of the Muslim Brothers in the Middle-East. On the other hand, it is a fact that the Movement in Tunisia is heavily represented at the University; the University, therefore, has also influenced the thinking of the Movement. This explains similarities of ideas between several members of the MTI and our trend.

What is the fundamental approach adopted by our Trend?

We do not believe that Islam is a reservoir of ready-made solutions to all problems. Until now, it has been the major mistake of Islamists to believe that. In fact, if you ask them what economic solutions, for instance, they would recommend in the present situation, they have only vague ideas which have little to do with actual practice.

A Method

For us, Islam is primarily a Method, not a closed and completed system. What matters to us is the end pursued by Islam. Depending on the epoch considered, this end may be reached by different types of organization and social customs. As an example of the end-related approach, let us consider the question of woman. According to us, Islam came to free woman, humanly, socially, economically. At the time of its advent, however, Islam could not jump ahead of the actual historical circumstances of the time: it changed woman's condition with respect to what it had been before in Arab society. Even polygamy must be understood in the relative context of this historical reform. Therefore, it should not be considered as an immovable religious standard, and all laws and social customs must always be seen in their historical context. The end is universal, the laws are transient. According to the Movement, this point of view is heresy. Then, we ask, what about slavery, which was tolerated by Islam in past centuries, and we ask the Movement: you too are now

against slavery; then, is it an heresy? And we demonstrate that they contradict themselves: they reject slavery but not polygamy.

We reject the Salafist method because it interprets tradition too literally, without any reference to actual history. Its concepts are without any connection to reality. For instance, for private property: according to Islam, the end is Justice. The sacred texts show clearly that God has placed the blame for corruption on earth on the privileged who live in luxury: there is not a single surah to praise them; on the other hand, the Koran is a plea for the underprivileged, those who are exploited. Since this is the end of the sacred, we, for our part, must try to find in all epochs in actual history what is likely to weaken the rich and strengthen the poor. To do this today, I must call on the economic, social and political sciences in order to gain a clear idea of what social relations actually are. If, through this approach, I become convinced that the principle of private property is used to justify exploitation, then, according to the profound end of Islam, I must declare that property is no longer sacred and attribute to it a function of social justice.

Let us take another example: our relation to the Tradition we inherited. Our relation to this heritage is not that of unconditional heirs. Heritage is subject to criticism and may and should be discussed in the historical perspective which we have adopted. I do not need the fuqaha to know what is true a priori; experience and study alone provide an approach to truth. Tradition and traditional books do not contain the truth on everything. This is where al-Ijtihad (the creative effort) has its place, and we must denounce the lack of it which, we believe, has been a factor of regression and decadence. Finally, the third aspect of our approach: we are looking for a positive interaction with democratic thought in the Arab world and in the world, for part of this thought belongs to us and was nourished by Islamic culture.

For us, democratic thought is an additional element, not a substitute for our Islamic thought. If, for instance, I fail to understand certain aspects of capitalism unless I make a reference to Marxism, it is obvious that I maintain the same critical attitude toward the latter. But we refuse to consider that Marxism is the product of a "Zionist plot," for to say so is in truth to plot against ourselves and our people, against the cause of social liberation: reactionary regimes are the ones who want us to think that way and who want us to consider that the primary struggle is that between religious belief and atheism, between Islam and Marxism, whereas the true conflict is essentially a social conflict.

We give priority to reality, not to the letter of the Texts. As a result, we are open to all the live forces in our country and we are not isolating ourselves. This society is ours, it is not a "jahiliyah" society as we said before. The progressive and democratic movement in our country is truly a national movement, not an irreligious one. Besides, we do not profess to be the only guardians of the Truth. Truth, in fact, is shared among all. This is why we believe in the imperative necessity of dialogue.

REPORT ON MZALI TALKS WITH MARIO SOARES

LD041810 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 4 Feb 83

[Text] The call made by President Habib Bourguiba in 1965 at Jericho for a return to international legitimacy constitutes the starting point in any talks aimed at solving the Palestine question. This was stated to TAP by the deputy chairman of the Socialist International League, Mario Soares, following a meeting he had this morning with the prime minister and secretary general of the Tunisian Socialist Destourian Party, Mohamed Mzali.

Soares described the meeting as extremely important and beneficial. He added that views were exchanged on a number of matters pertaining in particular to the situation in the Middle East and Lebanon as well as to the Palestine problem.

He said he acquainted Mzali with the results of the contacts made by a delegation of the Socialist International with officials in a number of Middle Eastern countries on the current situation in the region, particularly since, Israel's occupation of part of the Lebanon territory. He affirmed the determination of the Socialist International to work to secure recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Soares thanked Tunisia for arranging a meeting between the delegation of the Socialist International and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. He said that this meeting will take place this afternoon in Tunisia.

Soares said that his talks with Mzali also covered relations between the Tunisian Socialist Destourian Party and the Socialist International League and ways to bolster them, particularly as the Socialist Destourian Party is a member of the League of African Socialist Parties which has good relations with the Socialist International League.

The meeting was attended by Mongi Kooli, who is the minister accredited to the prime minister's office and director of the Socialist Destourian Party.

CSO: 4500/83

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL TALKS--A delegation of the Socialist International League led by ex-Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares, who is vice president of the League, left Tunisia this afternoon. During his visit Soares held a series of meetings with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and others. The delegation will submit a report on the results of its tour to the Socialist International's fact-finding committee for the Middle East and Lebanon which will be meeting shortly in Lisbon.
[Text] [LD061844 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 6 Feb 83]

CSO: 4500/83

PROGRESS OF GULF WAR REPORTED

Heavy Fighting Continues in Border Areas

Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Jacques Duplouch: "Iraq-Iran: the Gulf War--1. One Day Like Another on the Amara Front"]

[Text] For lack of observers on the spot, there is little talk about it. Nevertheless, the Gulf war pitting Iraq against Iran for the last 27 months has already resulted in 200,000 dead. It is a pitiless war that risks hardening and destabilizing the entire Middle East. Since July, Ayatollah Khomeyni's troops have been trying to force the decision and launching attack after attack against Iraq's southern border. After being outflanked for a short time, Baghdad's soldiers now seem to have the situation well in hand. In the Meisan sector, where our special correspondent went, battle has been raging since November--veritable carnage with no end in sight.

After Amara, the capital of the governorate of Meisan, southwest of Baghdad, the road heads toward the front, in an immense, uncultivated and barren plain. Desert as far as the eye can see. A grey desert. It is an empty and dead zone that leads to the war. Bumpy roads, broken up by the incessant passage of military convoys. Risk of falling off the shoulder with every turn of the wheels. The border is some 50 kilometers away. A 1-hour trip. An hour of challenging slaloms between the potholes, in the rubble and the deafening noise of ruined shock absorbers. No traces of the war yet, not even of tension. In the mud-spattered Land Rover that takes me toward the battle, the six officers--impressively stocky young men--joke noisily while gulping down chicken sandwiches. As we progress, though, silence takes over, the sign of deep meditation, as if each one were gauging better the reality of the danger.

Ten kilometers from the first lines, a change of scene. We pass abruptly from an arid expanse to a mountainous zone with jagged crests. An ideal area for positional warfare. The front is a tangle of ravines and brownish-red humps extending endlessly in a mauve mist that gives the landscape a spectral appearance. Pointing his right hand ahead, the sector commander who is driving the Land Rover tells us: "Iran."

Suddenly, on both sides of the road, as far as the eye can see, are military installations. An impressive power formation combining field artillery with long-range cannons, with mobile Katyusha batteries and SAM missile bases, their noses pointed skyward in a state of permanent alert, grouped around radar turrets pivoting tirelessly on themselves. Hidden behind mounds of earth from which only the barrels of their cannons stick out, T-56 tanks, and a few T-72's, of Soviet manufacture. Elsewhere, light armored vehicles. And everywhere, trucks. Hundreds of earth-moving machines. One has a hard time imagining the total amount of materiel accumulated in this part of the desert. Not to mention the munitions--thousands of boxes stacked in the open air. The feeling of a thoroughly broken-in organization. A feeling of order. And of total security also. How, indeed, is one to believe that anything could happen here, so close to the front, in which the Iraqi Army could maneuver with impunity [as published]? Total mastery of the air doubtlessly explains this ostentatious assurance.

But in this sector held by the 4th Army, battle has been raging since the beginning of November. An unwitnessed battle until now. Bitter, murderous, from another age. Started in the sand and suffocating heat of autumn, it continues in the cold and mud of a rainy winter. A pitiless battle in which both sides avoid taking prisoners. The Iraqis assert that they killed more than 20,000 Iranians between 2 and 25 November. The number of victims seems incredible!

Hand-to-Hand Fighting

Teheran's avowed ambition is to cut the Baghdad-Bassorah road by piercing the Iraqi defense lines that protect Amara. At any cost. It is all as if Teheran were little-concerned about human losses and is therefore launching offensive after offensive. Apparently without success. The Iraqi army, whose endurance capacities could be doubted for a time after a series of reverses last summer, is doing better than defending itself on its border. "Our soldiers have retained their fighting spirit since they have been fighting to maintain the territorial integrity," the commanding officer tells me. "National feeling, which is very strong in Iraq, has given the combat a new dimension. Each soldier now knows that he is fighting to defend his land. Today, the morale of the troops is far better than a year ago." What is certain is that the offensives launched by Iran, at Bassorah in July, at Mandali in October and at Amara in November, all resulted in setbacks. The Iraqi army, which has considerably strengthened its positions in the reconquered terrain, does not appear to fear any attack whatsoever.

The atmosphere gets more tense in the vehicle as we advance toward the first lines. "Just 24 hours ago, there was fighting here all night and a part of the day," a captain explains to me in impeccable French. "The fighting was of unbridled violence. After a large-scale Iranian attack, our commandos went on counterattack. The 105-mm and 130-mm shells, the rockets, the mortars of all calibers, the Hot and Roland missiles, were not enough. They fought with bayonets. More than 3,500 Iranians were killed." Not a word about the Iraqi dead. There is strict silence on this subject. It is impossible, of course, to check these figures. But I would soon see in the gaze of the men who lived this nightmare, who killed so as not to be killed, the shadow of the horror, the shadow of death, the shadow of themselves.

The Bitter Smell of Death

The Land Rover now threads its way through a labyrinth of casemates dug in the rock or ground, reinforced by sacks of sand. Lines solidly established and powerfully armed. Each fold of the land is a trap for the enemy. The Iraqis make the best possible use of the configuration of the sites to make them impregnable redoubts, with--half-buried--tanks in ambush and 105-mm cannons mounted on small Toyota trucks, the entire panoply of mortars and machine-guns. The noise of the ongoing battle is heard very distinctly. The Land Rover deposits us in front of the HQ of the sector chief. A moustached and athletic colonel whose name is kept secret--at the request of the political commissioner--on the assertion that the Iranians are convinced they have killed him. We go along with the anonymity. But it is also out of the question to have a precise account of the situation by being shown, on a map, the sites of the engagement, the advances or withdrawals. Military secrecy forbids it.

Our arrival elicits great excitement and demonstrations of good feeling. The officers obviously enjoy great prestige among their men. Great freedom of expression among them, despite the hierarchy. The famous brotherhood of arms, doubtlessly. When the gathering turns into a happening, despite the proximity of the engagements, the colonel, with a word, sends the troops back to their duties. It is brief, distinct, precise. In an instant, everyone is back in position. We are at Al Baglia, a bitterly contested strategic point. Everywhere are signs of the recent Iranian attacks. Casemates collapsed or burnt to a cinder show that Khomeyni's troops have indeed, for a time, broken through the Iraqi front and advanced about 5 kilometers into the country. Furthermore, the ground has not been won back yet; the officers do not try to deny this.

We reach the forward posts. Abandoned on the ground are ammunition boxes from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Carcasses of Iranian tanks. Mattresses, metal desks, lie close to RPG's [rocket propelled grenades] and survival rations. Farther off, black ranger uniforms and olive-drab battle-dress uniforms litter the ground. All the bric-a-brac of the debacle. And then the bitter, strong and persistent odor of death mixed with the dust as we approach the first lines.

Suddenly, cadavers, dozens of cadavers. Fixed in positions that make them grotesque or pitiable. Some still wear on their foreheads the red band with "Allah Akbar" (God is the greatest) in white letters. These are the Pasdarans, fierce "guardians of the Islamic revolution" of Khomeyni. Others, atrociously mutilated, have been covered with a thin layer of sand from which an arm or leg sticks out here and there. Cadavers ready to burst, faces blackened or stripped of flesh. Horrible. Heads crushed or bodies pulverized by shrapnel--an unbearable spectacle that effectively testifies to the violence of the fighting.

Drugs and Ideology

With attacks and counterattacks following one another nonstop, one does not even take the trouble to bury the dead. Here, death is the daily experience. Thus one no longer pays any attention to it! The border is the common grave of the enemy brothers. "The day before yesterday, 5 of my men killed more than

000 of the enemy," the colonel states. "No doubt about it! And don't be surprised by the size of the enemy losses," he adds. "Most of the time, the Iranians mount their attack in successive waves, without any concern for their safety, chanting the name of Allah. They have to face, first of all, the anti-personnel mines with which our lines are riddled. Next, the machine-guns, the tanks and the mortars. Then the light weapons. Finally, our bayonets. Their 'strategy,' brutal and costly in human lives, makes their chances of success precarious." This would explain the slaughter. "They are drugged," the colonel goes on. "What I mean to say is that they are drugged ideologically. The theocratic regime behind them and its missionaries at the front assure them of entry into Allah's paradise if they die for the Islamic revolution. The Pasdars, who fought well at the beginning of the war, are falling like flies today. Next there are the 'bassigs'--the supposed volunteers--who are paying the heaviest tribute in this war. Most of the time, they are boys of 13 to 16 or men over 60 who are enrolled by force, receive their training at the front and are thrown into the assaults against our lines." "How can one describe a regime that dares to sacrifice children and old men like this?" the colonel asks. This is the reality of the Iraqi-Iranian front. A closed world in which people angrily tear one another apart.

These 13-year-old fighters do exist. They are not a legend. I met some of them in the hospital-prison of Amara. Still under battle shock, prostrated, their heads shaven, dressed in ragged pajamas, they seem to be from another world and another time. With blank looks, their faces hard, closed, like people who have been humiliated forever. Why do they fight? "We had no choice," they answer. The Imam asked us to defend our land. They came to look for us when school let out and stuck rifles in our hands. After 3 weeks of training, we came to the front." They recognize that the latest offensives have been slaughters and that many of their comrades-in-arms were killed. For nothing. They have still not understood what has happened to them.

We approach the Iranian lines. The tac-tac-tac of the Iranian machine-guns is uninterrupted. According to the colonel, we are about 200 meters from the first enemy positions, separated by a minefield on which dozens of cadavers are heaped up. Our group must have been detected. We hear very distinctly the sound of mortar shells being fired. We hit the dirt, choked with anxiety as we await the "arrival" of steel and fire. Great coolness on the Iraqi side. The reply comes right away. With mortar, cannon, machine-gun. We take advantage of it to move back, to hypothetical safety. The fact is that we have to withdraw in Indian-file behind an officer who guides us through the "safe" windings of a pathway laced with mines. All the same, not very comfortable.

On our return, the storm breaks out. A literal one, transforming the battlefield into a quagmire. But not in the least reducing the intensity of the fighting.

Indisputably, Iraq, which has succeeded in containing and repulsing the Iranian armed forces, has the situation well in hand. There is no doubt but that the morale of its troops is better than a year ago. It is obvious that their fighting spirit is enhanced. But the fact that success in arms has thus improved is due also partly to the modernization of the arsenal. Thanks notably

to the acquisition of Western war materiel, sophisticated, bought mainly in Great Britain, Italy and France. The colonel vaunts to me, in passing, the merits of the French products: Hot and Milan missiles and 105-mm cannons.

"Equipped this way, we could fight for a thousand years," he says with a great resonant smile, echoing an official slogan in his own way. But when I ask him whether the solution to this war is a military or political one, he balks: "That is a political question," he says; "I cannot answer it."

While one waits for the politicians, far from the front, to decide the sequence of events, the murderous madness continues. There is not a risk of contamination of just the entire Gulf zone but also of the entire Arab Near and Middle East, where the war has now dealt a new hand.

Economic, Political Effects of War Considered

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Dec 82 p 2

[Article by Jacques Duplouich: "Iraq-Iran: the Gulf War--2. The Ayatollah's Triple Prophecy"]

[Text] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni has made overthrow of the Ba'athist regime in power in Baghdad one of the foundations of his foreign policy. "We shall conquer the three Satans," he swore when he was only an imam in exile: "the shah, Carter and Saddam Hussein." Why him? Because the Iraqi president incarnates, at Iran's door, everything that he disapproves of: progress without religion. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein has had the ambition, since the fall of the shah, of playing the leading role in the Gulf region, where Khomeyni wants to impose the Islamic revolution. Thus there is nothing surprising about the decision taken in Teheran to carry on the war until fulfillment of the triple prophecy.

What are the chances today of Iran's achieving its ends, taking into account the tensions and internal difficulties that have arisen in Iraq from the prolongation of the war?

What strikes the foreign traveler arriving in Baghdad is the extraordinary human beehive of activity aimed at moving Iraq into the 21st century. The capital is a vast work zone with a thousand work sites, bristling with giant cranes and swarming with construction machines perpetually moving in all directions. In this country at war, people keep working day and night. Over the Tigris, with its violent and muddy waters, bridge after bridge is being thrown in an attempt to solve the difficulties of urban traffic. Work proceeds on construction of a vast network of sewers, a peripheral boulevard, an airport, buildings, hospitals, schools, etc. Businessmen from all over the world continue to press into the newly built hotels--Meridien, Sheraton, Rasheed. The latest international fair attracted more than 2,700 international companies, as against 2,300 in 1981.

All Iraq mirrors what is going on in Baghdad. Building of a north-south highway, at a cost that cannot be calculated at present; gigantic irrigation works; development and improvement of land; industrialization of agriculture; modernization and development of industry.

Is the war having no effect on the country's economy, then? Evidently not. But President Saddam Hussein is held by the party's program: "The essential thing," he says, "is to build a prosperous life, for social well-being to be consolidated and propagated, and for it to harmonize with the national requirements while progressing."

The Iraqi people have become accustomed to well-being. To ensure its continuity and the stability of the regime, it is therefore necessary for the country's expansion to continue. This is not so simple! The war is cutting \$1 billion per month out of the national budget. Up to the present, it is Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf emirates who, fearing installation of the Islamic revolution at their doors, have been financing the Iraqi war effort. In certain circles in Baghdad, it is said that this financing might henceforth be doled out more stingily.

Appeal to "Friendly Countries"

In the last year, it has been necessary to give up a number of projects. "The war has had a heavy effect on the inflow of foreign exchange," admits Farouk el Obaidi, general director for foreign trade. "Oil production has been reduced considerably, and it is no longer possible to export by way of the Gulf, since Bassorah is under threat from the Iranian cannons. The Damascus-Teheran alliance prevents us from using the Syrian pipeline. What remains is the transport of our petroleum products by way of Turkey. Despite this, our trade balance is not in deficit, because we have adapted our projects to our means, while adhering to the priority objectives. Thus it can be asserted that the war has not really had an influence on the national-development movement."

Indeed! Several construction sites have simply had to be abandoned. Some European businessmen are admitting that they are having a harder and harder time getting paid. Certain French banks are even going so far as to discourage firms that might be tempted to open up new construction projects in Iraq. And they are advising them rather to work on the other side of the street. Baghdad is doubtlessly not yet in the state of ceasing payment, but is having to appeal to "friendly countries" for financing the projects in certain sectors.

Thus, it is well-known that Kuwait is carrying the entire burden in the agriculture-and-food sector. This support is admitted officially. In the Ministry of the Plan, Ismail Dulaimi explains: "Since September 1980, we have been fighting on two fronts--that of the war and that of development. Taking the burden of the war into account, we have abandoned everything that is not essential in the short term. Furthermore, we have some mutual interests with our Arab brother countries. They are associated in a good many projects and works in progress, which have to be examples of development for the Third World. Thus they are not just handing out charity by helping us."

Iraq, according to its president, wants to be a model for the world: "It is fated," says Saddam Hussein, "that Iraq should once again play its leading role to serve the Arab nation and safeguard its honor."

This ambition depends partly on the financial support of the Gulf countries and partly on Khomeyni. If Khomeyni decides to stabilize the front, and therefore prolong the war, Iraq's economy runs the risk of not getting under way again, with the concomitant risk of a popular uprising against the government.

"Fighting a Thousand Years"

That point has not been reached yet. Weariness, it is true, could have overcome a people put through the trial of 2 years of a war that has bled a generation white. Now it appears clearly that the conflict with Iran has had the opposite result. The threat of an invasion has rallied the Iraqi community. The impromptu conversations that one might have in the street, not only in Baghdad but in other cities too, in the provinces, all agree. "We are ready to fight the Persian invader for a thousand years if necessary": this attitude recurs as a leitmotif.

Could the immediate danger come, then, from an "Iranian-type" religious uprising? The fact is that the Iraqi population is composed 80-percent of Arabs, 60 percent of whom are of the Shi'ite faith. Upon his accession to power in February 1979, Khomeyni encouraged and openly supported the integrist Islamic movement "Da'wat al Islam" (the call of Islam) in the Shi'ite cities of Najef and Kerbala. There were some bloody riots in 1979. Since then, nothing. The Iranian minority established in the region has been repulsed, and the integrist sympathizers have preferred to expatriate. In Kerbala, which I was able to visit, people often recall Khomeyni:

"I knew him well when he lived here," says Imam Saaleh at the Al Abbas mosque. "I was his neighbor. 'His Grace' never consented to descend to our level. He never greeted us. The man thus revealed his true nature: haughty and scornful. What, then, is such a leader of prayer who considers his fellow-men unworthy?"

And he adds at once: "He is not a good Moslem either. Because Islam does not mean violence. Or war. Or death. Now what is Khomeyni's balance-sheet after 3 years in power? Terror. Repression. Hatred. Khomeyni is an assassin who does disservice to the cause of Islam. It is out of the question for the Iranian Shi'ites to heed him. The other day, right here in Kerbala, there was a demonstration of support for Saddam Hussein. With 500,000 persons. So you see clearly...."

A young man coming out of the mosque says the same thing. "Yes, I am a Shi'ite. But I am Iraqi first. What Khomeyni says, what he wants, is contrary to what I have been taught and to what I believe. In Kerbala, many have had family members killed at the front. Believe me, they will not forget what they owe to Khomeyni."

It therefore seems doubtful that the Shi'ite population and soldiers might rise up against the regime. For the moment.

Suitcase or Death

I found the same determination in Mendali, a largish town, grey and sad, 150 kilometers northeast of Baghdad. In October, this border town was transformed into a phantom city, when the big Iranian offensive came. Since that time, the vast majority of the population has come back to town. And the inhabitants are quite determined to remain here. Whatever happens. And the daily lot is violence. Distilled by the long-range cannons and the Iranian rocket-launchers the hospital an industrial bakery the popular neighborhoods have paid the costs of the recent bombardments [as published]. There have been deaths--but people refuse to give me a figure--and many wounded. "It doesn't matter much," the bookseller tells me; "we will not give in to the 'suitcase or death' blackmail. We are here in our homes, on our land, and we will stay here. Khomeyni will not be able to make us happy in spite of ourselves."

And pointing out a group of children with their arms full of books and notebooks, he says: "Here, they go to school. Over there, they are taken to school to as to be sent to the front." In the street, everywhere, is Saddam Hussein's portrait. And the propaganda that puts the professions of faith everywhere: "With our blood and with all our soul, we will sacrifice ourselves for you, Saddam Hussein." The only big store is well-stocked. Alcohol--whiskey and champagne--is even sold in it. "We have never lacked anything," the manager declares. "No, the prices have not shot up. Yes, we will stay. Because the people know what has been done for them. And they compare things with what is happening in Iran."

Rumors of Plots

Under these conditions, where could revolt come from against Saddam Hussein, who has committed his prestige and his authority to the war? On the one hand, from the Ba'ath itself. And it does indeed appear that the party is not unanimous about the present conduct of affairs. It is murmured in Baghdad that the minister of health, though a faithful person and one who had the president's confidence, has paid with his life for a critical attitude. Saddam Hussein himself spoke of "punishment." And in order to show clearly that the people are on his side, Saddam Hussein's followers have in recent weeks organized popular demonstrations in support of the president.

There remain the armed forces. The Iranian capital regularly hums with rumors of plots that never break out. On 1 December, though, the newspapers published a letter by Saddam Hussein on the role of the armed forces. A curious letter, in which the chief of state asks:

"Are the armed forces an organization like any other, or are they a corps apart in the state?" And he answers with some considerations that constitute warnings: "The armed forces are a way of serving the nation and the people by means of weapons. Nothing else." He then goes on to say that within the state, "every organization has room for initiative. Except for the armed forces, whose characteristic is obedience."

Why this call to order, unless the armed forces are beginning to get restless? Impossible to know. The military obviously refuse to talk, and the politicians deny that this text has any importance whatsoever.

Basing himself on the popular armed forces, the armed branch of the party, the chief of state still has the situation well in hand. But for how long?

11267

CSO: 4419/12

TERRORISM ADVISOR DISCUSSES DIVISIONS WITHIN PLO

Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew No 32, 19 Nov 82 pp 27-29

[Interview with Rafael Eytan, PM's Advisor on Terrorism: "Israel's Intelligence System Is Able to Cope With Any Terrorist Organization Which Penetrates the Country"]

[Text] Rafael Eytan, the PM's Advisor on Terrorism, says: "We expect attacks by small terrorist groups against Jewish civilians and isolated Israelis, at least in Israeli institutions in Europe. The reason: the PLO was beaten in Beirut, and some of the smaller organizations, which did not fight in Beirut, were not hurt. As a result of the weakening of Fatah, these small organizations have found a justification for continuing their terrorist activities, and thus they have been relatively strengthened".

Question: On what do you base your comments?

Answer: One can see signs in Fatah, that Abu Iyad, for example, can not meet with Arafat, and so he has no other alternative. In the past, even if Abu Iyad differed with Arafat, he was unable to maneuver since Beirut was the capital of the PLO, where two concepts controlled: unity of the word and unity of ranks — at least that was the way it was presented much of the time.

Question: Have the results of the Peace in Galilee campaign had an effect on the future operations of the PLO?

Answer: Today, it is difficult to predict this fully, but one can estimate the situation. My guess is that additional political divisions have been created within the PLO, and there are the first signs of differences of opinion among the terrorists on the issue of the resolutions of the Fez Conference as well as the Reagan Plan.

Question: Perhaps we might return to those small terrorist organizations about which you spoke, which are liable to increase their activity. In your estimate, which organizations will operate against Jews and Israelis in the future?

Answer: Two organizations were not hurt.

There is only one organization which was not touched at all by the Peace in Galilee Campaign — Abu Nidal's organization. This organization is well known in the world, and I can give an example of this: Kreisky, who was shocked by the attack on a synagogue in Vienna, telephoned Arafat and asked him: "What have you done to me?". Yasir Arafat answered: "We did not do it. It was not Fatah. It was Abu Nidal." After his talk with Arafat, Kreisky told the people of Vienna: "The PLO did not do this; it was Abu Nidal", and the press mocked him saying: "How can you say the PLO did not do it? Do we care if it was the PLO or not the PLO? They are from the same group, and it is not our responsibility to distinguish between them".

Question: How is it possible to distinguish them?

Answer: As professionals, we make distinctions between them. But politically, Abu Nidal and Yasir Arafat, and Abu 'Abbas, and George Habash, and Hawatimah, and Jibril, Salim Abu-Salam and Abu Ibrahim are all, ultimately, the same group, since it was the road of Yasir Arafat which caused them to sprout.

These organizations are always splitting off from the main one, which reins them in, and professionally speaking that is why we distinguish between the smaller and larger organizations. But politically — the large organization is the one which gave birth to the smaller organizations, and therefore, we conduct a war against the large and the small organization. It is one war, despite the fact that there may be a situation in which the large organization, because of a political decision of one sort or another, decides now not to carry out attacks in Europe, but rather by way of Jordan or Lebanon. And then, the little organization tries as best it can to continue the attacks.

Question: If that is the case, what happened to Abu Nidal's organization (Black June) after the war?

Answer: The organization was not touched, because it was not in Lebanon. Its base is in Iraq and Syria.

Question: It is claimed that Abu Nidal's organization is opposed to the PLO, since it was accused of the murder of Sa'id Hamami, a PLO man?

Answer: Abu Nidal's organization includes several hundred persons, and like the PLO it is subsidized. Its method of operation is relatively simple — dispatching small teams whose base is in the Arab countries to attack Jewish targets, and not especially Israeli targets. This is because a synagogue in Vienna or a school in Antwerp is not guarded, because it is impossible to guard all of the Jews of the world.

Question: How does the organization execute its attacks?

Answer: For example, it sends three or four terrorists from Baghdad to Europe, with their weapons delivered to them by diplomatic pouch. The terrorists themselves carry Iraqi or Syrian passports, and they receive their weapons in a relatively safe way in the country of the attack. After carrying out the attack, the terrorists change passports, leave their weapons, and disappear. This, by the way, is the reason it is so hard to catch them. In Vienna, for example, a number of means

of operation were exposed in the attack on the synagogue. One can see, step by step, how the weapons were transported in, how the terrorists were brought in, and how they located their target. The way in which the organization works (modus operandi) is obvious.

Question: Which was the second organization which was not hurt?

Answer: Abu Ibrahim's organization.

When Wadia Khadar died, this organization split into two. One remained in Lebanon and we were able to strike at it. The second, which is smaller, headed by Abu Ibrahim and including only a few dozen persons, was not hit.

This organization executes, tries to execute as best it can, a number of strikes each year. For example — two or three bombs in Italy, from before the Peace in Galilee Campaign. Since then, other actions are unknown. From the beginning, I have estimated that this organization would make very few strikes, because of its size and ability. At the same time, it should not be excluded from possibility that it might carry out a strike in the future.

Question: In any case, does it appear to you at this time that the PLO has abandoned its way of terror, and is turning to a way of peace, in public?

Answer: I do not for a minute believe that the PLO is capable of putting down its weapons of terror, but it is able to play the verbal game of propaganda and say that now they are following the political road, while at the same time there are elements in the PLO which will support terrorist acts.

At the same time, one must take into account the fact that even a small organization can carry out a strike in a very simple way and cause many injuries, but that is not to say that its strength is more than it really is.

Question: Do you have any authority on which to base that assessment?

Answer: My estimate is that Yasir Arafat, even if he adopts the political road, cannot but maintain, at least under the table, the option of terror, since those who are around him will not let him give up the method of terror — that is the only way for the groups outside of Fatah to express themselves.

Question: What then are the fruits of the war for Peace in Galilee?

Answer: The war for Peace in Galilee caused, in fact, some organizations to assume a polarized position, but at the same time, various elements in the Arab world have reached the conclusion, at least temporarily, that they must recognize Israel's right to exist on its own land, by force of the new reality.

Question: What happened, after the Peace in Galilee Campaign, to terrorist cells in Judea and Samaria?

Answer: Nothing special, in terms of terrorist cells, happened in Judea and Samaria as a result of the Peace in Galilee Campaign. The defensive system of Israel —

the intelligence, suppression, and security systems, in the last 15 years has been impressive. It can cope with any terrorist organization, including foreign organizations, which try to penetrate Israel. I am not saying that terrorist acts will not be committed in Israel, but the number of casualties is not a function of overall success, but of the event. I do not think that there is any real prospect of a terrorist cell operating beyond a limited time, and in most cases we discover them even before then.

Question: What is the significance of the PLO cell which remained in Beirut, about which the Israelis have been complaining to the American special envoy, Morris Draper?

Answer: It seems to me that for the foreseeable future, the terrorist organizations will be unable to return to Lebanon in that framework, but — at the same time — the terrorists are making great efforts to return to Lebanon. The reason is the shaky regime there, which enables them freedom of action that they do not have in other countries.

When I visited the Fakhani district — the PLO center in Beirut — and I saw the fleet of vehicles of Ibrahim Qulaylat, the head of Murabitun, or when I saw how the regime controls Beirut, i.e. it is almost non-existent — then I understood that only in Lebanon could they do what they did. At the same time, I think that it will be difficult for them to return to Beirut and reproduce what they had there before.

Question: Are they nevertheless trying to return?

Answer: They are trying to send in people and weapons. Let me say a few words about this first. When the terrorists left Beirut, they were convinced that they would return, so they left a foundation in the western part of the city, which they took out with the Syrian army which was evacuated from there.

In accordance with the agreement, we did not check on the types of weapons which the Syrian army took out from western Beirut. The terrorists had no problem in moving their weapons in that way. But they were convinced that the political situation in Lebanon would enable them to return. The leftist groups and a few Muslim leaders encouraged them in this belief. But the IDF, the Phalange, and the Lebanese army entered west Beirut. The weapons were taken, and the military part of the Murabitun ceased to exist. The documentation which was left was seized, and the base of the sort which they had in Lebanon could not be renewed.

It is impossible to say that they are not attempting alternatives, such as underground cells, or intelligence work, and this is not to say that there will not be casualties in Lebanon today, because the territory is not hermetically sealed.

Question: Today, after the campaign, does Israel face a danger of terror?

Answer: In fact, the campaign opened many dangers, but most of them are political. In any case, the Peace in Galilee Campaign and the stubborn anti-terrorist position of Israel moved us closer to a political dialogue with the Arab countries, and there is a prospect of a dialogue with the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. We have been working towards that for many years.

GREATER ACCOMPLISHMENT SEEN IN INFORMAL AGREEMENTS WITH ARABS

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew No 5, 3 Dec 82 pp 10-11

[Article by Elyakim Ha'atsni: "Peace Without a Contractual Agreement"]

[Text] A few days ago, the civil administration in Judea and Samaria held a mass meeting at Hebron under the motto "Yes to Peace". The host of the celebration was the "Village League" of the Hebron region, and it was merely a preparation for the holding of a general meeting of six similar districts from throughout Judea and Samaria. This meeting was supposed to proclaim itself as the Palestinian representation in Judea and Samaria. All of this is intended to supply Israel with a local Arab "partner" for the autonomy talks.

The strength of these leagues is unknown, just as we also do not know the degree of opposition to them which the PLO can enlist since it was beaten in Lebanon. But that strength is subject to doubt. There is no certainty that Jordan, or even Egypt, will join these talks. At the same time, it is clear that when the above mentioned "general meeting" takes place, the civil administration will have a partner for the unilateral application of autonomy.

In this way, one office after another in the military administration will close down, staff officer after staff officer will vacate their places for local Arabs. In this way, agriculture, commerce, welfare, justice, education, etc will be handed over to them unilaterally (i.e. without any political quid pro quo) in an irregular way.

Here we are immediately faced with two severe dangers:

a. Will they be given only administrative-personal matters? Or will they also get public works, communications and telecommunications, water, land, city and village planning, national parks, archeology — in short all of the things which deal with the infrastructure and superstructure?

We have been warning of this danger for more than a year, from the moment that the civil administration was set up. It is now most perceptible.

b. Who are the people who are supposed to man the civil administration in Judea and Samaria?

In this matter, the leader of the movement, Mustafa Dudin, presented -- before the defense minister, foreign journalists, and even the Israeli television audience -- clear credentials: he believes that all of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria must be removed. The fate of Kiryat-Arba is to be the fate of Yamit.

In an interview with Khanokh Bartuv (MA'ARIV 12 Nov 82) Dudin said as follows:

"There were many settlements in the Sinai, but when both sides were persuaded that they had to be removed, they were removed! In the place of Jewish settlers we should settle Judea and Samaria with our refugee brothers from Lebanon and Syria". The final goal is a Palestinian state.

The response to these words might be: My father (Shimon Peres, who decided on elections for Judea and Samaria, in which PLO people were elected as mayors) beat you with whips, and I (Arik Sharon, or whoever advises him to establish the village unions and engage in dialogue with them) will hip you with the scorpion, which is Mustafa Dudin, and his colleagues.

Who knows? It may ultimately become clear that Dudin's little finger is thicker than the loins of Shaka'a, Khalaf, and Qawasmah all in one.

The Hebron meeting of Dudin people is a serious danger for the Jewish future in Judea and Samaria. For now, it is a small cloud. But in a few months it may darken our skies from horizon to horizon.

This article will examine the roots of this danger.

a. The lesson of Egypt

One who for years warned against the destruction of Yamit in exchange for an illusion of a signed peace treaty with Egypt feels little satisfaction when his vision is gradually born out as true: the recall of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, penetration of the Negev by terrorists, behavior more PLO-like than that of the PLO itself, the building of a modern aggressive army whose purpose is to confront the IDF, and even the public declaration that that is indeed the goal and purpose. In such circumstances, nothing is more painful than the feeling of "I was right".

Would it be too much to hope that at least at a later time, the eyes of the peacebinks would be cleared from the dazzle of official false declarations, and that they would acknowledge that Israel's situation was several times better when we were sitting on the EL-Arish line with Ras Muhammad, in a state of non-belligerency, without a formal peace treaty.

For what is left of the "peace"? "Normalization" is dead. Is there any security value to the signed treaty? Isn't it transparent that there is no difference between "non-belligerency" and a "peace treaty", and that the two of them exist only to the extent of our early warning capability?

The failure of the peace treaty is not an accident. The truth can be expressed mathematically: the real advantage obtainable from relations with the Arabs is inversely proportional to the official nature of those relations.

In simple language:

In our relations with the Arabs, everything real and valuable can be obtained for nothing or almost nothing, on the condition that it is not given formal and official expression. Every formal agreement has an enormous cost, and ultimately the end purpose is lost.

The Egyptian example speaks for itself:

100 percent formal peace (mutual recognition, official relations) equals 100 percent concessions in territory (withdrawals, loss of essential defense and economic property) equals 0 percent in exchange. There are those who even say minus 100 percent in exchange, with Egypt under American influence misrepresenting us to the whole world. This is more dangerous than Egypt on the eve of Sadat's rise to power, when U.S. relations with Egypt were much worse.

b. The lesson of Lebanon

The lesson of Lebanon proves that the above mentioned formula works: the good fence from before the war was a real asset in fact, with no formal contractual basis. It gave us a defense buffer, good neighborly relations, trade, manpower for our labor markets, and even investment in human relations, such as medical services, supply of water, etc.

It would have been alright had we tried to expand this unofficial system from a population of 100 thousand in southern Lebanon to a population of a half million (the 40 km area). But this government is going all the way, on the Egyptian model, and is trying for too much: mutual recognition, formal peace agreement, ambassadors, ceremonies, flags. The net result is that today, even the modest achievements in the narrow strip of the Haddad sector are in danger. For in a sovereign Lebanon, with which one can make formal agreements, and not only security agreements, there is no longer room for the "breakaway" militia of Haddad, and the like. The Lebanese army will be on the northern border, with or without a multi-national force, all on the basis of a signed piece of paper. Here too the formula reads: real assets in exchange for a valueless piece of paper.

As an Israeli patriot, and not a Lebanese patriot, I prefer "disorder" in Lebanon, a hundred militias and not one army, with some of those militias linked to us. Enough of "peace in the Galilee". It is best to forget any thought of peace or a signed security agreement with Lebanon. On the contrary, we should do everything to bring the Christian Phalange closer to us, or the Shi'ites, or the Sunnis, the Druze, and even the Palestinians south of the Awwali River and distance them from the central government in Beirut, in order to preserve that asset known as the Haddad sector. The lack of officialness in our relations is inversely proportional to their real benefit. Even the price of a continued Syrian presence in northern Lebanon is not alarming. Such a presence would force a weak half fictitious government in Beirut to depend on us for balance.

All of this is by force of the inter-Arab and international reality, and there is no prospect of our being able to change in it the near future.

c. Another peace like this — and we are lost.

The application of the above mentioned "peace formula" in Israel itself is especially critical, because here we are speaking of a large Arab community which lives with us (in Israel proper, and in Judea and Samaria) in close proximity. The formula for co-existence with this community is as follows: 100 percent "de facto" as against 0 percent formal relations. This is the best situation one can imagine.

More than 100 thousand workers are integrated into our economy, and are gradually adjusting to co-existence. Instead of importing this number of workers from Korea, Portugal, or Turkey, while the Palestinians rot in refugee camps and serve as easy enlistments for the terrorists, our industry enjoys a large market for its products, including a channel for marketing in other Arab countries. We have various human relations and normalization to the degree that we want.

If there is no more intimacy and friendship between the two peoples, it is not because the Arab hand rejects it, but rather because the Jewish hand is not extended more.

The typical Israeli, who is excited by any "exchange" with Egypt or Lebanon (students, tourists, "culture") rejects any social contact with our nearby neighbors. This is so in spite of the fact that such developments are so essential and important when compared to the imaginary romance of faroff Arabs.

This whole desired normalization, which Egypt denies us today by breaching the "peace" agreement, is at hand with the local Arabs, without a formal agreement, without the need for any concessions, at no cost, heart to heart and mind to mind, the only condition being sensitivity and intelligence. One who has neither goes tripping after the transient styles and dreams.

There is only one thing which there is no possibility of obtaining from the Israeli Arabs in the foreseeable future, and it is not even proper to demand it: that they should concede in a formal manner, by official act, by document, by signed agreement, what they view as their rights and their land. In this respect there is no difference between Ramlah and Ramallah, between Jaffa and Nablus. Moreover, if there were an Arab who would sign an agreement acquiescing to the faits accomplis of Zionism, his signature would not be worth the paper it was written on. On the other hand, go and calculate the price which the "sane" people are demanding of us in exchange for a "breakthrough".

To summarize, we already have everything of value with regard to the Arabs of Israel, and what we do not have would bear so high a price as to endanger our very existence. And it would be worthless.

So we return to our formula, the "peace-no peace" formula.

d. Mustafa Dudin

Today, the formula presents us with Mustafa Dudin. This darling of those who pursue a formal peace was at first — according to himself and Israel — interested only in the development of the villages — electricity, water, roads, education. In exchange, he would sever all actual ties with the PLO. This was the optimal stage, the "end" without politics. Unfortunately, he became envious of the civil administration in the peace "achievements" with Egypt, and he sought a "breakthrough" in Judea and Samaria. Israel wanted an Arab representation which would participate in autonomy talks. Village organizations, on a regional basis, became national organizations. And now they talk of a political newspaper. The punishment was not long in coming, as an automatic natural phenomenon: Dudin has proclaimed the fate of Kiryat Arba to be that of Yamit, and he has publicly joined the Reagan plan (which the Israeli prime minister considers a catastrophe). In short, we have nurtured our own Palestinian Amin Jerayel.

Instead of holding land, in fact, without interpretation and political declarations — there should be meetings with Jewish settlers, mutual greetings on holidays and festivals, language study groups in Hebrew and Arabic, soccer games, joint committees for coordination, dialogues to reduce tensions. Instead of settlement in fact — without asking for a political quid pro quo — there should be those elements of personal autonomy in which we are interested. Again we are looking for the signed paper, the television text, the declarations. The unavoidable punishment will happen — it will be the "formula".

7075

330: 4423

FARMERS PLAGUED BY WILD BOARS

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 25 Dec 82 p 18

[Article by Hani Nasr Allah and Mazin Abu Zubayd: "Valley Farms Threatened With Destruction"]

[Excerpts] The green valley is facing a genuine threat.

The danger is herds of wild boars which use the thickets prevalent along the Jordan River as refuges and, when night descends, begin to emerge from the thickets and invade the green farms, wiping out everything in their path.

Hundreds of dunums along the Jordan River, from al-Shunah in the north to Karimah, that is, a stretch of more than 50 kilometers, and inland for more than 3 kilometers east of the river, each night become a stage for the rampages of the wild boars in which they engage in a variety of destructive acts.

How then can the farmers in the valley go on living with this disaster? How can the farmer leave his farm at sunset and what are his feelings when he returns the next day only to find it devastated?

How do the officials in the valley view this issue? AL-DUSTUR explores the green valley to examine the facts over a 3-day period in order to present to the reader this journalistic factfinding because of the concerns of the man working the land with his high hopes.

With the Farmers on Their Farms

Ever since we began our activities to explore the whole issue first hand in the northern valley following the arrival of a number of complaints at AL-DUSTUR's office, we sensed some reserve on the part of the people we met.

In our opinion a sort of strange silence lasted 2 days, despite the gravity of the damage done to the farms during the night. However, when they felt comfortable with us among them, they began to flock around us, coming from various farms, and each wishing to take us by the hand to show us how the wild boars had gone on a rampage in the fields of zucchini and eggplant and the banana and (al kalamantina) trees and how they would root in the ground

up to a half a meter deep, to show us how big the herds are and how they get through the barbed wire, no matter how thick and strong it is. They showed us how they had used every possible "technological" way to fight back, radios, lights and gas-operated air guns, and how the boars got used to them and would pass by them as if they were not there and go about their destruction on the farms.

Farmer Ahmad al-Nayif al-Bashtawi, North al-Shunah: The wild boars are extremely harmful. In our area you find them eating bananas and citrus fruit. When some farmers put out poison to protect their farms from these wild boars, the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature took these farmers to court.

On our part, we urge the quarters concerned to protect our farms by any appropriate means; otherwise, we will have no farms because everything on the farms is subject to damage by the boars, particularly in the al-Zur areas close to the Jordan River the areas where these harmful animals hold sway since the farms are difficult to guard at night.

'Ali Nahar Abu Hudayb, al-Mushari': I farm a piece of land in Zur al-Saghir, al-Mushari', planted in squash, eggplant and beans. We used to plant potatoes in al-Zur but damage by the wild boars made us stop planting them for good. We got permits 2 years ago to stay on the farms at night and used to take turns guarding them with guns. At night we would see herds of wild boars, each with 15 to 20 animals, crossing the farms and we would get them out since they would run when, hearing us yell, they became aware of our presence. When these permits expired and were not renewed, the boars had a free run and things returned to where they had been. We appeal to the quarters responsible to apply some general measure to protect our farms in the face of this looming danger.

'Arif Ahmad Sulayman, al-Mushari': I own 62 dunums of irrigated land along the river planted in squash, broad beans, eggplant and beans by farmers. There has been extensive damage in previous seasons but it has let up. This is attributable to the growth of dense thickets of canes, brambles and tamarisk on the other side of the river. These thickets were like jungles where the boars would hide and use as a home. So, I think that elimination of such dense growth in all areas along the river would be a positive factor in getting the boars to move on and stopping their activities. At this point I would like to caution that the use of poison is a two-edged sword. It could harm people and animals that get hold of it. One herd of 40 head of sheep died in one fell swoop because they took some poison that was laid out to combat the boars.

No one said that he had poisoned a wild boar despite all this damage although some boars had died from one cause or another--how? An owner of an agricultural supplies place said that he had been taken to court and had gone to al-Shunah merely because he had said that "such and such" was a type of poison that would kill boars.

Musa Husayn al-Khatib, Wadi Ilyas: My farm is located right beside the river and used to cover 31 dunums but the river has cut away at it for the past 5

years and only 8 dunums are left. They are planted in squash and eggplant which are now at the mercy of the boars which no longer are satisfied with eating the fruit but eat the plants as well.

I believe that the boars live in the dense thickets which are prevalent along the river and on the islets in the middle of the river and from there sneak into the farms at night to wreak destruction everywhere they go.

Some persons who have seen them say that the boars are the size of a big donkey. I do not think that the methods used by the farmers, such as barbed wire around the farms, are of any use and believe that the appropriate authorities, on the highest level, must get involved to solve this problem facing the al-Zur land in the northern and central valley as far as Dayr 'Ala.

This area, about 70 kilometers long and at least 2 kilometers wide, will be the scene of activity by the boars unless we double the personnel. The boars have helped to bar the planting of some crops, such as lettuce, potatoes and corn, as it is considered risky to plant them.

While we were speeding along in our car toward Zur al-Sa'idiyah, west of the town of Karimah, thoughts kept coming to mind since at the time there was a plague of rats in the capital, all the necessary technological expertise was mobilized to fight them, using anti-rodent experts. So why is the green valley being exposed to all this damage without anyone taking action to help it. Rather, the wild boars are enjoying full protection, like gazelles, rabbits and doves. I went on to wonder: Will the day come when we see wild boars playing with our children in public squares like cats. I stopped meditating when we found ourselves at the edge of the river where the farmers began pointing with the hands, saying: "Here, the wild boars hide in those thickets."

As far as the eye could see, farms covered the green valley telling the story of the eternal friendship between man and the land.

Each farmer began telling us his worries mixed with profit and loss sheets. Headman Salih Ahmad Hamdan, Zur al-Sa'idiyah, Karima: I have made nothing at all this season and I do not know how I will pay the loans I got from the cooperative society and the federation of farmers and wholesalers amounting to 5,000 dinars, not to mention the debts that have piled up the last year. The boars are insatiable. When they cross a field nothing is left after they cover it with deep furrows. Even fallow land is not safe from their depredations. The painful thing in this situation is that we see all the destruction being wrought on our farms and can do nothing.

'Abd-al-Rahman Salim 'Abradah: I have a citrus orchard and other land which I farm on shares. Everything has been affected by the destruction by the boars. I have used various preventive methods to save my crops but to no avail.

The boars have had a big huge effect on production. Take for example 35 dunums of squash which could be expected to produce 300 cases per picking. We will get only 27 cases and the rest has gone as food for the boars. Given this situation, we have no choice but to stop farming and leave.

Nahar Sulayman Khalaf: I have a 43 dunum farm planted in squash, peppers, beans and broad beans. I left it for 2 days and returned to find it stripped as if a whole herd had invaded it. I got nothing from it and stopped working it completely.

With the Agricultural Engineers

Agricultural engineer Muhammad 'Ali Miqdadi: This current issue can be controlled and its harmful effects stopped by taking appropriate measures. The successive forays of the boars which coincide with nightfall have wiped out hundreds of dunums planted in crops during the fall barren period. This has prompted the farmers, who for the most part are tenants or sharecroppers, to hesitate to plant or to continue with this production plan, some feeling that this would save money and wasted effort by cutting losses in advance.

Stopping farming in the agricultural units along or overlooking the Jordan River can have only one consequence, a loss, and this makes it essential for the quarters concerned to take action each in accordance with his responsibilities and potential.

Among modern methods in this regard to protect crops are the erection of barbed wire permanently around the threatened land and giving the farmer a chance to guard their crops at night through appropriate security arrangements.

When Will This Threat Ease?

Eng 'Abdullah Wajih al-Salman, director of the Northern al-Shunah Farmers Cooperative Society, talked to us about this problem, saying:

The problem of wild boars is not of recent vintage but goes way back in the area. However, the threat has begun to grow for two reasons:

1. Increased numbers on the Jordan River with no permission to combat them.
2. The development of farming in al-Zur right on the river and the elimination of woodland and its replacement by fruit trees and vegetables. For special reasons, the wild boars have found this area a fine breeding ground with few dangers and they are able to live in safety. Accordingly these boars have begun to increase in numbers until they have now become large herds threatening our farms and crops. The threat involves foraging on farms of bananas, potatoes and corn and when the boars do not find such crops, they turn to attacking fruit trees and eating the fruit.

If a herd of boars attacks any farm, it is worse than locusts since they totally wipe out all fruit and cereals. This is what the valley farmers are suffering from, particularly those close to the Jordan River.

Accepted ways to combat the boars are:

1. Hunting, that is, by shooting them. No farmer can do this because that requires a special permit from security authorities.
2. Poison, that is, by poisoning fruit and putting it out as easy food for the boars. However, some farmers have been hit with legal actions brought against them by the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature because they were using this method and this made them stop this approach.
3. Traps. This is an impractical method because the boar must tread upon the trap to be workable; if he proceeds beside it, he is safe.
4. Cannon. This is an apparatus that gives out a sound familiar to cannon fire. However, the boars quickly get used to the sound and are no longer afraid.
5. We therefore find that the farmer cannot practically and effectively combat the wild boars which in repeated forays wipe out crops for good. Therefore, some farmers who can afford it build an enclosure around their farms. This is very costly and requires a concrete wall because some of the boars have managed to dig under the enclosure and get into the farms. Because of this, a comprehensive plan must be adopted to eliminate the boar threat which is growing day by day by passing new legislation allowing the farmers to use all means to eliminate the wild boars, keeping in mind that poisoning has been the easiest, most successful and cheapest method.

Agricultural engineer Ahmad al-Radayiday, director of the Northern al-Shunah branch of the farmers federation: The wild boars are a worse plague than an epidemic or agricultural diseases because the fields as a whole are threatened with the forays of these abominable animals which are now increasing in numbers year after year and are prevalent in all areas of al-Zur along the Jordan River. Their threat has become very serious and has begun to spread to the hillsides, reaching the higher areas, such as the Ajlun hills and neighboring areas. The threat may grow worse and increase in numbers, if we take into account the way they increase, endangering other agricultural areas in Jordan.

Accordingly, the authorities concerned must take positive action to rid the farmers of the evil of these animals. There are local solutions and general ones.

The local solutions involve the farmers building barbed wire fences around their farms using special specifications, i.e., strength and height of the wire, and making a main gate to the farm to be opened and closed as needed.

The general solutions: Since the wild boars are a natural animal resource according to Jordanian law which punishes any violator, a bill must be passed to contain these animals in a limited area away from agricultural land by earmarking an extended area of land where they could live as a natural animal resource.

With Officials in the Northern Valley

The director of valley agriculture, Eng Khayr al-Din 'Uwaydat: The boar threat is constant almost throughout the year given the continuous production of vegetables, bananas and other crops.

The scale of the problem is increased by the fact that they are present in border areas and so we encounter great difficulty in combatting them and estimating their numbers. There are several authorities with a connection with the issue, besides the Ministry of Agriculture, including the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature.

We said: What steps did you take during the past season?

During the past season, we asked official quarters to deal with the problem and some special arrangements were made in agreement with the appropriate quarters to combat the boars in the areas where the farmers had complained about large numbers of them.

What is your perception of the problem at the present time?

We are currently advising the farmers of ways to combat them on a limited scale and on placing barbed wire around threatened farms.

The hunting law poses an obstacle in combatting wild boars. I believe that this should not stop the farmers from resisting damage by the boars if they are actually within the grounds of the farm only.

Although the pig is taboo in the Islamic shari'a, its existence has an effect on the balance of the natural environment. God has his own concerns in creation.

District Officer of the Northern Valley

The problem of the wild boars was raised in the office of the district officer of the Northern Valley District who said: A large number of farmers of the northern valley area have complained that the wild boars in the al-Zur area are damaging their crops. Most of the damage, estimated at thousands of dinars, has been to bananas, melons, corn and cantaloupes.

I have received information that the wild boars have gone up from the valley area to the 'Aljun area and have actually damaged some crops there.

What steps have you taken to protect the farmers?

I have asked the Royal Society for Protection of Nature to permit farmers to hunt the boars with special permits from the society itself, keeping in mind that the society vigorously opposes putting out poison for these boars. The society stated that the farmers hurt personally by the boars would have to go to the offices of the Royal Society for Protection of Nature in Amman

to be granted licenses for hunting these boars after the society gets details from them about the threat to their crops by these boars.

Do you have any other solutions in mind?

I think that leniency in granting licenses to hunt the boars will be conducive to hunting down a number of the wild boars which have seen a great increase in numbers and, as a result, protect the farmers' crops. There is another preventive approach involving stringing barbed wire around the farms to protect them but this is very expensive.

So, we hope that we do not leave the farmers at the point of despair because of disregard of their very real problems. We hope that studied and urgent action will restore the confidence of the people in our country, in our green valley, that their concerns are our concerns and that our objective is for them to remain on and associated with his land, that protecting them and their lands, which are a source of livelihood and wealth for our country, is more important to us than protecting "nature".

8389

CSO: 4404/149

VARIOUS REPORTS ON HIJACKING NOTED

'Aden Radio' Reports

NC201952 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 20 Jan 83

[Text] One of the planes of our country's Al Yemda Airlines was hijacked by suspected elements, intriguing against the Palestinian revolution, during one of the regularly scheduled flights of our Boeing plane between Kuwait and Damascus. The mercenary pirates attempted to force the crew of the plane to change its flight to Cairo. However, this attempt was foiled and the plane landed safely at Djibouti airport and the hijackers surrendered to Djibouti authorities.

ANA reports that official authorities in the PDRY followed this incident with concern and demanded participation in the investigation of the hijackers.

More on Hijacking

NC201193 Paris AFP in English 1058 GMT 20 Jan 83

[Text] Djibouti, 20 Jan (AFP)--The aircraft, on a flight from Aden to Damascus via Kuwait, carried 40 passengers and 10 crew.

It landed here at 11.30 a.m. (0830 GMT) after the captain told the control tower that he had problems.

The nationalities and number of hijackers involved was not immediately known. Airport sources said they were asking for food and more fuel for the aircraft, but they had issued no political demands.

Djibouti Interior Minister Yussuf 'Ali Chirdon was in contact with the air pirates.

Commando Plane Rejected

NC201144 Paris AFP in English 1142 GMT 20 Jan 83

[Text] Djibouti, 20 Jan (AFP)--Airport sources said the Djiboutian authorities refused to allow a South Yemeni military plane to land carrying a commando to attack the hijacked plane.

The sources said that negotiations by radio between the control tower and the plane had been cut off by the hijackers.

A Palestine Liberation Organisation representative here came to the airport and was talking with one of the hijackers. One of the co-pilots said that the hijacker had a "Palestinian accent."

Air traffic at the airport has been disturbed by the incident.

Gunfire Exchanged

111120Z Paris AFP in English 1200 CMT 20 Jan 83

Djibouti, 20 Jan (AFP)--Gunfire was exchanged inside the plane between members of the crew and the hijackers, and two passengers were wounded, according to a Djiboutian police officer who got close to the plane.

The crew of the Boeing, still armed, had moved up into the flight deck, the officer said.

The plane's captain apparently left the airport in order to keep [words illegible]

Later an ambulance had arrived at the airport, and it seemed likely that the Djibouti Security Forces would take over from the negotiators.

Hijacked Passengers Arrive

111134 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 21 Jan 83

Aden. The passengers and crew of the Al Yemda's Boeing--which was hijacked by suspected elements, who have infiltrated the Palestinian revolution, during one of its regularly scheduled flights between Kuwait and Damascus yesterday--returned to Aden on board a special flight this afternoon.

They were received upon arrival at Aden International Airport by Brother 'Abdallah Muhammad 'Aziz, member of the YSP Central Committee and minister of communications; Brother 'Abbas Zaki, PLO representative in Aden; and brother [illegible] officials at the Ministry of Communications and Al Yemda.

Meanwhile, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has sent a thank you cable to his brother Hassan Gouled, president of Djibouti, in which he expressed his appreciation and thanks for the efforts he and brother Djibouti officials exerted to guarantee the safety of the passengers and crew of the Yemeni airliner.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad earlier received a cable from Hassan Gouled informing him of the efforts he made to contain the incident and guarantee the safety of the airliner's passengers.

Hijackers Surrender

NC201257 Paris AFP in English [no time given] GMT 20 Jan 83

[Text] Djibouti, 20 Jan (AFP)--Three hijackers who forced a South Yemeni Boeing 707 to land at the airport here today with 40 passengers on board surrendered at 3:15 p.m. local time after a shoot-out with the crew.

The hijackers had allowed two passengers, who were wounded in the exchange of gunfire, to leave the plane and they were taken to hospital.

One passenger of Iraqi nationality acting as mediator left the plane with the wounded passengers, accompanied by a hijacker who won assurances and guarantees from the Djibouti authorities.

The hijacker, who claimed to have Palestinian and Syrian nationality, said he had not seen his family for two years and hoped to leave for another unspecified country in order to live and work there.

The three hijackers then left the plane, surrendered their weapons and left the airport with Djiboutian Foreign Minister Moumin Bahdon Farah.

The passengers were also allowed to disembark.

CSO: 4400/179

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

GULF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION--Kuwait, 20 Jan (QNA)--'Abd al-Qadir Jamal, PDRY minister of oil and chairman of the Oil and Ministers Committee [titles as received], has stressed the importance of establishing industrial cooperation between the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula countries through various industrial projects. He stressed the region's ability to develop industries to supply the Gulf and peninsula market in the future. In an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM published today, he said that it is possible to make use of an undeveloped area in the PDRY to develop trade by constructing assembly factories and reexporting their products. [Text] [GF201728 Doha QNA in Arabic 1450 GMT 20 Jan 83]

PDRY-VIETNAMESE PROTOCOL--A protocol for cooperation between the YSP and the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party] for 1983-1984 was signed at the YSP Central Committee's Secretariat today. The protocol included the development of relations and cooperation between the two friendly parties in the exchange of visits and party expertise, exchange of plans, coordination, and cooperation between representatives of the two parties in party conferences and regional symposiums, cooperation between the higher scientific socialism college and the higher party college of the VCP Central Committee and the exchange of documentary and cultural films. [Text] [GF251644 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 25 Jan 83]

CSO: 4400/179

SOVIET REACTIONS TO THREE YEARS OF WAR DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 28 Dec 82 p 4

[Article by Claude Lorieux]

[Text] The USSR has protested against the demonstrations that took place during the morning outside its embassy in Teheran. The police have been forced to fire into the air to disperse the Afghans, who had tried to enter the embassy. Other demonstrations against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and marking the third anniversary of the intervention were held in other capitals, including Delhi and Geneva.

Babrak Karmal does not lack a sense of humor--sometimes unintended. The head of the Afghan Government had decided that yesterday would be a holiday. To celebrate the third anniversary of the "fraternal" intervention of the Soviet army? No, simply Muhammad's birthday.

The High Council of Ulemas (the doctors of the faith) in turn announced to the faithful that "the fratricidal war against revolutionary Afghanistan is not a jihad, holy war."

Three years after the Soviet intervention that put him in power, Babrak Karmal keeps trying to make people forget the sacrilegious statements he made in the past, but which his adversaries the Afghan resistance still remember. Why this determination to appear a good Muslim? It is in the name of Islam that the Mujahidin (100,000 of them, according to American sources) have been waging a war that, if not total, is certainly cruel, and that 3 million Afghans have become refugees in neighboring Pakistan, as well as Iran. It is a war in which the civil population is more and more involved, in which it is rare to take prisoners, and to which the only foreign witnesses are doctors (most of them French, Belgian or Swiss) or a few journalists.

Although limited in scope, this conflict has over the months extended to almost all the Afghan provinces. The Soviet forces have been progressively expanded: from 80,000 they now reportedly total 105,000 or 120,000 according to American official estimates. In 3 years, their losses have risen to about 7,000 killed and more than 10,000 wounded.

Nevertheless, they have enlarged their field of operations, the Soviets have not increased their commitment to a degree that would make it comparable to the

American involvement in Vietnam. They are conducting a limited war, which in some sectors even takes the form of a kind of status quo--not only to say gentleman's agreement--with the bands of Mujahidin. Certainly, they have responded to the main challenges of the resistance, by driving them (temporarily, to be sure) from Qandahar last winter, or by "punitive" operations, as they were still doing this autumn against the resistance in Panshir, one of the showcases of the anti-Karmal movement.

Memory of the Basmatchis

However, the resistance is far from beaten. The Soviet press, which at the outset of the intervention presented an almost idyllic picture of the "fraternal country," today presents it with realism, though certainly not going to extremes. It is a matter of making the "average Russian" understand that the cleanup operation will perhaps take longer than expected.

The readers of PRAVDA or the Red Army paper do not yet mention the memory of the Basmatchis, the Soviet Central Asian rebels who resisted the Kremlin's troops for more than 15 years, but everyone is thinking about them. Starting with the Mujahidin. Technically and militarily, they are in a better position than they were 3 years ago: deserters and smugglers have provided them in general with more effective weapons. In 1980, they were attacking the Russians like their grandfathers had machinegunned the English in the Khyber Pass. Schooled by experience, they are operating more in small groups, and there is cooperation among groups with differing political views.

However the resistance is far from being all-powerful: It is still unprotected against the rocket-firing helicopters, which "do wonders" against the guerrillas. Especially it is divided. The "parties," which are located, often comfortably, in Peshawar, the Koblenz of the Afghan emigration, often have divergent visions of the country's future. The integrists imagine Afghanistan transformed into an Islamic republic "a la Khomeyni." The intellectuals, long kept aside, find it difficult to tolerate this sectarianism. Some view King Zahir Shah, who lives in exile in Rome, as a possible unifier... but always in a very hypothetical way. Those killed in the Afghan civil war are not all victims of Soviet or government bullets.

These divisions make foreign aid to the guerrillas more difficult, despite the sympathy they enjoy not only in the West and the Muslim world, but also among the nonaligned. Leonid Brezhnev had certainly not foreseen the rallying of support that was confirmed at the latest session of the UN General Assembly. The Soviet intervention was condemned by 114 votes to 21, with 13 abstentions.

Advent of Andropov

Yuriy Andropov's advent gave rise to a number of rumors about possible modification in the Soviet position: Was not the KGB opposed to the Kabul coup, as revealed by a Soviet defector? Some also thought they detected some wavering in the attitude of Pakistan, target of the Kremlin's cajolings and pressure. The departure to Moscow of most of Babrak Karmal's team for the Soviet 60th anniversary celebration made one think that the Kremlin was going

to make an initiative. Karmal has returned to Kabul. However, Andropov's spokesmen have made no statements, except to repeat the "dogma:" No withdrawal unless there is a halt to foreign intervention. Is the door still closed to any bargaining. Nothing is less certain. However, the West fears a "solution" that would in fact be nothing more than a cover to enable the Soviets to stay.

9920

CSO: 4619/22

HIGHLIGHTS OF THREE YEARS OF WAR INTERPRETED

East Burnham ISLAMIC WORLD DEFENCE in English Jan-Mar 83 pp 28-31

[Text] **The insurgent war in Afghanistan tends to be pushed into the background, overshadowed by the more violent eruptions in Lebanon and elsewhere. Nevertheless this "long haul" struggle between the armed forces, and the *Mujahidin* guerrilla resistance continues, and may soon be reaching a critical watershed. With a 90,000 strong occupation force, surprisingly small considering the size of the country, the Soviets are holding the *Mujahidin* in check. In an interview, the Afghan Prime Minister, Ali Khistnand, said: "The Afghan army has never been more powerful in its history, and depends much less on Soviet troops to fight the Muslim rebels".**

Afghanistan had become a republic after a coup in 1973, led by Mohammed Daoud, although he tried to keep his country non-aligned, it gradually fell under Soviet influence. His army and air force were armed, re-organised, and trained by a large Soviet military mission. As a political movement, the *Mujahidin* resistance stems from this period. It was mobilised in opposition to the Soviet-engineered coup of April 1978, which ousted President Daoud and installed Nur Mohammed Taraki in his place.

In 1978, the Afghan armed forces were 110,000 strong. The army, of 100,000 men, was in 16 small formations, some designated divisions and others regiments, all on the Soviet pattern, with a total of 1,000 tanks and armoured vehicles, and 1,000 guns and heavy mortars. The air force, of 10,000 men, had 180 combat aircraft, and a few transport planes and helicopters. All the arms and equipment were Soviet-manufactured. The enlarged Soviet military mission held the armed forces in a tight grip.

The only political party in Afghanistan was the People's Democratic Party, the PDP, which had been formed in 1965 on Communist lines, but it had split into two factions. The larger one, centred mainly on the armed forces, was known as the Khalk (the Masses), and the smaller one the Parcham (the Flag). There was intense rivalry between these two factions, involving the occasional shoot-out, assassinations, and sometimes mass detentions when one or the other had the power to imprison. President Taraki led the Khalk faction. Soviet troops were flown in to quell an army mutiny at Herat in March 1979; and when another army mutiny flared up in Ghazni garrison, in September, because a Parcham general had been sent to take command, the Soviets were again asked to intervene with military force.

In September 1979, a coup was mounted by Hafizullah Amin, also of the Khalk faction, which ousted Taraki. This was not to the Soviet liking, as President Amin began to adopt a non-alignment policy, and made overtures to the United States.

The Soviet invasion

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan began on the 23rd December 1979, and was spearheaded by an airborne division (10,000 men), flown into the main Afghan air base at Bagram, just north of the capital, Kabul. The operation consisted of 200 sorties by An-12 and An-22 transport aircraft, accompanied by about 100 Soviet combat planes, mainly MiG-21s, and about 40 Mi-24 helicopters. These airborne troops quickly settled on the main Afghan airfields near the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez, Jelalabad, Kandahar, Konduz, Herat and Bagram. At the same time three Soviet infantry (motorised rifle) divisions moved southwards into Afghanistan along the strategic roadway heading for Kabul. These were soon followed by two more divisions, and within a week about 50,000 Soviet troops were in the country. The invasion force was

commanded by Marshal Sergei Sokolovsky, the First Deputy Defence Minister.

The Soviets had made careful preparation for this invasion. The Afghan army and air force were already virtually under the control of some 2,000 Soviet advisers. General Ivan Pavlovsky, a Soviet Deputy Defence Minister, made a long visit to Afghanistan, between August and October 1979, to formulate the plans. On the 8th-9th December, a Special Brigade of Soviet airborne troops arrived at Bagram air base; and on the 20th, with light armoured vehicles and guns, it moved northwards to hold the vital Salang Pass and road tunnel, through which Soviet invading forces, with over 1,000 tanks and armoured vehicles were to pass.

The Soviets brought with them an exiled Afghan politician, Babrak Karmal; engineered a palace coup in which President Hafizullah Amin was killed; and installed Karmal in his place as their puppet President. The Soviets took over existing government and military installations. They found Afghanistan in the throes of insurrection with the *Mujahidin* virtually in control of twelve of the 28 provinces, and with strong centres of resistance in another ten, while a number of provincial towns were closely invested, and others were actually occupied. The Soviet arrival caused a surge of anti-Russian feeling, especially in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and other major cities, which Afghan troops barely controlled by day. At night the cities and 80 per cent of the countryside were given over to the *Mujahidin* and other anti-government groups.

The overall Soviet aim was quickly and quietly to turn Afghanistan into a compliant puppet state to be a link in the plan for a defensive belt of pro-Soviet states along the southern border of the USSR. An Afghan puppet Government was to govern the country for the Soviets, and the Afghan armed forces were to fight the *Mujahidin*, while the Soviets sat back on the key installations, and controlled the strategic roads, only intervening with aircraft, armour and guns, whenever the Afghan army needed such support.

During the first two months or so the Soviets tried to operate this policy but it failed because the Afghan army was falling to pieces. Its strength was reduced to nearly half: troops deserted, many young men avoided conscription and Afghan soldiers were reluctant to fire on the *Mujahidin* in case of blood feuds. A two-year period of conscription was in force, but there were many exemptions. From this period the *Mujahidin* resistance movement took on a more positive political character, as the object was now to get rid of the Soviet invaders; but at the same time spasmodic traditional inter-tribal fighting continued.

Numerous small *Mujahidin* groups had sprung up across the country, but remained independent of each other. This was because the groups

remained in their own tribal areas with tribal rivalries and personality clashes. Desertion from the army was rife, and although most deserters simply went back to their villages as military service was unpopular, they took their arms with them, most of which eventually found their way into *Mujahidin* hands. Others, who deserted to join the *Mujahidin*, sometimes in large groups, took heavier weapons and quantities of ammunition with them. Even so, the *Mujahidin* was inadequately armed, and was hardly organised at all in the military sense.

The Soviet offensive

As the Afghan army proved to be an ineffective instrument, the Soviets realised they would have to combat the insurgency themselves. More Soviet divisions were brought in until Soviet troops numbered over 80,000, and their campaign against the *Mujahidin* began in March 1980. The Soviets moved to relieve the besieged towns, by first of all intensely bombing the *Mujahidin* positions surrounding them, and then using Mi-24 helicopters to fire rockets and machine guns to drive the besiegers back into the mountains. Occupied towns were restored to government control by combined Soviet and Afghan military attacks.

Next, the Soviets concentrated on clearing the strategic roads, vulnerable to *Mujahidin* ambushes and other activity. Again, this was done by extensive aircraft bombing and helicopter rocket attacks on any suspected *Mujahidin* positions, and then razed villages and buildings near the roads. Despite this, all vehicles had to move in convoys along the roads, protected by tanks and guns, with helicopters flying overhead to give warning of ambush or attack, and with bomber-aircraft on call. In April, for example, near Kirqa, on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad, eight senior Soviet officers, including three generals, were killed in an ambush action. All movement on roads between cities ceased during the hours of darkness, enabling the *Mujahidin* to move about freely to lay mines and destroy culverts.

The Soviets almost lost control of some main cities including Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat. A rising in Kabul in February, took Soviet troops three days to put down. This was followed by a week-long strike, in which shootings, explosions and mass arrests were common, especially at night. Military cantonments were usually outside cities, while government buildings inside them were heavily guarded. In April it took the Soviets four days hard fighting to restore order in Herat. In June, martial law was declared in Herat and Kandahar; both were centres of deep anti-Russian feeling. In the same month there were disturbances in Jalalabad and a strike in Mazar-e-Sharif, all anti-Soviet motivated. On the 24th July,

There was another army mutiny at Ghazni, which took Soviet troops ten days to quell.

The majority of the population lived in valleys, some of which had fertile agricultural land, and many became centres of resistance. In the spring the Soviets blocked access routes in a number of valleys in Konar, Lagman, Nangarhar, Logar and Paktia—provinces lying between Kabul and the Pakistan border. Soviet and Afghan army casualties were suffered in Konar province in March. Other black spots from the Soviet point of view were the province of Badakhshan, bordering the USSR and China; and the Panjshir Valley, some 65 miles north of Kabul. The road between Kabul and the Kyber Pass at the Pakistan border, was a main trade artery, and was now cluttered with escaping refugees. The few western journalists who managed to slip into Afghanistan, which was barred to them, reported many burnt-out tanks and vehicles pushed to the side of this road.

Soviet change of tactics

In mid-1980, the Soviets changed their tactics, and began adopting measures reminiscent of those used by the Americans in Vietnam. This gave rise to reports of North Vietnamese and Cuban guerrilla warfare experts being in Afghanistan. A few did visit briefly with a Soviet delegation in July, but did not stay on as Marshal Sokolovsky rejected their advice. In this month, Afghanistan was divided into seven military districts, each under the control of a Soviet general and an Afghan government official, each of which had up to 1,000 specially trained commandos at their disposal, and a number of Mi-24 helicopters available for quick reaction strikes against the *Mujahidin*.

Soldiers with more experience were drafted in as young, less mature ones, who had been told they were going to fight the Americans and Chinese, had not made out so well in the early months of the fighting. Initially, the Soviets had brought in about 5,000 Muslim Soviet troops, mainly Turkoman, Tajik and Uzbek, who spoke dialects similar to the Afghans, to work on Soviet "hearts and minds" projects, but were soon recalled as they began to sympathise with the local Afghans.

Soviet tactics were now based on air-power, fire-power and the wide use of Mi-24 helicopter gun-ships. After clearing an area by blanket bombing, often with napalm and cluster bombs, heliborne assault troops would move in to eliminate pockets of *Mujahidin*, in both the valleys and the mountainous areas. Whole stretches of territory alongside strategic roads were depopulated and designated "free fire" zones, in which anything that moved was fired at. A similar policy was adopted at the mouths of the

larger valleys to drive the inhabitants farther into them away from their fields. This was the Soviet Starvation Policy, in which crops were burnt, domestic animals killed and irrigation systems destroyed.

The Soviets began a programme to reconstitute and condition the Afghan army, which owing to its desertion rate could no longer be trusted with weapons that might be of use to the *Mujahidin*. Some units had been completely disarmed. By the end of 1980 the army was down to about 40,000 men, of whom only 12,000 were conscripts. An amnesty offered to deserters in February (1980) proved futile and another measure in April, to entice school-leavers into a "voluntary call-up" for only six months service instead of the normal two-year conscription period, also flopped. Able-bodied men began to join the refugee columns into Pakistan and Iran. Another scheme, to commission some of the regular non-commissioned officers as junior officers, had limited success. Many Afghan officers were selected for training in the USSR.

In January 1981, the minimum age for conscription was reduced from 21 to 20 years, but at the same time extended government powers were assumed to recall reservists and retain conscripts in the service. In April, the minimum age was lowered again, from 20 to 19 years of age. That month, unreliable Afghan army units guarding Kabul were replaced by Soviet ones. Later, in April 1982, about 10,000 conscripts who had completed their initial service, were retained indefinitely resulting in open discontent. In September the recall of all former servicemen under 35 years of age was authorised, causing serious rioting in Kabul and other cities, and increased exodus of the able-bodied from the country.

Insurgent war

In the autumn of 1980, the Soviets launched a series of offensives, using some 25,000 Soviet troops in all, backed by aircraft and helicopters, together with any Afghan units they could muster. The *Mujahidin* still controlled 80 per cent of the country. The first operation was in August, into the Panjshir Valley, which continued into the following month, until stopped at Rokha, when boulders tumbled by explosives, blocked the tracks. In September, another operation was launched against the *Mujahidin* in the Konar Valley in an attempt to seal off infiltration and supply routes from Pakistan; in October, a similar operation was launched in Paktia province; and then the Logar valleys, south of Kabul, were heavily bombarded from the air. In October, the *Mujahidin* attacked a Soviet headquarters complex near Kabul, and in December, the air base near Jelalabad. The pattern of this insurgent

war was emerging.

During 1981, the Soviets seemed content to maintain the status quo, and by using American-Vietnam tactics waited until the capability of the Afghan army improved. It was a year of intensive Soviet aerial bombing of *Mujahidin* areas and positions; Mi-24 gun-ship raids; more "free-fire" zones; and forcing people further up their valleys in the hope of starving them into surrender in the winter months ahead. Road movement was by daylight only, in heavily protected convoys, and the cities and towns continued to echo with the sounds of explosions and shootings, especially at night.

The Soviets did not seem to seriously commit many ground troops into action away from the motorable roads and tracks: the Soviet soldier seemed reluctant to get out of his vehicle. Small offensives were periodically launched into the Panjshir Valley, and other troublesome valleys adjacent to both the Pakistan and USSR frontier areas, which usually petered out when they ran into tough opposition. *Mujahidin* resistance was particularly active in provinces adjacent to Pakistan; in the mountains to the north and east of Kabul; and in the Paghman area, about 20 miles north of Kabul, which was a vital road junction.

Herat remained a problem. The *Mujahidin* overran it on the 27th December and Soviet armed forces did not regain control until the 27th January 1982. In January government forces lost control of Kandahar, and it took Soviet troops until the 8th February to "cleanse it of rebels". Kabul remained tense, with frequent incidents of violence by day and night; and the Soviet Embassy came under rocket fire on several occasions. Pakistan Intelligence estimated the Soviets had suffered 5,000 killed and wounded by the end of 1981, and had lost over 650 tanks and vehicles, and about ten aircraft and helicopters. One Soviet MiG pilot was captured in June when he baled out after his plane was hit by a SAM-7 missile, and was held prisoner by the *Mujahidin*.

In April 1980, the Soviets made a Treaty with the Afghan Government for the "temporary occupation by a limited Soviet military contingent" in the country. In June, Soviet troops moved into the sensitive Wakhan Strip, a long thin finger of mountain massif that touched China, having Soviet territory to its north and Pakistan to its south. It is anticipated that the Soviets will soon annexe the strategically valuable Wakhan Strip. In December, President Karmal formed the National Patriotic Front, a coalition of both Khalk and Parcham factions, and others, but he had difficulty in holding it together. The two PDP factions still quarrelled viciously, and occasional shoot-outs still occurred.

Meanwhile, the *Mujahidin* were not doing as well as they should have done. This was because

the several groups remained independent, and were reluctant to co-operate with each other, and even on occasions fought each other. They also lacked sufficient modern weapons and ammunition. Soviet weapons were still brought over by deserters from the Afghan army, and others trickled in over mountain tracks from Pakistan and China. Many opportunities were lost because they still fought in the traditional, tribal fashion, disregarding timing, co-ordination and field discipline. In short, they lacked military expertise.

They also lacked central direction. A number of leaders had established themselves and their group headquarters (there were at one time over a dozen, all claiming to speak for the *Mujahidin*) in Pakistan, where there were (latest figures) over 2.7 million Afghan refugees registered with United Nations organisations, living in makeshift camps. Another 400,000 had fled to Iran. On the 19th March 1980, six of the exiled *Mujahidin* groups, in Peshawar, Pakistan, formed the "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan", but the reputed largest and most influential one, the Hezbi Islami (Islamic Party) refused to join this Alliance. Failure to present a united front and a common policy meant that few countries were prepared to send money or arms, and consequently the *Mujahidin* in the mountains were deprived of means to fight the Soviets. Egypt did send a few arms, as did China, while Saudi Arabia gave a little money, and promised more when a united leadership would appear.

During 1982, the Soviets in Afghanistan continued to rely upon aircraft and fire-power to contain the *Mujahidin* in the mountains, launching only the occasional land operation usually as a punitive measure. More futile attempts were made to seal off infiltration routes, along which a small volume of arms and supplies continued to trickle. Apart from using the "iron fist" from time to time the Soviets remained content to sit upon strategic centres and roads, and wait for the Afghan army to become sufficiently effective to combat the insurgency for them.

The largest Soviet-Afghan operation was in July 1982, when a week-long offensive was launched in the Paghman area, which penetrated the main valley for some distance. Another, smaller operation, was mounted farther north in the Shomali region the following month. In September, *Mujahidin* forces bombarded the air base at Jelaalabad with rocket fire. All cities remained under night curfew, and by day protected convoys of vehicles moved along the strategic roads, which by night were deserted, except for the roving *Mujahidin*.

Soviet strategy

The Soviet forces in Afghanistan had neither the capacity, nor the inclination, to become deeply

involved in guerrilla warfare, which would quickly have absorbed increasing numbers of soldiers. So the stalemate persisted. The road-bound Soviet formations could not successfully carry the battle into the mountains; while the *Mujahidin* in them were fairly secure, although vulnerable to air attacks. The Soviet military leadership in Afghanistan was still heavily conditioned by the doctrine of large, land-mobile formations, and although it used up to 10,000 commando troops in small units for heliborne raids, it seemed unwilling to develop this degree of flexibility any further. The idea of using trained mountain troops does not seem to have commended itself to Marshal Sokolovsky.

The strength of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan is usually quoted as being about 90,000, but Pakistan Intelligence insists it is over 110,000. There are at least twelve Soviet divisions (ten infantry and two armoured), under 25 Soviet generals still headed by Marshal Sokolovsky. Each has its full complement of weaponry and vehicles, ready for battle as if positioned in Central Europe. The Soviet air contingent has about 400 combat aircraft, mainly MiG-21s, but also some MiG-23s, and Ilyushin-28 planes for bombing missions; and over 80 Mi-24 helicopters. Plenty of T-72 tanks are in evidence, as well as large numbers of T-64s and T-55/68, and the whole new range of BMP vehicles. Although the *Mujahidin* have no aircraft in this guerrilla situation, Soviet formations have their full complement of anti-aircraft weapons.

The Soviets have operated psychological warfare fairly successfully in Afghanistan. They organised a special group of Afghans to infiltrate the *Mujahidin* movement, stirring up tribal and family feuds, and issuing misinformation. All sources agree that *Mujahidin* groups fight each other. The buying of allegiance or treachery with money, food or material rewards is another Soviet tactic widely practiced, but seldom gains permanent results. Faiz Mohammed, a Government Minister, was killed at the village of Tiga, in Paktia province, when trying to "buy loyalty".

Groups of Baluchi tribesmen, forced out from their native Baluchistan province in Pakistan because of their involvement in the 1970 insurrections there, are used by the Soviets to monitor, and even attack *Mujahidin* groups. Large numbers of leaflets are continually dropped over villages and towns, warning inhabitants not to co-operate with, or help the *Mujahidin*, threatening punishment, and carrying black propaganda messages. In February 1982, after a large scale mutiny in the Pole-Charki prison, Kabul where most political prisoners are held, informers infiltrated the prison to detect and denounce ringleaders.

The Soviets have almost openly taken on the responsibility for the Afghan educational system, and teachers are bribed, or intimidated, to preach

the Party line, as are some local Mullahs. The *Mujahidin* has responded by warning parents not to send their children to certain schools, killing or intimidating teachers, and destroying schools. The *Mujahidin* have perfected the system of Shabnama (night letters), which means pushing messages, threats or instructions under doors at night.

US Intelligence claims the Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and on the 30th December 1981, stated that some Soviet personnel had been "gassed" in an action in Paghman province; and that 3,042 people had died in 47 incidents involving chemical warfare means. Later, US Secretary Defence, Haig, increased this figure to 10,527 dead; but independent corroboration is hard to come by. A UN investigating team working amongst Afghan refugees in Pakistan could find no confirmation, but did find evidence the Soviets were using "cluster and phosphorus bombs". However, continual reports of Soviet chemical warfare activities, coupled with rigid censorship in Afghanistan, deepens suspicions.

Afghan army

Despite chronic problems of desertion and divided loyalties the Afghan army has survived, and seems to be improving. A small cadre of dedicated officers and soldiers has remained loyal to the Afghan puppet government. Afghan units have always been in the forefront of Soviet-organised attacks and sweeps into the Panjshir Valley and other *Mujahidin* resistance centres. Former reservations about killing fellow Afghans seems to have disappeared. Factional in-fighting within the army between the Khalk and Parcham factions continues, and for example, on the 5th October this year, General Abdul Wodud, the Kabul corps commander, was shot dead in his office. Desertion continues, but is counter-balanced by more efficient enforcement of conscription. During the operation in the Panjshir Valley in September, a complete Afghan regiment, of 1,200 men, defected en bloc to the *Mujahidin*, with their weapons; but this is becoming the exception rather than the rule.

The Afghan army, now reported to be 43,000 strong, is completely controlled by Marshal Sokolovsky. 5,000 "advisers", are distributed throughout it, down to battalion level. Marshal Sokolovsky dictates the policy, organisation, training, appointments and operations of the Afghan armed forces. Afghan soldiers are still not completely trusted with their weaponry. Ammunition is usually only issued for operations.

Large numbers of Afghan officers, especially younger ones, have recently trained in the USSR. Many are given command of companies and platoons in the field, preparatory to further promotion. The Afghan Prime Minister boasted

that a five-day operation, commencing on the 5th October 1982, in the Helmand province, was completely successful in "capturing 200 rebels. No Soviet troops took part". If this is true, the Afghan army is becoming a far more effective Soviet instrument. The Afghan air force operates on a very tight Soviet rein. Generally, Afghan pilots are not allowed to fly on their own, and Soviet personnel form part of all air crews. There are exceptions, and one Afghan pilot, with his MiG-21, defected to Pakistan in October 1982.

The Soviets are experimenting with a Youth Militia, the Askaris, recruited on a political ideological basis. They are armed, given elementary training, and accompany Afghan army patrols in cities at night sometimes. The Askaris seems to be a pale copy of the Iranian Baseej. They were reported to have been in action in August and September, against the *Mujahidin* in the Mazar-e-Sharif area.

While the *Mujahidin* inside Afghanistan are undoubtedly keeping up a flurry of ambushes, small attacks and sabotage, the lot of the people amongst whom they shelter has become precarious in many areas. The Soviet Starvation Policy has brought productive agriculture almost to a stop, there are acute shortages of flour.

Soviet permanence

The Soviet armed forces show no signs of withdrawing from Afghanistan; on the contrary, evidence is strong that they intend to stay for a long time. The Soviets see their own position in Afghanistan as strengthening, and that of the *Mujahidin* weakening.

Considerable construction work has been undertaken by the Soviets in Afghanistan. Underground concrete fuel and ammunition storage chambers have been made; strategic roads widened; a bypass constructed around the vulnerable Salang Pass; a large dual road-railway

bridge has been completed over the River Darya (Oxus), at Termez, on the USSR frontier, and a 30-mile length of railway from it to connect with the Soviet rail system (Afghanistan had no railways); an oil pipeline has been laid from Termez south to the main air base at Bagram, near Kabul; a country-wide communication network, linking all bases has been installed; and permanent barracks have been built.

It was predicted when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that they were stepping into a Vietnam-like morass which would eventually exhaust them, and that like the Americans they would eventually have to withdraw; but now, three years later, this does not seem to be happening. The reasons are several. Afghanistan consists largely of barren mountains (at least four-fifths of the country), while Vietnam is lush, tree-covered and fertile; the Soviets are on Afghanistan's doorstep, not 8,000 miles away; Soviet censorship blankets out the ruthless methods employed, while the Americans had a free, but hostile, Press; the Soviets are trying to build up the Afghan puppet army, while the Americans neglected the ARVN (South Vietnamese armed forces) until it was too late; and most important of all, perhaps, the Soviets have shied away from mountain guerrilla warfare.

Initially the Soviets expected a quick and easy occupation, but now they are resigned to the "long haul" struggle, convinced their strategy and tactics are beginning to pay off, and that the world at large is indifferent to the fate of the Afghan people. They see a watershed ahead when *Mujahidin* morale will start to decline. What the *Mujahidin* desperately need is quite clear. With a determined and united leadership to forge a grand strategy, a professional and military command and staff; and financial, material and moral support from the Islamic and other states, the *Mujahidin* can eventually rid their country of the Soviet military occupation.

REBEL LEADER GHAFUR GIVES IDEAS FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT

Paris LIBERATION in French 26 Dec 82 p 17

[Article by Francois Sergent]

[Text] Muhammad Ghafur is one of the new elite commanders of the Afghan resistance.

A member of a small royalist movement, he is pleading for the resistance to be united. In the northern part of the country, toward the Soviet border, this law graduate of Kabul University has 600 to 700 armed men under his command. His raids are celebrated and he is already a legend. Thus, it was he who, in one operation, took 18,000 guns, no less, from an Afghan barracks and then distributed them to any Mujahidin who asked for them.

Today Muhammad Ghafur is in France. He came to testify at the Tribunal of the Peoples on Afghanistan, which was held early this week in Paris. At 32, his body is riddled with fragments and he even has a bullet in his chest. In the small hotel in the Latin Quarter where we met with him, he wore the traditional garb of the Pashtous: a brown coat with wide, flowing sleeves, baggy trousers and a flat felt turban. Very attentive, he is careful, despite language difficulties, to make himself understood.

Muhammad is a former rank-and-file member of the integrist party, the Hezb-I-Eslami, but today he has joined the royalist movement of the Mahaz-e-melli-ye Eslami (National Islamic Front) of Gaylani. With his men he conducts principally two types of operations: harassment of Soviet-Afghan convoys and night attacks on barracks and forts. These operations are organized with all the groups of Mujahidin in the region and among the 150 or 200 men making up the commandos, one finds all the nuances of the resistance. To Muhammad this kind of unity in the field is of major importance, and must be the prelude to a national unity leading up to a unified command. "A single command is what the resistance lacks most," the young military leader tells me. As long, he says, as the Soviets maintain and stir up division. "In my region," he adds, "a resistance group (The Setam-e-milli, is paid directly by one of the sections of the Afghan PC [Communist Party] and is used to stir up ill feeling. Last year," he tells me, "we learned through our informants that a group of government soldiers had been set up to kill me or seize me. We then decided to infiltrate this commando unit. On 23 September 1981 we caught them. Among them were three Afghan army officers." Ghafur then decided to exchange these three men

for his brother Adbel, who has been in the hands of the Soviets for over 3 years. Despite several attempts, Kabul refused to exchange prisoners and the three officers were executed.

What does Ghafur expect of a resistance victory? First of all, an unconditional departure of the Soviets, then the disappearance of the puppet government in Kabul, and finally the creation of an Islamic state, which would be free and democratic. Is he not afraid that such a state would become integrist and retain all the shortcomings of Afghan society? No, Ghafur replies cunningly. "Do you believe we would go to all this trouble to get rid of a government hated by everyone, only to put another government, equally hated, in its place?"

8946

CSO: 4619/21

DEVELOPMENTS OF THREE YEARS OF RESISTANCE EVALUATED

Paris LIBERATION in French 23 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by Jean-Patrick Voudenay]

[Text] Afghanistan (correspondence)--From the gravel to the edge of the horizon. Just barely a footpath in which there is occasionally a bit of a trail. And then, right in the middle of the wadi, which is as wide as 20 highways, an ugly sign on which is drawn a teapot and an arrow. A glance to the right. A cave, almost invisible, dug into the cliff. Inside it, a "tchaikhana" (a tea-house). It, at least, will have nothing to fear from the bombings by the Soviet air force.

On this trail, which crosses, one after the other, the provinces of Paktya, Ningrahar, Kabul, Kapisa and Parwan, the "tchaikhana" are prospering. They profit from the continual passing of caravans of weapons from Pakistan, going toward Eastern and Northern Afghanistan. Sometimes, on much-traveled footpaths, the teahouses are several km apart. Sometimes again, in the bombed villages, they are the last drop of life in the midst of a desert of ruins.

Periodically, the Soviet air force, Migs or helicopters, strikes the villages. More out of a concern for reprisals than for real effectiveness. In a village situated at the foot of the Tenzine pass, a week before we came through, an air raid had left six dead among the population.

A point of departure for weapons convoys, the Pakistani village of Trinangale, several km from the Afghan border. There one discovers the diversity of the Afghan resistance in a startling nutshell. Everywhere, mounts are being loaded, including a few dromedaries. At the edges of the roads the Mujahidin are testing the weapons they have just received. The air is saturated with odors, of beasts, of dust, of powder.

Tribes are slowly leaving. Young Mujahidin are arriving almost on the run, happy to be going soon to be initiated into the guerrillas' BABA [expansion unknown] in several secret camps. On the shoulders of the guerrillas, the most modern assault guns mix with the most archaic weapons, the Kalachnikov (AK-74) is the brother of the old Lebel, which is still manufactured by hand in the Pakistani villages of Darah and Landi Kothal. In the jumble of the bazaar, weapons of every kind are sold, except heavy armament.

The police and the Pakistani army are almost invisible. However, it is always open season for Western doctors on a humanitarian mission and foreign journalists. The Pakistanis have established about a dozen checkpoints on the road that goes from Peshawar to Trinangale.

Once over the border, one hears the rumor of heavy weapons battles in the direction of the city of Khost, which has been besieged by the Mujahidin. And then, tranquillity for the next 3 days of marching.

Misappropriated Weapons

The caravan with which we are traveling seems ridiculous in comparison with some others. It is made up of just a few donkeys escorted by about 15 guerrillas. Fourteen large antitank mines make up most of its load. Its destination is the Andarap Valley, north of Panchir. The escort is part of the Jami'at-e Eslami (the Islamic Society--a moderate fundamentalist movement).

In some convoys we have encountered, the quality of the materiel being transported is impressive: DSCHK heavy machineguns, mortars, RPF-7s, etc. It is not certain where the weapons come from. For the Jami'at, for example, it seems that part of the weapons they receive are coming from the Pakistani Jami'at, with very close ideology, which has its own armed militias in Pakistan. For its part, the Pakistani fundamentalist party has many sympathizers among the army officers who divert stores of armament for its profit. Some of it is then given to the Arghan Jami'at.

The small weapons convoy now crosses the big Kabul-Jalalabad road. It passes close to governmental posts, one of which is located 100 meters from the footpath the Mujahidin are following. Each camp ignores the other. It happens that guerrillas and government soldiers meet at the watering place. They greet each other and offer each other a cigarette.

The fort is situated very near an important network of high-voltage lines. A resister explains, "They (the government people) don't prevent us from passing through, and we in turn don't attack the post, and don't blow up the pylons." Another guerrilla disagrees: "Not at all, that network supplies electricity to an important bazaar. We don't want to deprive the merchants of electricity."

Three days later, it is like the song: "Three steps forward, two steps backward." That is to say, 3 days to forge ahead and 2 to retreat.

The caravan advances at this pace into the Kohe Safi, "the white mountain," 60 km north of Kabul. In this region the war is rekindled between, on the one hand, the Hezb-e-Eslami party (the most extremist of the fundamentalist parties, led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin), and, on the other hand, the other resistance organizations.

Last year, the Hezb-e was chased out of the region after battles that left dozens of people dead. Today it is back and has definitely decided to recapture "its" villages.

On both sides there are only little local chiefs, full of their insignificant powers, who are only interested in the future to the extent that they will be

able to retain their privileges. If the weapons convoy were an important one, if for example it were led by Orughul, that lord of the caravans who is capable of safely conducting, over the most infernal trails, convoys of more than 100 horses, donkeys and mules, the potentates of the "white mountain" would not dare to say a word. This time the caravan is led by an inexperienced and timid "commander"; a made-to-order prey for the little chiefs of the Kohe Safi.

The latter want just one thing: to seize its load and the Kalachnikovs of the escort. Otherwise, they say, these weapons are going to fall into the hands of the Hezb-e Eslami, who will then use them against us. They also force the escort to fight on their side against the troops of the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

For days the little weapons caravan of the Jami'at remains blocked in one or the other of the villages of the Kohe Safi. It also backtracks when the Hezb-e threatens to seize a village.

During the battles, the Soviet-Afghan forces do not intervene. Their forward posts are sometimes situated at least 20 km from the villages around which the Mujahidin are in confrontation. In fact, they seem to be adding fuel to the fire: "A parchami (branch of the Afghan PC [Communist Party] in power) officer came close to our lines when we were attacking. With the aid of a loudspeaker he asked us if we needed any weapons," says one of the region's resisters. "Moreover, the Soviet air force flew over us several times while we were fighting, but didn't take advantage of it to attack us."

A "Commander" Who Is Resigning

The little weapons caravan of the Jami'at-e Eslami has already had to abandon the most precious part of its cargo--the 14 mines--when it was forced to flee, by night and in a hurry, from a village that was attacked by the Hezb-e Eslami. Since they could not find more donkeys to carry the mines, the guerrillas hastily hid them in a house that had been destroyed.

After lengthy discussions with the "little chiefs," the caravan hurries by night in the direction of the large Soviet base at Bagrum, 60 km north of Kabul.

The convoy passes very near the defense posts installed on the periphery of the airfield. At regular intervals, flares fired by the Soviet sentinels dazzle the night with light for several minutes. They are green, a sign that all is well. There is only one alert. In fact, it is only a group of Mujahidin who are coming from the opposite direction.

The caravan arrives on the Shamali plain. It finds its vanguard, rests for 2 days, becomes integrated into a more important convoy and takes to the road again. It arrives in the Boulakheil valley. The first villages are completely destroyed. Others seem to be hesitating between life and death. Only a few houses are inhabited. Higher up, the destruction is much less significant. But a single plane flying over the valley is enough to cause, among the women and children, a feeling of fear that is close to panic. Everywhere, natural cavities are fitted out as shelters. As the Soviet-Afghan forces are occupying the natural entrance to the valley of the Panchir, the caravans, some of which are bringing tons of materiel, must go through the village of Boulakheil.

Despite the frequency of the carrier shuttles, which have to confront terrible passes that are occasionally mined by the Soviet air force, tons of weapons and munitions are waiting in this village. There the caravan abandons its meager baggage and goes on its way with its few donkeys without any load.

The Parties of the Resistance [by O.R.]

The resistance in the Sunnite areas (85 percent of the population) is now divided into two poles, the "fundamentalists" (whom I prefer to call "Islamists") and the "moderates" (who might also be called nationalists, traditionalists and secularists):

The Islamists are the result of three splits in the Islamic Youth Movement, which was founded in the 1960's:

- the Hezb-e Eslami of engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the most radical and the most sectarian;

- the Hezb-e Eslami of Younous Khaless; chiefly Pashtoun and influential in the east;

- the Jami'at-e Eslami of Professor Borhanuddin Rabbani (the current president of the alliance of these three parties). The most influential, but mainly Tadjik (Persian-speaking). Clearly more moderate than the first.

The moderates were founded after the coup d'etat:

- the Harekat-e Enqelab-e Eslami of Maulawi Mohamed Nabi. The most influential of the three, mainly Pashtoun and implanted in the south, this is the party of the traditionalist clergy and the "middle" notables;

- the Jabheh-ye melli-ye Najat-e (National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) of Sebqhatullah Mojadidi. Secular, this party is chiefly made up of the Pashtoun tribal leaders. Little influence;

- the Mahaz-e melli-ye Eslami (National Islamic Front): directed by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gaylani. Openly royalist, it includes the large tribal families. It has scarcely any forces on the ground, but it is wealthy.

The Shi'ites are found principally in three organizations:

- the Shura-ye Ettelaq (Council of the Union) in the Hazarajat, led by Sayyed Beheshti. Traditionalist and moderate, its influence collides with the rise of the Nasr;

- the Nasr (the victory): the only genuinely Khomeynist party in Afghanistan, it remains, however, uniquely hazarah;

the Harakat-e Eslami of Sheykh 'Asef Mohseni. Based in Qandahar, but also influential in the region of Mazar-i Sharif. Acts as a buffer between the first two.

Apart from these 9 "big" parties, there are about 10 organizations, either Shi'ite or "progressive," (including the SAMA [expansion unknown]), whose influence is nevertheless very weak and rather on the decline for the last 2 years.

8946

CSO: 4619/21

BANDIT, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ATTRIBUTED TO MUJAHIDIN

Schoolchildren Kidnaped

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

A feeble, old man, brought to the mountains by Haji Gul Mohammad, of a group of so-called, "Hara-the Saur Sar Kou, Farahkat Enqilab Islami" band province, who had been br-'Islamic Revolutionary Mo-

vement') headed by Mullah Mohammad Shah and had spent six months in the bandits' jail, said after his release: "I lost my two children to these murderous highwaymen."

"These mercenaries kidnap girls from the rural areas to add luxury to their own life, and commit on them deeds which are contrary to Islam, morality and humanity. They arrest those youth who wear good clothes and have handsome faces from the villages as well as vehicles, and, after getting money and other property kill them after accusing them of some unreal crime", he said.

"During the six months, I have even seen innocent persons, whom I knew before, being called to the committees and being killed due to some personal disputes with the ringleaders of the counter-revolutionaries", he added.

On Sunbula 17, 1360 (September 8, 1981) before sunrise, one of the members of Toran (Cap) Ghulam Rasoul group, belonging to the "Jamiati Islami" band, came to the commandant of the reserve unit of the Herat city. Knocking at the door, he entered the commandant office and surrendered with his arms.


He said: "At 12 at night, a group of my friends who are also the members of the Ghulam Rasoul group came to my house and said that they were my guests. After a meal, all of us went to bed. After some time, I became aware that one of these 'Mujahiddin' had outraged my honour. Therefore, I consider life is meaningless for me, please help me and free me from the wickedness of these robbers."

Atiqullah, a teacher of the Jabul Saraj Lycee who was also put behind the bars by a group of mercen-

aries under a mosque in a subdistrict of Panjsher (Part II) said: "Under direct instructions of Ahmad Shah Masoud, after killing a number of innocent people in the Chaplanak village of the Jabul Saraj district, the bandits transferred four women who rejected the illegal demands of the bandits to the Maidan Shahi Bazarak and Chah Aho jails and they massacred 45 peo-

ple whom they took out from these jails in the Kotal Chiragh hill."

Similarly, they killed five prisoners—Sultan, Mahtabuddin, Khwaja Bashir, Ahmad and Ghulam Haidar—in the Kamiat region of Nooristan and 20 innocent persons in the Nish region of the Nooristan without any charges.



With these arms the counter-revolutionaries resort to subversive activities.

(Photo: Haqiqate Enqlabe Saur)

SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

Losses caused by the counter-revolution through destruction of hospitals of Logar and Bala Murghab, eight other hospitals and health institutions amount to Afs 100,000,000.

Losses caused to the establishments of central health centres, damage of different equipments of health institutions and health centres have cost the country Afs 225,000,000.

Losses caused to transport means of health institutions, basic health centres, rural water supply projects, the department of campaign against malaria and some other organisations total Afs 427,000,000.

The total number of health centres, made inactive by the counter-revolution, is 104 throughout the country.

Public Facilities Destroyed

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

Masjidi, a resident of the Eshiq Abad village of the Jabul Saraj district, Parwan province, who was a member of the so-called "Jamiate Islami" band and engaged in destructive activities, answered correspondent's questions recently.

Question: How, where and from whom, did you get military training?

Answer: We were given military training, which was to mostly acquaint us with the methods and ways of terrorising people, by American and Chinese advisors in Peshawar, with the help of an interpreter from Jalalabad.

Q: What do you know about the most important operation carried out by you and the band to which you belonged?

A: The groups of the "Jamiate Islami", in which I was also included, set fire to a part of the bazaar of Gulbahar district at the command of ringleader in Saur 1359 (April 1980). This event took place in those days in which the armed forces too, had operation in that region, and therefore according to the instructions we propagated to the people,

that the armed forces had set fire to the bazaar.

Q: With which foreign organisations and countries does your band have relations and what do you know about these relations?

A: I am aware that in addition to Pakistan, the "Jamiate Islami" band has political and military relations with China, the USA and Egypt. Every month a number of residents from the villages and towns are called to the commissionaries located in Pakistan with the instructions of the "Jamiate Islami" band and are sent to bring weaponry and arms which come from the US and China through Egypt and Pakistan. Those who reject to accept the orders are sentenced to different punishments such as cash fine or death. For example, six persons from the Da Nau village of Jabul Saraj district, Kharaj and Rokha villages of the Panjsher district, had first been put in the jail in the Dahna Ryod on Hamal 12, 1359 (April 1, 1980) and later were killed due to their not accepting the orders of the traitor Ahmad Shah—to go to Pakistan and bring arms from there.

Hospital Plundered, Schools Burned

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

Here is another list of the counter-revolutionary crimes:

Plunder of the equipment of the health clinic of the Asmar district, Kunar province, in 1358 HS (1979).

Burning and destruction in the Panjsher district—of the Rokha Lycee, the Secondary School,

ool of Onaba, and the Lycee of Bazarak Panjsher—by the "Jamiat Islami" band under the command of Ahmad Shah, in Hamal 1359 HS (March-April, 1980).

Burning of the Gulbahar Lycee and bazaar by the "Jamiat Islami" band under the directives of Ahmad Shah in 1359 HS.

Destruction of the building of health centre in Ghorband district and plunder of its equipment and drugs in Saratan 1359 (June 1980).

Destruction and burning of the office of the Ghorband district, the Girls' Lycee of Sia Gard, Ghorband district, and the building of the agricultural directorate of the district by the Gulbuddin band under the command of Saiful Rahman on Saratan 20, 1359 (July 11, 1980).

Destruction of the Water supply centre in the Ghor province by the Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi band under the direct command of Abdul Salam.

The crime created an active water famine, leading to and contagious diseases the centre had started functioning after the victory of the Saur Revolution, with the cooperation of the local people).

Destruction and burning of three schools, 38 primary schools and 55 rural schools and the Panjsher hospitals by the "Jamiat Islam" band un-

der the instructions of Ahmad Shah in 1359 HS.

Mohammad Hassan, one of the residents of a sub-district from Panjsher (part 1) said: "Mercenaries have forbidden our children to go school, set fire on our schools, took away drugs from our patients, closed the transport roads and plundered the property of the people." Shah Agha, a fifth grade student of the Khinj Panjsher school said: "Before these thieves came, we were living in peace could study our lessons. The suicidal mercenaries have prevented us to study our lessons. Now, I and my classmates are cowherds.")

Burning of the Mashr-iki Lycee of the Kandahar province by a gang of the "Harakat Islami" band with Haji Nik Mohammad and Esmatullah Mosalam as ringleaders.

Destruction of the Zohruddin Lycee in the capital of the Badghis province and burning of the Ghormach Secondary School and the Bala Murg-hab School of the province from Hoot 24, 1357 to Hamal 1358 HS (March 1979) by the Gulbuddin and Rabani bands.

Burning of schools of the Jaghori and Jaghoto district, Ghazni province, till Hoot 1358 (March 1979) by the "Shorai Etefaq Islami" band (United Islamic Council) and conversion of the ruins into the band's bases.

Family Victimized

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

The night covered the Chapa village of the Boor subdistrict, Baghlan province, with its black veil. Children, women and men were all fast asleep. Only the barking of the dogs broke the stillness of the night.

But, around midnight, the barking of the dogs suddenly became louder and the clip-clop of horses awoke the people from their sleep. The defenceless villagers got up, and every one of them had the same question in his mind—"which innocent person would be martyred by the 'Mujahiddin' this night?"

The sound of the horses stopped in front of the house of Zohra and the "Mujahiddin" entered her house without any permission. Her four children, who had not forgotten the tragedy of their father's death and whose tears had not still dried, saw their mother captive in the hands of these messengers of death.

Stone would have been melted by weeping and maiming of Zohra and her innocent and defenceless children, but these had no effect on the "Mujahiddin of Islam".

Mullah Hassan, ringleader of the mercenary group, who had yellow and protruding teeth, his face made more horrid by the dim light of the lamp, dealt a heavy slap on the face of Zohra and said: "You wicked woman, it was you who said that the Mujahiddin are infidels, that they res-

ort to burglary and robbery, that they killed your husband for no reason and plundered your property, that they kill innocent people everyday and eat the sheep and goats of the people. And, it was you again who said that who ever gives food to the 'Mujahiddin' are their collaborators and they have to share their crimes. Where have you learnt these words? Now, we give you the punishment you deserve."

Zohra, her eyes full of tears and her children clinging to her legs, said: "I have said what is correct, I have said the truth..." But, before she could complete, one of the criminals caught her and tore her blouse down to her skirt and threw it outside the door.

The children clung on to Zohra's legs and would not let go of their beloved mother who was their only care-taker, after the capture of their father by these bestial criminals.

However, the resistance of the children could not last beyond moments. Merciless kicks of the "Mujahiddin" landed on their heads. One of the children became faint, while the other three could not cry any more.

The horses moved towards a mountain where the centre of the "Mujahiddin" was. But Mullah Hassan's horse moved rather slowly, because, a person was bound on its back—Zohra, who stained the stones of the desert with the blood of her body.

The caravan of horses only stopped at the region of Shar Shar (the polygon of mercenaries). Mullah Hassan got down from his horse and fondled Zohra who was on the verge of death and asked her to yield to their evil demands.

But, Zohra did not give up her resistance. She spat on the Mullah's beard and thus fuelled the wrath of the "Amiri Hizbi Islam" (Leader of the Islamic Party).

Mullah Hassan commanded his men to cut Zohra's limbs. The executioners executed the order without any delay. Blood emerged out of the wounds inflicted by the criminals, but the anger of the "Mujahiddin" did not abate.

The ringleader ordered his men to put out the eyes of Zohra with which she read holy Koran every day. And, a gun was focussed towards her eyes and the trigger pulled—and Zohra fell down and died.

Drops of rain began to fall from the cloudy sky and a lightning lit up the gruesome scene for a while. The faces of these thieves became red, all of a sudden, and they mounted their horses fast—the security forces and revolution defenders were hurrying towards them.

But, there was nothing left of Zohra but a bloody corpse.

(Courtesy: Haqiqate Enqilabe Saur).

INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FORESEEN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] For centuries, despite rich natural resources, fertile land and favourable climatic conditions for sound growth of agriculture and livestock-breeding in this country, no major development was perceived in the main economic sector where over eighty per cent of manpower were engaged directly or indirectly, due to the unjust, old, feudal relationships and utilisation of rudimentary agricultural methods.

Agricultural and livestock products and by-products constitute one of the major sources of the national income and is the main economic sector of this country.

The peasants, who for years, suffered from the predominantly feudal social relationships, were liberated from the centuries-long exploitation with the victory of the Saur Revolution and its new, evolutionary phase.

The democratic land and water reforms provided favourable conditions for rapid growth of the agricultural sector.

In keeping with its progres-

sive policy, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has undertaken planned programmes, aimed at enhancing of agricultural outputs in the interest of the vast masses of the farming population, with the sincere cooperation of the farmers.

In a bid to ensure the rapid growth of agriculture, the DRA Government, under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, has undertaken extensive programmes for improving the living and working conditions of the peasantry.

As part of its development efforts in the agriculture sector, the Government provides bank credits for purchase of agricultural inputs, chemical fertilisers, improved seeds and other chemicals, to help the farmers to increase their land productivity.

Distribution of the 294,000 hectares of land to 294,000 landless and petty land-holders throughout the country, will no doubt, introduce new progressive relationship in agriculture, promising satisfactory results.

The Government provides all-out cooperation for the development of the cooperative movement and expansion of its networks throughout the country. The farmers can obtain a better price for their products sold through the cooperatives. Through them, again, they can obtain required credits on time and on favourable terms. The cooperatives also provide easy access for the farmers to the modern agricultural methods, inputs of better qualities and at reasonable prices.

The cooperatives provide sensible solutions to most of the problems facing the farmers in transportation and marketing of their produce and help to put an end to the illegal practices of middlemen who can thrive only at the farmers' cost.

By procurement of updated agricultural inputs, the cooperatives highly contribute to popularisation of mechanised farming, to replace the old primitive methods of farming.

The second stage of the democratic land reforms programme, with the participation of the farmers, the operational plans of which are in progress throughout the country, entails positive results:

Now, during the new and evolutionary phase of the revolution, the ties of the farmers with their land plots is being further strengthened and the fruits of their labours are not exploited. Therefore, as a dynamic force, the ranks of the peasants take an active part in flourishing the homeland and safeguarding the gains of the revolution.

IMPROVED WATER DISTRIBUTION SOUGHT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

The solution of the land problem cannot be separated from the solution of water problem. The usable water for irrigation of cultivable lands, which belonged to feudal lords before the revolution with their land and irrigation establishments, was inadequate, and irrigation work was based on the traditional and old systems. Therefore, the Saur Revolution has undertaken the democratic solution of the water problem, parallel with the democratic and radical land reforms, as a undelayable and urgent task before our society.

In our country, there are a total of eight million hectares of cultivable land, of which 2.6 million hectares can be partly irrigated and 1.6 million hectares supplied with sufficient water.

The surface water amounts to 50 to 55 billion cubic metres annually, of which 10 to 15 billion cubic metres are used for the irrigation of agricultural lands.

During the reign of feudal circles, despite great expenditures in this sphere, desirable results were not achieved. The problems of permanent devastation of irrigation facilities and se-

diment problems, lack of the necessary modern and even old networks of irrigation systems, lack of basic attention to the maintenance of irrigation systems, non-existence of laws and bases of rights for the use of water afflicted the toiling peasants.

After the new and evolutionary phase of the Saur Revolution, the democratic solution of the water problems was outlined in law, beside the democratic land reforms. And all Government organisations, party and social organisations have placed this issue parallel with the land issue in their working plans.

In order to abolish the rule of feudals over water and to better manage irrigation, a law of water was enforced. A department was formed in the framework of the Irrigation Ministry and whose branches are functioning in 26 provinces to generalise the water law. Their major duty is just distribution of water to the toiling peasants of the country.

In addition, the Institute for Water and Water Resources, Survey and Project-Making and the Con-

sultative Services Organisation for Water and Power, are performing special duties in order to better and carefully manage the irrigation system.

For this purpose, technical instruments worth 20 million US dollars have been purchased. The construction work of projects of the Salma Dam with a capacity of 750 million cubic metres which can irrigate 73,000 hectares, the Kajaki Dam which will reserve 1.3 billion cubic metres and irrigate 480,000 hectares of land, the Khan Abad Irrigation Project which can irrigate 30,000 hectares of land and the Helmand project which will be built at a cost of 19 million dollars with the assistance of friendly Czechoslovakia and machinery for which, worth Afs 4 million dollars, ha-

ve already been delivered, will irrigate 110,000 hectares of land, are all continuing.

The construction work of the Sardeh Ghazni Dam and the entire work on the Kushk and Murghab Dam were completed and their utilisation has begun.

Studies for reservoir dams on the Warsij, Farah Rod, Kokcha Saffa, Kamal Khan are continuing. With the completion of these projects, further facilities will be created in the irrigation sphere.

The expansion of water resources in the country will be developed with reforms, the use of existing water resources and construction of new irrigation establishments by the revolutionary Government.

Courtesy: Haqiqate Enq-lab Saur).

CSO: 4600/271

TRANSPORT WORKERS HAIL NEW GAINS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

"The patriotic workers of the Afsotr Company, as a result of their activities and hard work in the field of transport, won the first place in the work emulation drive of the first six months of the current year among the transport institutions of the country and received an honorary flag."

Stating this with pride in an interview to the Kabul New Times, Jan Gul, president of the trade union of the Afsotr Company added: "The workers of the company, at the present historical and critical stage, be they drivers, conductors, or technicians, in a single front and unitedly, actively take part in the advance of the transport activities. They are stubbornly resisting all the difficulties in their way of activities and removing them successfully."

He noted that the union has organised over 1,340 workers and employees in three departmental and 12 group organisations. The organisation of the workers and employees in the union took place largely after the new and evolutionary phase of the Saur Revolution. Before that, it did not have more than 66 members.

"But, with the shining new phase of the revolution, the workers and employees, with special and uninhibited zeal, consolidated their ranks around the union and their cooperation", Jan Gul said.

Explaining how the workers and employees could get the first place in the work emulation drive among the transport institutions, he said: "The Afsotr transportation and forwarding company employs a large number of patriotic and hard-working drivers, conductors and workers who on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Saur Revolution, pledged to increase their work capacity and carry more consignments and goods from the ports to the capital and provinces. As they kept this pledge, the company exceeded the plan target by 18.3 per cent in the first six months of the current year."

The Central Council of the Afghanistan Trade Unions welcomed and appreciated the performance and distributed prizes in cash and letters of merit and appreciation to over 200 drivers, conductors and employees.

yees of the company.

Similarly for their further encouragement the union published the photographs of some of the drivers, conductors and workers who had demonstrated merit in the work in the weekly and wall magazine and the workers' weekly publication of the ATU CC.

Likewise, these positive activities of the workers and drivers were mentioned in the meetings of the workers. At the end of the meetings and functions, concerts were performed by the troupe of the union for their entertainment.

About the other activities of the union of the company, he said: "The union sent seven children of the workers to the Soviet Union for rest and recreation. It also sent two creative and active workers for a tour of the land of the Soviets. Similarly, a number of workers sent to the recreational centre at Jalalabad for some time."

Speaking of the cultural activities of the union, he said: "Around 75 illiterate workers of the company are busy learning in three literacy courses. The officials and employees of the company have pledged to teach the illiterate drivers and

conductors during the free time and the recess. Similarly, the sports teams of the union actively take part in matches—the volleyball and the chess teams have participated competitions."

About the voluntary and collective work organised by the union, he noted that, "the primary party organisation and the union, in a most friendly atmosphere, take joint efforts in the planning work of different parts of the company and remove all the shortcomings of the company together."

The workers have taken an active part in reactivating the defunct trucks and emptying and loading them collectively and voluntarily. The workers of the technical section have always prepared the tools and equipments needed for the company's trucks and repaired them in time and thus prevented delays in the work of the company.

The president of the union said: "In order to enlighten the workers and make them aware of the work of the company, the union is publishing a wall monthly called Shahrahi Dusti (Friend Relations) which offers necessary information to the staff of the company."

ULEMA COUNCIL ISSUES DECLARATION FOR RETURNEES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 17 Jan 83 p 2

[Text]

Declaration of the Islamic Affairs Department and the High Council of the Ulema and Religious Figures of the DRA:

In the name of God, the most Merciful and Benign:

Thanks to the Great Lord and greetings to His Prophet and his devoted followers and those who come later.

Dear religious compatriots:

You know better that after the victory of the glorious Saur Revolution in our beloved country Afghanistan, all corners of our dear country have been full of an energetic wave of zeal and pleasure, joy and happiness. We and you are witness that, even in the remotest corners of the country, the sun shone upon the oppressed and long-suffering compatriots who had never known happiness and had acquired nothing but misery. They became awakened. Their eyes full of tears of happiness and pleasure and hearts overfilled with wishes and aspirations for the beautiful tomorrow of their homeland, they rose and supported and defended their popular Government—the Democratic Republic

of Afghanistan.

We and you remember that, and every one of us is witness to that the Government has taken up measures and programmes and implemented them one by one, according to the principles of holy Islam and according to its pledges to God and the people. Each of these was a deadly blow to the ranks of all enemies of our beloved homeland.

The Government of the DRA, in accordance with the Sureh Koran, "Lata kalwa al roba", and the Prophet's sayings, forbade and abolished usury and every kind of exploitation.

The Government of the DRA, on the basis of order of God Almighty, condemned and declared inadmissible every kind of tribal, religious, racial, linguistic, and social discrimination, privilege, and superiority.

Compatriots, fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters:

The responsibility for every sin, mistake and crime, which took place before Jaddi 6, 1358 (December 27, 1979), does not fall on the shoulders of the present Government. The Government of the DRA freed unconditionally all political

prisoners after the new phase of the Saur Revolution in order to heal the past wounds of the people. For the assurance of the people, all religious rights and rituals have been declared free and deep respect for the religion of Islam and complete freedom for religious ceremonies were guaranteed to our noble compatriots through the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. And, in order to better practise these, the Islamic affairs department and the High Council of Ulemas and Religious Figures of the DRA were formed and activated.

The popular organisation—the National Fatherland Front—was founded according to the spirit of Suras of holy Koran that say that all craftsmen and strata should take direct part in the affairs of the country and the army.

In order to avoid wrong social formations and eradicate every kind of exploitation of man by man, the Government has resorted to democratic land reforms. It has issued the addendum no. 1 to the decree no 8 of the Revolutionary Council concerning the land possessed by the ulemas, religious figures, mosque superintendents, imams and preachers of mosques and has spent millions of Afghanis on rebuilding, repairing, painting and decorating mosques and holy shrines.

All these obvious facts and decisive proofs have originated from the healthy policies of the DRA Government which have been registered and declared in

all reputable official documents of the Government. The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Programme of Action of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan are the documents from which every Muslim of our country can understand that the state has expressed clearly, obviously and explicitly its policy on the sacred religion of Islam and national and cultural traditions of the noble people of Afghanistan and profound respect for them, and, counted these as its most vital and important duties.

FREEDOM

As respected Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and President of the RC, on Dalw 5, 1358 (January 25, 1979) evening, said: "Dear brethren and sisters, the RC and the DRA Government once more publicly declare with decisiveness and honesty full freedom for all religious, sects, national customs and traditions of the people of this country whether they be Sunnis or Shiites. They are free to attend, according to the principles of Islam, various mosques, "takias", temples, "khanaqas" and private houses, and other religious and sects inherited by other people of this country from their ancestors which are not in conflict and do not endanger the security of our Islamic society with its humanitarian principles are entitled to the same freedom. Those who may attempt to treat contemptuously or pressure any of our Muslim peoples because of their be-

liefs or oppose the sacred religion of Islam will be legally prosecuted. This declaration made on behalf of the RC and the DRA Government will be legally effective since publication thereof in the Press."

Suffering and deceived compatriots, who have abandoned homes and the native land:

On the basis of their immaculate goodwill, the party and the Government have repeatedly declared and announced general amnesty for those compatriots who had left their homes and native lands due to the false and poisonous propaganda of the enemies of the revolution and urged them to put an end to their miseries and to their life contrary to the courage and dignity of Afghans who are wandering and hiding in the territories of alien countries. As it was stated by Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and the President of the RC, on Dalw 5, 1358: "Likewise, it is announced that those clergymen, hazratas, mullahs, religious scholars and tribal leaders who have left Afghanistan shall be respected here following their return."

Therefore, our words are directed to you, compatriots and countrymen who are wandering in strange countries. Return to your houses and to your homeland which you love from your heart. Return to your homeland where your countrymen are engaged in noble work and building of a blossoming future. Your countrymen are working, living, and performing religious rituals honourably, but, what are you doing? How are the enemies of your homeland employing you? They say lies to you, hide the realities of

your society from you. They kill your Muslim brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers and small children in the homeland of your ancestors. They destroy bridges and roads and set fire to schools and mosques and plunder the wealth and properties of the peasants and workers.

Do you want to share these crimes and do you want that crimes of enemies of Islam such as the US, China and others, are carried out by your hands? Consult your consciousness and think what answer, on the day of resurrection, you would give for this to God Almighty and the Prophet and where you will carry the burdens of your sins?

We ulemas and religious figures of Afghanistan invite you, pious countrymen, not to listen to the falsehoods of mercenaries and non-Muslim and mendacious leaders. Return to your homeland. Eyes of your countrymen, families and relatives are on your path, the homeland and the countrymen are waiting for you. Trust in your Government. The Government is yours and it serves for you. You can avail yourselves of the decree on general amnesty of the DRA Revolutionary Council and return to the kind embrace of your homeland without any danger. Do not let it get too late for you to take part in the great cause for building a new and blossoming society, and finally do not let yourselves be blamed by God Almighty and the Prophet, the people and the homeland.

Wamanullahi tawfiq (With God's might).

(From "Voice of the Homeland", a publication of the NFF of the DRA.)

BRIEFS

AA GUNS MISSING FROM BASE-- Peshawar Jan 22--A large number of ZK-1 and Dashaka anti-aircraft guns have been found missing from the ammunition and weapons depot at Bagram air base in the Parwan province of Afghanistan resulting in the arrest of several members of the Khalq Communist faction, according to the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen in Peshawar. As the missing arms are believed to have been handed over to Mujahideen, control of the vanguard depot and other installations at the Bagram air base has been taken over by Russian forces, and local Communist pilots have been ordered not to fly aircraft any more. A bloody feud between the Khalq and Parcham factions, which aggravated after Khalqi General Abdul Hudood, commander of the central Kabul garrison, was recently killed by the Russians for his strong opposition to the Parchamites, has flared up after the anti-aircraft guns were found missing. Meanwhile, drivers arriving in Peshawar from Afghanistan, said that over 1,000 trucks and other heavy vehicles were stranded at Qandahar city for want of diesel. They said diesel price has gone up from 30 afghanis to 50 afghanis per litre. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 23 Jan 83 p 12]

CSO: 4600/272

'INDIAN EXPRESS' VIEWS AIR DEFENSE AGAINST F-16

BK191455 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English 12 Jan 83 p 6

[Article by Ravi Rikhye: "The F-16 Again"]

[Text] The prime minister has again recently publicly expressed concern about the American supply of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. She fears that much of India previously safe from Pakistani air attack is now vulnerable on account of the F-16s' range.

We don't know who advises the prime minister on military matters, but if the advice on the F-16s is typical, India is in a great deal of trouble. The reality of the F-16 is very different from what is being made out. To persist in presenting this aircraft as a threat creates several problems.

Our defence planning becomes distorted because we buy counters to the F-16 that we don't need. Doubt is cast on the Indian Air Force's [IAF] ability to defeat a much smaller adversary, thus directly casting aspersions on Indian military power and capability. These aspersions influence foreign perceptions of India in negative ways. And a fear psychosis is created.

Consider first the F-16 from an analytical view, then from an operational view.

Analytically, the F-16 can be no threat because Pakistan will have to use it to defend its main bases against a very heavy, sustained IAF offensive. Just on current plans alone, without counting a planned expansion, the IAF is building towards a strike force of 16 attack squadrons (5 Jaguar, 3 MIG-23BN, 8 MIG-27M). This excludes approximately 8 MIG-21MF/BIs fighter squadrons available for shorter range attacks into Pakistan while leaving sufficient aircraft for an effective air defence against the PAF [Pakistan Air Force].

To defend, the PAF will have two squadrons of F-16s and two of Mirage-3s, backed up by strike Mirage-5s, MIG-19s, and A-5 Fantans in a secondary air defence role. Considering the density of the IAF's planned offensive, this is a pathetic force. If the PAF makes the mistake of using F-16s on strike missions, it won't be able to have airbases to operate from, because in the absence of the F-16 the PAF cannot mount any meaningful defence.

Current IAF doctrine calls for attack missions to be flown with 16 strike aircraft, hitting in waves of four at intervals of 30 seconds, supported by six escorts and two escorts with electronic countermeasures equipment. With F-16s present, the PAF has some chance of protecting its bases; without the F-16s it has virtually no chance. To send the F-16s on strike missions will be foolish in the extreme.

As a dog-fighter, the F-16 is probably the best aircraft in existence. Its strike capabilities are, however, entirely secondary to its air superiority capability. When loaded with external stores and fuel tanks, at low level its maximum speed drops to 350 to 400 knots per hour. Given the right conditions, probably even the little Ajeet can kill an F-16 in this environment unless the latter jettisons its stores, thus aborting its mission, and gets back to air-to-air combat. The F-16s operating against the Osiraq reactor outside Baghdad could fly high level because of protection from Israeli F-15s and ECM which prevented the Iraqi Air Force from doing anything.

F-16s coming into India will, however, have to contend with an entirely different environment. Our main military targets are heavily defended with anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. Our Soviet-built SAMs have a low probability of kill, which is why India is looking for a Western low-level SAM, with an initial requirement for 12 fire units. Nonetheless, the IAF and Indian Army can barrage-fire their SAMs, which may not be economical, but is an effective defence. Parenthetically, though the Franco-German Roland SAM appears to be the favourite of the IAF, it is to be hoped the missile is not purchased. It is ineffective against very low-flying aircraft and against aircraft operating in close-coupled pairs--standard attacking tactics today. Aside from the U.S. and Norway, which have cancelled planned purchase of Roland, the West Germany Navy and Air Force have also cancelled, despite the German involvement in the programme. French claims about Roland's performance in the Falklands are based entirely on Argentine claims, which are highly inflated, and therefore cannot be taken seriously.

Aside from the anti-aircraft guns and missiles, the IAF will deploy MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighters, generally outnumbering any F-16 attackers three-to-one. The IAF will operate in groups of two MIG-23MF's for long-range missile attack and four MIG-21s for close-in work.

In a straight air-to-air fight, with both aircraft starting from a 180 degrees opposed position, the F-16 will defeat the MIG-21 every time. But such dog-fights are extremely rare: six by one count in the entire 1971 war. Air combat generally takes place with larger numbers on both sides; once the numbers increase the individual effectiveness of each aircraft counts for less. The IAF has estimated that 1.2 MIG-21/BIs will equal one F-16 in air combat. Given our numerical superiority, if PAF F-16s are sent on strike missions, they will have no chance. If the IAF's estimate seems optimistic, consider one series of tests in the U.S. where a MIG-21MF beat an F-16 nine to six in dogfights. (The MIG-21 was of Egyptian origin.)

If all this was not enough, it appears that the U.S. has deleted all strike capability from PAF F-16s. Though I have yet to confirm this, it appears that PAF F-16s lack...the toss-bombing computer, have pylons capable of taking only up to 500-kilogram bombs, may have attack modes deleted from the radar, and probably do not have an inertial navigation system. In other words, they can be used only for visual bombing. It will be suicidal for Pakistan to risk its limited numbers of F-16s in this manner.

Now consider some operational matters. A chance meeting in an airport lounge with an American fighter pilot who was in transit proved most illuminating. This officer has flown 6,000 hours in fighters, including 275 combat missions, and has been responsible for developing the fighter tactics used today by the U.S. Tactical Air Command. His credentials are proven, and his views are important.

All through our talks, he repeatedly emphasised that fighter pilot training was far more important than the aircraft itself. It is absolutely essential that pilots follow their flight leader without question, even if the flight leader is going into the ground. If you have such pilots, he said, four Ajeets can take on four F-16s and perform creditably. He could defeat four F-16s even with four F-86F Sabres--the Sabre is now so old that it has been phased out from even the PAF, which is very short of money for new aircraft. It is a contemporary of the first Soviet jet fighter, the MIG-15. Allowing for the hyperbole which fighter pilots are prone to, his point is to be taken seriously given his wide experience.

His other main point was that the aircraft is too far ahead of its pilot. Despite all the effort made by General Dynamics to reduce the work-load by automation, the aircraft is of such high performance that inevitably a high rate of crashes results. In U.S. Tactical Air Command F-16 fighter wings, aircraft are being flown under great constraints to reduce the loss rate; despite this, there are serious losses. In his opinion, once the PAF pilots get home with their aircraft, with no one to restrain them, an extremely heavy crash rate will result. He even went so far as to say that before the Pakistanis make their fortieth and last aircraft operational, their two squadrons will be understrength because of losses. This assertion is of significance in view of Pakistan's requirement for an additional 20 aircraft, for a third squadron, once financing can be arranged. Always assuming a baulky American Congress approves the sale.

Given all this, the IAF's operational pilots are not, and never have been alarmed about the F-16. They were confident of handling it long before the new information about lack of offensive capability became known.

The alarm in the IAF has been sounded by senior officers. The men that actually have to fight have no opinion worth repeating of their superior officers in this matter. Perhaps the seniors are responsible for misleading the prime minister.

One school of thought is that since the Mirage-2000 purchase, the costliest defence contract India has ever signed, has to be justified to a sceptical exchequer, a threat has to be created. If this is so, the nation suffers, because neither is the F-16 a threat, nor is the Mirage-2000 the counter. And of course, the Mirage-2000 contract would have been signed no matter what.

If India is really worried about the F-16, the correct solution is to continue purchase of Soviet aircraft, which are far cheaper and are perfectly suited to our purposes. If for reasons of diversification it is thought essential to buy a Western aircraft, we will do better if we produce Northrop's F-20 Tigershark, or even buy the F-16 itself. But under no conditions should a fear psychosis be created just to justify buying the Mirage 2000, which has been purchased for other than military reasons.

CSO: 4600/1585

NEW DEVELOPMENT IN KHALISTAN MOVEMENT REPORTED

BK131554 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English 5 Jan 83 pp 1, 7

[Article by B. K. Tiwari, EXPRESS NEWS SERVICE]

[Text] London, 4 Jan--The Sikh movement may assume a new dimension following revelations here that Mr Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale has accorded "total" support to Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan in his effort to work abroad for establishment of a sovereign and independent state of the so-called Khalistan.

Dr Chauhan on Tuesday displayed and read out a letter which he said he had just received from Mr Bhindranwale authorising him to "fight for the sovereignty of the Sikh nation" so that Guru Govind Singh's stipulation "Raj karega khalsa" [Sikhs will rule] could be given the desired shape.

According to Dr Chauhan, Mr Bhindranwale's letter, dated December 12, had given a new turn to the whole Sikh agitation both in India and abroad, the more so because he (Sant Bhindranwale) was not now only head of Damdami Taksal but also one of the prominent members of the Sikh Morcha.

There was now no question of asking for any fulfillment of earlier demands for autonomy for Sikhs within India. "From now on, the demand for a separate, sovereign and independent state of Khalistan will be intensified both within and outside India," he said.

In his letter Mr Bhindranwale, among other things, told Dr Chauhan that without proper direction all sacrifices by the Sikhs would go [to] waste. "So we must be clear in our mind before fighting the Government of India.... The Government of India has gone back on its promises...the way we are exposing the betrayal of the Congress is praiseworthy..."

The two-page letter was written in Gurmukhi.

He referred to a meeting of Sikh ex-army officers--three major generals, four brigadiers, 12 colonels, 3,000 majors and captains and 7,000 NCOs--in Amritsar who have for the first time involved themselves in the Sikh agitation. "This could mean that in due course the entire Indian Army may be involved" for the fulfillment of Sikh's demand.

Whether or not Dr Chauhan's threat is real remains to be seen. But in Britain, he said, the so-called Khalistanis may be involved in direct confrontation with the Indian authorities. He did not rule out violence, if the proposed Sikh demonstrations against India's Republic Day celebrations were obstructed. "We are for peaceful demonstrations.... But if we are not allowed to be peaceful then..," he said.

Dr Chauhan disclosed that the Canadian Government had refused him an entry visa a second time. He said he wanted to go there to attend the wedding of his godson. He said that he planned to approach Amnesty International for its intervention in his case. He suspects that the Indian Government was responsible for influencing the Canadian Government.

It appears Dr Chauhan is having problems with the U.S. administration as well in regard to his visa. He said he had applied for it to the American Embassy here. So far he had not received it but an official had told him that the matter was under consideration."

CSO: 4600/1585

NEWSPAPER SCORES PRC FILM DOCUMENTARY ON LIFE IN TIBET

BK191028 Hong Kong AFP in English 1001 GMT 19 Jan 83

[Report by Dilip Ganguly]

[Excerpt] New Delhi, 19 Jan (AFP)--A Chinese documentary shown at a film festival here could spark a new row between New Delhi and Beijing just days before talks are to resume on their border dispute and other bilateral issues, observers said today.

The film showing Tibetans happily living under Chinese Communist rule was branded "rank political propaganda" by the NATIONAL HERALD newspaper, said to be close to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and reflect the government's views.

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was "looking into the circumstances under which the film was allowed to be screened" at the Ninth Indian Film Festival that closed last Monday, the HERALD said.

The newspaper said in a front-page report that the film conveyed an image of Tibetans prospering under the rule of the Chinese, who annexed the Himalayan territory in 1951 and suppressed an uprising there eight years later.

The Tibetans "were shown dancing in front of the Chinese troops, perhaps to please their overlords," the paper said. But it added that the film was unable to conceal the tensions underlying Tibetan life.

"The scenes showed heavy movement of military vehicles on the roads.... The overall impression that a discerning viewer could gather was that despite all efforts to cover up the harsh reality, Tibet continued to be a military camp where life was largely regimented," the paper said.

New Delhi officially recognises Tibet as a part of China. But the presence of the exiled Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of the six million Tibetans, as well as more than 110,000 Tibetan refugees here have often proved to be irritants in Sino-Indian relations.

CSO: 4600/1585

STATISTICS GIVEN ON IRAQ'S MILITARY LOSSES

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 30 Nov 82 p 12

[Text] Commander of revolutionary militia, Pasdaran, announced: "Iraq has lost \$30 billion worth of military equipment."

Mr Mohsen Rezaii, commanding officer of the Islamic revolutionary militia forces participated in a news conference yesterday and answered questions asked by Iranian and foreign correspondents. He spoke of the situation on war fronts, recent Iranian forces' advances, duties and responsibilities of the Ministry of Sepah and its patrol forces within the cities, positions of opposition groups at the present time and the rate of militia forces sent to Lebanon.

According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, Mr Rezaii, citing Iraq's attack on Iran and employment of 15 divisions and 90 brigades in the past 27 months, said that Iraq has lost almost \$30 billion worth of military equipment. Some 5,500 tanks and personnel carriers have been either destroyed or captured, of which one-third is being used by Islamic forces against the Iraqis. They have also lost 400 cannons and many antiaircraft guns. In addition to that, 50,000 Iraqis have been captured and many have been killed or wounded. So the size of a company has decreased to 40 and units to 8.

In the meantime, Iraq's ninth division has been cancelled altogether. Generally, when an army cancels or dissolves one of its units, it is an indication of a fall in its organization. This has been confirmed by Iraqi officers.

Mr Rezaii, pointing to the army of 20 million, said that the revolutionary army of 20 million people represents the people's involvement. It could be said that Iran is the only country that has fully utilized its population's potential for their own destiny, country and revolution. This army, which was established by the Imam's order, is now leading the way, and is the principal planner in the battlefield. Mr Rezaii said that "Basiij" is the most secure and useful phenomenon created by the people and there are over half a million of them at the fronts. Mr Rezaii described the Ministry of Sepah's responsibilities as support activities for preparation, logistics and establishing a line of communication between the militia, the cabinet (government) and the Majlis (parliament).

Mr Rezaii added: "As it has been said by other officials, the bases used by Iraq's Mujahedin are within our boundaries, however, as soon as certain areas of Iraq with potential for accepting these forces are liberated, these forces will move there and continue their activities until Saddam's regime is fallen.

As for the situation in war fronts, he said that at the present time we initiate any activity and it is we who dictate where the fighting will take place. Saddam's forces are in a counter-attack position. A few days ago, Iraqis employing (deploying) their infantry brigade and a tank battalion counter-attacked, which resulted in a number of dead, wounded or captured, and then retreated.

Mr Rezaii then explained the necessity for establishing the Ghods battalions and the difference between the Ghods and Basij. He said the purpose of Ghods battalions is to reinforce the regular army. Those who have been trained by Basij will remain in Sepah's reserve, but there are forces who have served and been discharged, and now would like to return to serve again. So plans are underway to set up Ghods battalions which would be army reserves.

As for the situation in the liberated areas of Kurdistan, he said that the last area, Piranshahr-Sardasht, located about 3 km from Iraq's border, which was under antirevolutionaries supported by Saddam, has been liberated and is under our control. There are some areas which need mopping up and in some of them we have succeeded about 90 percent.

Mr Rezaii, speaking of militia forces patrolling cities, said that in fact they are present to reinforce security and more organized encounter with antirevolutionaries.

Mr Rezaii then explained Pasdaran's liberation movements and said that Sepah has been formed by Ayatollah Montazeri and other concerned people. It was decided that a committee be set up to include Sepah, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a representative of Ayatollah Montazeri. The functions of these movements are cultural and have nothing to do with armed activities in other countries. If we present our Islamic culture and victories of Islamic revolution to the world, we are confident that our revolution will be expanded (spread) all over, except in a few specific countries such as Iraq and Israel.

Concerning the position of the opposition groups, Mr Rezaii said that our problems with these groups have no political dimension because they are politically dead. It is their terrorist activities that concerns us. Such activities exist throughout the world. Considering how young our revolution is, we have had a very "good" security strength and have inflicted heavy damages upon them. Their dispersion and escape from the country reflects their weakness.

Mr Rezaii talked about Pasdaran's activities in Lebanon and said that they arrived in Lebanon in order to join other Islamic forces fighting Israel. However, since other countries did not participate in this front, we had to limit ourselves to training and promoting our cause. We strongly deny claims (accusations) that Iranian forces attack Lebanon bases.

Mr Rezaii explained the difference between responsibilities of Pasdaran and Komiteh. He said, according to our charter which has been written by the Majlis, our responsibility is to protect cities and it is for security reasons that our forces are present in the cities. Our brothers from Komiteh, he said, who have come from within our society, are now helping to protect the revolution. Of course, he added, a charter will be written in the Majlis and exact responsibilities of the Komiteh will be determined.

Concerning Iranian territories controlled by Iraqis, Mr Rezaii said that Iraqis are now in Naft-Shahr and stealing oil that exists there. The city of Mehran, he said, is surrounded from three directions. Also, he added, the area from Naft-Shahr to Ghasre-e-Shirin and Ghasre-e-Shirin to upper Javan-Roud and near Paveh is in Iraqi hands. Some other areas between Mehran and Soumar were also captured by Iraqis.

Mr Rezaii, talking about the role of Sepah after the war, said: "If superpowers permit us and the war ends, we have other jobs to do." Formation of an army of 20 million, he said, is a big job that we have to do. Our active presence, he added, in reconstruction and serving the government is our big responsibility.

But I think, he said, that America and the superpowers would be foolish if they did not leave us alone. We are prepared, he said, to face them; we created several divisions during this war.

In conclusion, Mr Rezaii spoke of the Iraqi prisoners of war and said: "We familiarize our prisoners with the Islamic revolution and our bases have become training centers for Iraqi prisoners. Generally, he added, one of the problems armies of the world face is that they do not know what to do with prisoners of war, so they put them all in jail. Saddam's problem, he said, is what to do with them when they return."

CSO: 4640/101

REACTION TO RAJAVI-'AZIZ MEETING REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 p 8

[Text] While the majority of exiles felt the interview in the Paris paper Le Figaro with the youthful Shah Reza was a contribution to his image of a young man of sober judgement and responsibility the meeting between Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and Iraqi official Tareq Aziz produced a series of critical statements.

During a round table discussion in a Persian language programme on the Paris Radio Univers a Pan-Iranist representative described Rajavi's action as "a great treason," while even republican and some other leftist groups were furious that Rajavi had claimed to speak for the people of Iran. Their anger was not reduced when a CBS programme on Iran for which reporters had interviewed most opposition groups in an endeavour to give all shades of opinion featured only Rajavi and the National Council of Resistance as representatives of the opposition! "It turned out to be one more case of studio editors imposing their opinion on people in the field," commented one exile politician.

The only response from Tehran on the Rajavi meeting was contained in derisory references by Friday prayer leader Emami-Kashani to French efforts to support Iraq, he implying that the French had set up the meeting. He said Paris was supporting a lame horse in Iraq while gambling at the same time on a U.S.-made horse with no legs at all (the latter a reference to the Mojahedin). "If there has been any doubts about these people being U.S. puppets until now then everyone can see it clearly now," he said.

Monarchist supporters expressed their relief that the young Shah had finally made some pronouncement to fire his supporters with renewed hope. Growing support for the monarchy among the exiles, and the apparent appearance of the young Shah's name on many voting papers in the recent experts' assembly elections, have given some support to the spreading feeling that whatever people's feelings about the past regime a monarchist standard may yet prove to be the best rallying point to group the now vast opposition to the mullah's regime. The failure to find a nationalist political figure of sufficient stature means, many people are now urging, that a traditionally nationalist symbol remains the only obvious alternative.

One of the main drawbacks to the use of the monarchy as a symbol of the opposition so far has been the inability of the young Shah's advisers to establish sound relations with the varying monarchist groups around the world. This has failed to establish a united front that fairly reflects the extent of the support for the return of constitutional monarchy, even amongst those who until recently were among its opponents but are disillusioned with alternative groupings or causes, critics say; and at the same time it has made the job of bargaining with other political groups that much harder. Many moderate republicans who would prefer a monarchical regime to that of the mullahs if they were convinced it would lose the worst faults of the Pahlavi era are said to have been deterred from giving their overt support to a monarch-led nationalist movement because of their impression that the Shah's own "cabinet" does not enjoy the full confidence of majority of monarchists. If this impression can be corrected, the critics contend, a nationalist movement could snowball into an undefeatable force.

CSO: 4600/287

CLERICAL REGIME 'FRIGHTENED' BY LEFTIST INFILTRATION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 pp 4, 5

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeini has instructed his top aides to carry out sweeping changes in the middle rank positions of his administration with a view to eliminating all suspected leftists. This was revealed to IPS by ranking officials of the regime last week.

The officials, mainly remnants of the former regime who have received top jobs in Khomeini's administration, have told IPS that the conservative mullahs in the administration are now worried over the possibility of a coup within the administration by "leftists who are disguised in clerical garments."

"Soon after the conclusion of the elections to the assembly of experts, it was clear to everyone that the older clergymen felt a great deal of suspicion and mistrust among the clerics against their younger turbaned subordinates," one informant said.

He said at least two young mullahs attached to the ministry of foreign affairs and another at the ministry of interior were known to have been taken into custody. In Isfahan, too, several young mullahs were reported to have been arrested on charges of corruption, but rumour had it that all those arrested were agents planted by the leftists, including the Tudeh (pro-Moscow Communist party).

Another informant told IPS that special briefing sessions had been opened in Qom and Tehran to instruct the "Islamic Judges" on the methods of identifying leftist elements within their ranks.

It is believed that leftists are mainly entrenched in watch-dog committees at various ministries and other institutions which employ large numbers of personnel. At the universities there are also a number of watch-dog committees which the mullahs suspect have been infiltrated by the leftists. Khomeini said recently these committees should be reshaped to cut out both unsuitable people on them and un-Islamic practices.

The same informants were unanimous in their contention that leftist elements were among young mullahs who had infiltrated Montazeri's office at

Qom. The regime has had to seek the cooperation of the former SAVAK agents in trying to crack down on leftist mullahs--often young men who were recruited to the theological schools during the past four years.

"I personally know of one case in which a former SAVAK official in Tehran was put in jail because he had refused to work for the regime," one informant said. "Eventually the daughter of the agent was sent to prison to convince her father that it would be to the benefit of the family if he accepted the regime's offer to work for them."

The informants claim that top officials, including President Khamenei, were now convinced that the leftists, especially the Tudeh, have a definite plan to stage a "palace coup" within the regime. Khamenei is among those clerics who favour close ties with the Communist bloc at an official level but would not allow a communist takeover. Now they fear the communists may snatch the power from them through a bloodless internal coup. This worries Khomeini and his heir-apparent Montazeri in particular, according to available evidence.

The same informants say that some people often say that the kind of life they enjoyed under the Shah's regime was too good to be repeated. People also believe that Western interests had imposed Khomeini on them and that they were not likely to help Iranians to change Khomeini.

It is under such illusions that some people now claim they are prepared for communism because they believe any kind of law and stability, even one decreed by communists, would be better than the state of officially-encouraged lawlessness and lack of stability.

Faced with such reaction by the people the officials are trying to weed out leftists, the sources say. They believe that it is the leftists, especially the communists, who have been encouraging people to think and say a communist regime would be better than the mullahs' rule.

Despite such claims by well-informed sources there is the undeniable fact that the regime still maintains a vehement anti-American stand in public. On several occasions recently the regime's spokesmen have claimed that the communists, including the Mojahedin and the Union of Iranian Communists, are in fact American spies and have no connection with the Soviets.

In reply to this fact one informant told IPS: "We too are puzzled why the regime spokesmen insist on attributing every resistance to the Americans, why indeed they try to brand their leftist adversaries as American stooges while it is obvious that they have Russian connections."

One plausible explanation of this was the regime's willingness to continue to cooperate with the Soviets on an official level. Khamenei, it is said, believes that it would be possible to strike a deal with the Russians according to which the Russians would restrain their Tudeh agents and, in return, the mullahs would help the Russians in their overall foreign and strategic policy.

But all that does not hide the fact that the regime is nervously trying to weed out communist and leftist agents from its ranks, the informants say.

EX-TUDEH MEMBER SAYS MOSCOW HAS NO PLANS TO UNSEAT MULLAHS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 pp 5, 6

[Text] A former active Tudeh party member has told IPS the Kremlin has no immediate plans to help the Tudeh unseat the Islamic republican regime.

"The feeling among our comrades is that Iran is at present governed by a popular regime and that it will probably be more than 10 years before the Iranian nation is ready for progressive rule by our party," the man, now living in Warsaw, said.

"The present regime has distinct anti-imperialist policies which suit the Soviet Union," he said. "On the other hand the Soviet Union has no territorial and overall strategical advantages to gain by pushing a premature socialist revolution in Iran."

The man claimed that he had left Iran and quit the party for personal reasons, and that he wished to live with his Polish wife in Warsaw.

He dismissed recent anti-Tudeh measures reported in Iran as "intrigues by former officers and agents of the Shah's regime who have survived the various purges." He said such intrigues in the interests of the monarchy were doomed to failure because power in Tehran was held by genuine anti-royalist clerics.

"Naturally when problems arise there will be some nostalgia for the old times, but Khomeini has enough charisma to ride out the tide," he said, adding that Khomeini's anti-Western policies would outlive him.

The Tudeh man's opinion corresponds with the views of a well known British leftist writer on Iran, Fred Halliday, who is thought to be well informed on Soviet thinking.

Writing in the Times of India recently Halliday claimed that Moscow was happy with the Iranian theocratic regime and that the Soviets saw no reason to try to get rid of it or to be anything but friendly towards it.

In fact, Halliday believes that Washington and other Western powers, like the Soviets, are fully resigned to the fact that Khomeini is there to stay,

and therefore these powers were also now trying to live with the mullahs rather than fight them.

However, a former Iranian diplomat, quoting his contacts inside Iran, told IPS that the mullahs were not quite sure whether the West was now prepared to accept the Islamic republic at face value.

"The mullahs still feel they are being shunned by the Western powers," he said. "There is a feeling among the mullahs that they will never be able to compete with the Saudis and Egyptians in cultivating ties with West Europeans. The mullahs like to curse the West in public but to have ties with them in private," he said.

CSO: 4600/285

SCARCITY, PRODUCTION, IMPORT, CONSUMPTION OF DRUGS DISCUSSED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Nov 82 p 14

[Text] An exclusive interview with the managing director and board member of Iran Drug Company concerning scarce drugs, production, importation and consumption of drugs--Generic Plan implementation and planning for solving the drug shortage.

In an exclusive interview with ETTELA'AT, Doctors Ali Olamazadeh and Mazloomi, managing director and board member of Iran Drug Company, respectively, discussed and answered questions concerning problems in production and distribution of drugs, Generic Plan, the names of new drugs and drug shortage in the country.

Doctor Olamazadeh, glorifying the revolution's martyrs of the imposed war, praising the Imam and praying for those who fight for Islam, said, "I would like to talk about the Generic Plan and the new system concerning drugs in Iran. After the great Islamic Revolution, officials who felt responsible for an independent and self-sufficient drug industry, set out to work and replaced the old dependent system with the Generic Plan. Our specialists and drug experts have had many talks with the public, however, more explanation is in order."

One Thousand Drugs Only

With the implementation of the Generic Plan, the public has been set free of thousands of drugs with different names imported into Third World countries by international profiteers and intermediaries.

Doctor Olamazadeh added, "Prior to the Generic Plan, there were 4,000 brand names, I am referring to brand names not types of drugs. If a comparison were to be made between the drugs in the old system and the ones imported for the first after the revolution, we would find that the number of drugs would not be over 1,000. So, we will see that drugs which existed in the old commercial system are available today in the Generic system. If we assume that an identical drug was manufactured by four different companies, then it can be said that in the old system there were only 1,000 types of drugs."

For instance, we can mention a drug called "ANTI" which is used by patients suffering from ulcers. In the past, this medicine was offered under many different names. This drug with a formula "Gel Hidroxide Aluminum Magnesium" is offered plain or sometimes with "Cimeticon" which is an anti-gas drug. This drug comes

in two forms, gel or chewing tablets. In the past, there were different names for "Antisil" and physicians prescribed different brand names. At the present time, however, this drug is offered under two names, Gel Hidrexide Aluminum MG which is plain and Gel Aluminum MG-S which is an anti-gas drug. So patients could obtain these two drugs at any drug store. If they look for the same drugs with commercial names, however, they may not find them and think there are no Antisil drugs on the market.

Banned Drugs

He added, "To give you another example, in the Generic System a drug called 'Dolonorobin' has been banned due to certain side effects. This is a vitamin/pain reliever drug and is manufactured in West Germany. As far as I know, this product is not sold in that country and is for export to other countries only. We have stopped domestic production and importation of it. However, there are people who look everywhere for this product. There may be some people who have stocked up and now are selling this product at a very high price. Nevertheless, according to the FARMACOUF Committee of the Generic Plan, this product is considered useless."

Commercial Drugs

Doctor Olamazadeh said, "Another example is a drug called 'Tagamet' which sells for 30 rials a piece. The same drug is offered by its Generic name of 'Cymetoin' and costs 10 rials each."

He then added, "The same applies to cold and pain reliever tablets. The drugs such as aspirin, penicillin, acitamonifin, codeine, phenobarbital, vitamin C and feridifris can be found in the open form of distribution. But if you look for a commercial brand name, you will find it impossible to find one. The same goes for cough syrup. In the past system, 50 different brand names were available. But now with the Generic System there are only two or three types of cough syrup. I should point out that the Generic Plan has some problems."

Drug Industry

The managing director of the Iran Drug Company said, "The drug industry is divided into three areas: production, commerce and distribution. It seems that the industry's production should be under the control of the Ministry of Industries and its commerce and distribution under the Ministry of Commerce. On the other hand, the Ministry of Health is in charge of public health and the Iran Drug Company could carry part of this responsibility, but that is not the case. Officials in charge should consider this an important matter and decide on future plans. If a decision is made and the direction is clear then occasional shortages caused by lack of sufficient coordination among segments of the industry can be prevented. Single management, proper organization, short and long-run planning, control, qualitative and quantitative supervision are important and it is hoped that a single organization or ministry will be in charge of the Iran Drug Company."

Other Difficulties

Doctor Olamazadeh then added, "There are other difficulties facing the Generic Plan. Many people and private organizations disagree with this system. It seems natural that officials in charge of planning and executing this system are attacked by opposition, because principal opposition are multinational corporations, their agents within the country and foreign and domestic intermediaries who have profited in the past and now find those profits nonexistent. We ask these groups to stop hindrance and false advertisements against the Generic Plan.

Success of the Plan

Concerning the success of the Generic Plan, Dr. Olamazadeh said that available statistics show imported drugs by private sectors during the years prior to the revolution as follows:

1352-6.5 billion rials; 1353-9.4 billion rials; 1354-14 billion rials; 1355-15.2 billion rials; 1356-19.5 billion rials; 1357-17.3 billion rials. For the purpose of comparison, drugs purchased by the Iran Drug Company in the years 1356, 1357 and 1360, after the revolution, are as follows: 1356-3.5 billion rials; 1357-2.2 billion rials; 1360-13.5 billion rials and projection for 1361 is around 15 billion rials. Had these imports been carried out by the private sector, the total would have reached 20 to 25 billion rials. The reason is that the Iran Drug Company procures the drugs at reasonable prices. It should be noted that the total import would not exceed 1356 which was the highest level in the pre-revolution years.

Drug Production

He added that this year, drugs are being imported by the "Daroupakhsh Company," the Ministry of Health's manufacturing firm, and some other independent importers. This would cause import volume to reach a considerable level and if production of drugs has gone ahead as planned, there should be no shortage of drugs in the country.

As for the distribution of drugs he said, "Even if we produce and import enough drugs, we face distribution difficulties. Then he added that 3 years ago, the Iran Drug Company decided to use the services of distribution companies. These companies such as Alborz Distribution Company, Khorak Distribution and Noor Distribution Company have been contracted and are distributing imported drugs throughout the country. The Iran Drug Company, using its own distribution units, distributes drugs among the government organizations.

Exclusive Distribution of Drugs

Doctor Olamazadeh said that another service by the Iran Drug Company is the exclusive distribution of drugs. Certain drugs cannot be distributed to all drugstores or sometimes there is a possibility of misuse of a particular drug or it is likely that the product will be overpriced. To prevent such problems and in order to serve the public better, the Iran Drug Company has set up a store at the main office of the company and drugs are sold by prescription.

Consumption of Drugs

Speaking about the consumption of drugs, Dr Olamazadeh said that 48 billion rials worth of drugs were consumed in 1360. This figure corresponds to a per capita consumption of 1,200 rials with a population of 40 million. Out of 48 billion rials, 16.8 billion was domestic production and 31.2 billion rials went to imported drugs. He added that in 10 years, assuming that the population grew to 60 million and the per capita consumption of drugs would increase to 1,500 rials, we would need 90 billion rials worth of drugs.

Planning for Drugs

Doctor Olamazadeh said that if we limit our imports to 31.2 billion rials a year and keep it at that level, within 10 years the drug industry would face a very difficult task. The industry would have to produce 58.8 billion rials worth of drugs a year to meet the country's drug requirements. This would be a 350 per cent growth rate.

Shortage of Drugs

After Dr. Olamazadeh, Dr. Mazloomi, board member of the Iran Drug Company, talked about the shortage of certain drugs and said: "The basic problem is the lack of accurate statistics. Even though experts collected some data after the revolution, they were not reliable and shortage of drugs occurred occasionally."

"Perhaps the war has had its effect on the drug market," he added. "The principal responsibility of this company is to make sure that the country's drug needs are met. And this is done based on the plans sent to us from the Drug Office. Hopefully this problem will also be resolved."

Doctor Mazloomi said, "One reason for the shortage of some items is that they may not be covered by the Generic Plan. Cases such as this, of course, are very scarce. I should point out that scarce drugs could be obtained by patients from emergency drug centers of the Red Crescent."

Doctor Olamazadeh then talked about powdered milk for infants and said: "All mothers know that nothing is better than feeding the babies themselves. In this area, the prophet of Islam has some advice and we have quoted him on the milk cartons that have been ordered recently!"

He added that prior to the revolution 50 million boxes of powdered milk were consumed annually. Of this total, 60 to 70 percent by one firm and the remainder of 30 to 40 percent by many other producers were distributed in the market. After the revolution, it was decided to limit the number of brands, keeping better quality products and dropping the low quality items from the import list.

List of Scarce Drugs

At the conclusion of this interview, Dr Olamazadeh presented to ETTELA'AT a copy of the list of drugs unavailable in the market. These items can be obtained with a prescription from Iran Drug Company's drugstore.

CSO: 4640/104

IRAN

IRAN SAID TO BE 'ACTING AGAINST OPEC ON BEHALF OF U.S. POSITION'

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 265, 20 Dec 82 p 35

[Article by Mas'ud Tabataba'i: "Iran's Attitude toward OPEC Is Designed To Destroy the Organization and Carry Out the U.S. Plan"]

[Text] Iran is still violating the duties of its membership in OPEC. At the most recent OPEC meetings Iran refused to abide by any of the organization's decisions, even if Libya were to abide by them. Speaking for Libya in 1980 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud had anticipated Iran and called for the establishment of an alternative organization to OPEC that would be "closer to the interests of people." Iran then proceeded to carry out this appeal and to form this single member alternative organization.

Although it was assumed that this populist trend had intended this alternative organization to apply the slogans of the Islamic Revolution to the economic arena, Iran violated all these slogans one right after the other. The principle of cutting back production to preserve the value of oil for future generations was being implemented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by Iraq and by Kuwait but not by the advocates of this "populist OPEC." It was also the countries assailed by Iran and not this "alternative organization" that raised sale or export prices and maintained their [present] level to realize the maximum price from the oil that was sold to "the western enemy."

It is with such demagoguery and revolutionary rhetoric that Iran has been deliberately throwing a monkey wrench into OPEC's machinery, exposing all the OPEC nations to danger from western conspiracies that are being waged against them by world-wide oil monopolies that are entertaining ambitions for the region's oil. These monopolies are backed by Arab governments. Khomeyni's regime considers any recognition of these governments "a devilish deed," and yet his regime not only recognizes these governments in the markets of Amsterdam and elsewhere, but it cooperates with them in committing wrongful deeds and aggression.

Iran thus increased its oil production to 2.1 million barrels a day. It was able to do that in two ways: first, it reduced prices until the difference [between its sale price and the official OPEC sale price] exceeded 5 dollars per barrel; and second, it made barter agreements with western countries like Turkey, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Japan. Khomeyni's regime pretended that these countries were not

"devilish" because "they were neutral regarding the role of the United States in denying the rights of peoples."

Iran and Turkey formed a barter agreement whereby Iran would supply Turkey with 7,200 barrels of oil a day and Turkey would build for Iran a cement and lime crushing plant. Iran and Sweden agreed to exchange 60 million dollars worth of manufactured goods for Iranian oil of the same value. Iran agreed to sell Yugoslavia 30,000 barrels of oil a day in return for foreign currency. It agreed to supply Japan's Itoh and Marubeni companies with 20,000 barrels of oil a day each. It also agreed to supply 10,000 barrels of oil a day to Japan's (Toyominka) Company. In addition, Iran commissioned Japan's Mitsui Company to conduct an engineering study in a period of 6 months re-evaluating the petrochemicals complex in Bandar Khomeyni which had been made inoperative by the war.

This trend was not unknown to the American government and it was not carried out without its approval. The United States, its allies in Europe's Common Market and Japan decided to support Iran in the Gulf War until the two countries that are fighting this war are destroyed. The Arab will to resist would thus be subdued, and the Iranian people who are awaiting the end of the war to declare a revolution against Khomeyni's regime would also be subdued. Western interests ordered Israel and others to provide Iran with weapons, and they worked with the Mafia and with some companies and banks to strengthen "Iran's war effort." In return, Iran increased its oil production regularly. In January 1982 Iran produced 34.1 million barrels of oil, but in July [of the same year] its oil production rose to 74 million barrels.

But the courage of the Iraqi army foiled this plan. Iraq bombed installations at al-Kharj and some western tankers that had come to Iran to ship oil. Sometimes oil was shipped to "devilish" parties and other times to non-devilish parties, according to how Khomeyni and his followers interpreted their interests.

Faced with this fundamental shift in the course of the war oil production fell again. Oil production last September was 69 million barrels. Prices also fell to prevent further reductions in the volume of production, and western interests forbore their habit of maintaining a hard-line in negotiations.

At the same time the Tehran government abolished many of the restrictions that it had imposed early in the Revolution on the movement of foreign currency. It did that to facilitate the growth of Iran's trade with western countries. The Tehran government suspended a law that had nationalized foreign trade, and trade offices in these countries strengthened this trade effort by raising the ceiling on financial credit for international trade. A spokesman for the Central Bank of Tehran announced that increased oil returns which will result from all these efforts would increase Iran's foreign currency reserves to about 1 billion dollars a month.

The economic revolution in Iran against the past administration has come to an end, and everything that was declared by speakers and religious authorities about the need for comprehensive change to build the alleged Islamic system has been recanted. The social revolution has not materialized at all, especially after the communal farms projects was abolished. The political revolution has dwindled to an action of changing faces and facades. Of the broad-scaled bloodthirsty action

only one "revolution" remains [to be carried out]: that of instating Khomeyni on the Pahlavi throne and arousing the feelings of racial hatred against Arab neighbors abroad and against Arab, Baluch, Kurdish and Turkmen minorities in Iran. In this regard the Iranian people have become as powerless as they were before.

But the Iranian people's uprisings against their previous governments, which had acted in collusion with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, will inevitably recur. The Iranian people will rise against the government of Khomeyni which is acting in collusion today with world-wide oil companies to do away with OPEC. This uprising will put an end to the trend to sell out "the people's" interests against OPEC, and it will also put an end to [the effort to] sell out Islam.

8592

CSO: 4604/9

WESTERN JOURNALISTS ASSAILED AS 'INTELLECTUAL SLAVES'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Jan 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ali Zulfikari]

[Text]

ONE of the greatest achievements of the Islamic Revolution of Iran was to unmask the true face of Western journalism as a dangerous machine of infernal power devoted to serve the purpose of intellectual slavery of nations. The arrival of the media machine on the scene of international politics made obsolete the classical methods of colonialism and announced the era of neo-colonial control of nations through the globe-embracing network of invisible chains that could capture minds and enslave souls with the speed of electromagnetic waves. However, before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Western media confronted the Communist block which was almost as vicious in its tactics of mental and spiritual enslavement. In fact the Western and Eastern machines of intellectual enslavement competed with each other to enroll the maximum number of slaves within the prisons of their mythologies.

The media prisons are run by thoroughbred intellectual slaves commonly called journalists, who function as prison guards within the global confines of the invisible prison. Before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the media prison guards did not have any significant problem with their inmates throughout the world nor the imperialist masters any worries about the loyalty of their prison guards who had been nurtured in the 'slave-hatcheries' of Western universities where the outgoing 'specialists' learned the arts and skills of intellectual prostitution. But the Islamic Revolution of Iran threatened to destroy the traditional peace within

the imperialist prison as much as it called into question the future loyalties of its guards. That the media machine is nearing the point of total collapse is indicated by the extent the Western journalism has been forced to stretch its lies almost to the breaking point.

This can be understood by the example of the Associated Press, an intellectual slave-making machine of U.S. imperialism, which is controlled by the Zionists. In a recent story (January 17), quoting some spurious source dubbed "a former Iranian prisoner" identified only as "Ahmad", the AP writes: "The Iranian said prisoners (in the Islamic Republic of Iran) are tortured with electric cattle prongs, routinely beaten, forced to eat their hair and excrement, raped by guards The inmates at the Iranian prisons are tortured so brutally that they call executioner's bullets 'shot of deliverance'."

Actually, such a ghastly charge can originate only in the imagination of Zionists inspired by the record of their own deeds in Lebanon and occupied Palestine. But the question arises, whom do the imperialist media intend to deceive through such mendacious and ghastly lies? Do not such lies, more than anything else, suggest that the Western media, in their capacity as the prison authorities of the world, have been forced to the frontiers of despair at the triumphant march of this Divine Revolution? Does it not signify that the masters of the Western 'free press' are realising that with every day that passes, the power of their invisible chains is breaking down and the truths that emerge across the prison lines erected by Western journalism are setting more people free?

But the imperialists underestimate the reality when they fear that only the inmates are escaping from their prisons; for there is a gradual weakening in the hitherto assumed loyalties of the media's prison guards, as the truth of this revolution are opening the eyes of the journalist to the realities of their own hitherto unquestioned slavery of mind and soul. Let these slaves realise that their present professional 'achievements' are viewed as the most dishonorable plight a man of education can be subject to. Let them know that their chains do not bind those who achieve their liberty through

sole service to the One God and the true followers of La ilaha illallah (There is no god but Allah) If they are not willing to liberate themselves from the dishonorable intellectual slavery of imperialists, let them know that there are others who are willing to lay down their lives to liberate human beings from the bondage of the chains of deceptive journalism. Let them know that the slave-societies they have created with so much of ignoble effort will be set free one after another as this Divine Revolution moves ahead on its liberating course. All your efforts - though they may have temporarily helped the imperialists to devour the rights and resources of the oppressed humanity - will finally come to nothing. Rest assured that the Barakah(blessing) of the blood of martyrs of Islam will soon hurl Western journalism into the bottomless pit of ignominy. The final end of all enemies of God and man. Let us tell you what Imam Hussain said to the wretched soldiers of Yazid.

"If you do not believe in God and in the hereafter, at least be free men in your worldly affairs!"

CSO: 4600/259

CIRCULAR SPECIFIES DUTIES OF STATE ORGANS

LD271625 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 27 Jan 83

[Text] Dear listeners, the headquarters in charge of enforcing the imam's decrees has sent a circular to organizations, government departments, judicial centers and revolutionary organizations, defining the scope of the duties and responsibilities of judicial, administrative and security organizations throughout the country, in accordance with points No 159, 165, 166, 168, 172, 173, 22, 23, 25, 32 and 39 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The circular says: In pursuance of the spirit of the constitution, all those who as a result of government appointment have been given some responsibilities should be servants of the nation, leading them toward God. The fighting and Muslim 'Ummah, and the fighters at the fronts of the war between truth and falsehood will never forgive disrespect toward the blood of the martyrs and the essence of their aspirations, namely the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The circular emphasizes: The headquarters in charge of enforcing the imam's decrees with the assistance of Almighty God and the support of the Muslim and revolutionary 'Ummah, will confront any violations, aggression and bullying which are the evil inheritance from the deposed regime. According to some complaints and reports which have been received, some of the existing violations are due to the overlapping of duties and responsibilities of judicial, administrative and security organizations; therefore, the headquarters in charge of enforcing the imam's decrees declares that the general and official bodies in charge of the investigation of violations are the common [makahem-e omuni] courts. With the exception of some special and exceptional cases which will be specified below, the investigation of which has been entrusted to special bodies and courts, all other cases, claims and offenses should be referred to common courts and no individual or organization, whether these are special judicial authorities or administrative and security organizations and departments, have the right to interfere in the cases which are under the jurisdiction of common courts. Those who violate this guideline will be prosecuted in accordance with religious and lay laws.

Revolution courts and prosecutors' offices formed throughout the country in accordance with the law on revolution courts and prosecutors' offices approved on 17 June 1979 and subsequent laws approved by the revolution council or the Islamic Consultative Assembly will deal with the following:

Cases specified in Article 2 of the law on revolution courts and prosecutors' offices concerning individual and multiple murder aimed at strengthening the Pahlavi regime and suppressing the struggle of the Iranian people, as regards both issuing orders and carrying them out.

The killing and torture of the struggling people, either by issuing orders or by carrying them out.

Major economic crimes: namely, plundering the public treasury or squandering the wealth of the country in the interest of foreigners.

Conspiracy against the Islamic Republic of Iran through armed activities, terrorism, destruction of property and spying for foreigners.

Armed robbery, forcible entry and the production, importation or distribution of narcotics.

Forcible entry and occupation of property, murder trespass or preventing the rightful ownership of government or private property in accordance with the law; the law concerning punishment for causing disruption in agriculture and livestock raising as approved on 10 December 1979; clarification of the law concerning punishment for causing disruption in agriculture and livestock raising as approved by the revolution council; the law concerning those who violate public and personal property, whether these are legal corporations or real individuals, as approved on 13 December 1980 by the revolution council; the law preventing the occupation and seizure of property belonging to the government; the law abrogating the ownership of unused urban land and the construction of any buildings upon them, preventing any dealings and transactions in land and property on the basis of unofficial documents, and preventing the division and disposal of such land, as approved by the revolution council on 26 April 1980.

Note that in those cities in which the revolution prosecutor general has set up courts and prosecutors' offices in municipalities, those courts should act purely within the context of the law for preventing violations against government land or unused urban land.

Narcotics. In addition to Paragraph H [HEH] of Article 2 of the law on revolution courts and prosecutors' offices, approved on 17 June 1979, revolution courts and prosecutors' offices can only investigate those files that have been sent to them in accordance with the law concerning the formation of councils to decide the qualification of courts entrusted with the investigation of files on narcotics while receiving seized narcotics.

Violations in connection with water and electricity: according to the law concerning the prosecution of those who use without a legal permit water and electricity and installations of the Ministry of Energy and affiliated companies and organizations, approved on 16 March 1979 by the Revolution Council.

Offences in connection with the cutting of trees and violations concerning forests and public pastures.

Military revolution courts: According to the law concerning the formation of military revolution courts, approved on 29 Aban 58 [20 November 1979] by the revolution council, the investigation of offences and crimes of individuals who engage in incitement and destructive activities within the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police is within the jurisdiction of military revolution courts.

Islamic revolution courts and prosecutors' offices of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, revolution committees and mobilization units: the investigation of the offences in connection with military or security duties of the official members of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the Islamic revolution committees and mobilization units will be within the jurisdiction of these courts. If members of the above-mentioned organizations commit common offences, whether those offences are committed during the execution of their duties or outside it, they will be tried in common courts. The single article concerning the guards belonging to committees and the revolution guards, approved on 15 July 1979, according to which the investigation of all the offences of the guards belonging to committees and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps that are committed during the execution of their duties had been entrusted to the Islamic Revolution Courts, was abrogated as the result of the approval of principle 72 of the constitution approved on 15 November 1979. Therefore, the jurisdiction of such courts are limited to offences in connection with special military or security duties of the guards, the files concerning their common offences should be sent as soon as possible to qualified common courts for investigation.

Military courts: military courts investigate special military and security offences by the personnel of the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie. The common offences of personnel will be investigated in common courts. According to principle 161 of the constitution, the supreme court is in charge of supervising the correct implementation of laws in courts and ensuring uniformity in judicial practices. In order to prevent issuing verdicts that are illegal and contrary to the Shari'a and in order to invalidate incorrect verdicts and sentences, the prosecutors in towns and provinces that come across any such violations are dutybound to send a report together with a copy of the verdict to the prosecutor general of the country and to the national inspectorate.

Because the judicial branch implements its overall supervision concerning the correct implementation of laws in all state organizations through the national inspectorate; all the directors of government organizations and departments and revolutionary organs that notice any violations or misconduct that should be investigated by the national inspectorate should immediately report such cases to the national inspectorate.

The authority to try and issue verdicts on violations committed by government employees and members of revolutionary institutes is given to the administrative justice tribunal. All government organizations and revolutionary institutes should implement the verdicts issued by this tribunal within the legally stated time limit and report matters to the tribunal.

Appointing and dismissing managers of production, industrial, agricultural, commercial and government services or of bodies affiliated to government organizations--for example, the organization of national industries or the organization for the development and renovation of Iranian industries--is solely up to the relevant executive officials. The revolution courts, the prosecutors' offices and the military and security forces--like the guards corps, the revolution committees and the basij [mobilization]--as well as popular units and institutes such as Islamic societies and councils do not have the slightest right to interfere in this matter. No doubt, if such institutes see any irregularities in the management of any unit, they could report the matter directly to the relevant officials.

The executive power branch and all the units throughout the country attached to it are independent, according to the constitution. No official or office of the judiciary, revolution courts, prosecutors' offices or guards corps has the right to interfere in the authority of the executive power, except in cases specified by law.

Governors-general, governors and district officers in their relevant province, provincial town or district have the highest political rank and are official representatives of the government. The responsibilities and authorities of the above-mentioned officials have been outlined in the law. Except for those cases specified by law and having the country's official approval, those officials do not have the right to interfere or exercise influence. If governors-general, governors and judiciary judges commit an offense, they will be prosecuted by the judicial authorities in Tehran. Local judicial officials and societies--such as revolution prosecutors' offices, guards corps, committees and basij--are strictly forbidden from molesting them.

With reference to the general terms and the amendment to the note of Article 8 of the bill of law on the formation of public courts, approved 23 February 1980, all offenses committed by the said officials--including general and counter-revolutionary offenses--will be reviewed by the judicial authorities in Tehran.

Regarding their security duties, members of the committees are responsible to the Interior Ministry. In matters relating to the judicial power branch--including revolution courts, prosecutors' offices and penal courts numbers one and two--these committee members should act as bailiffs for the judicial power and should only carry out written official orders issued by the appropriate judicial authorities within their jurisdiction. Without orders from the appropriate judicial authorities they do not have the right to carry out any form of investigation, search, summoning or arrest nor can they enter houses or confiscate possessions. This order does not apply to overt offenses. Violators will be prosecuted in the appropriate courts and punished in accordance with law and religion. All security officers and members of the guards corps, committees and the basij should not carry out orders by non-judicial authorities to summon or arrest people or to confiscate property.

Islamic societies of government departments and organizations affiliated to the government as well as industrial, production, services, agricultural and commercial institutes--in both the private and government sectors--should only be active

within the framework specified in note four of the parties' act. If any irregularities are seen, such matters should be confidentially reported to superiors without interference in the management. [sentence as heard]

Managers of industrial, domestic and commercial service's units--both private and public sectors--should not, as a principle, interfere in the societies' activities which are correct and in accordance with precepts. Violations will be investigated.

Outside of office hours, the heads of government departments and organizations affiliated to the government do not have the right to force government employees against their will to be present in their places of work under any pretext.

The supreme councils for the supervision of the reconstruction of ministries and government institutes regularly supervise and investigate the performance of the primary and secondary councils. If they discover any irregularities, they should dissolve the offending councils and prosecute the offending members of those councils and prosecute and eliminate the effects of the offensive sentences.

From the date of this order, all supreme supervisory councils should for 1 month compile the detailed statistic information on the dossiers [word indistinct] in the primary and secondary councils [words indistinct] of the employees and the verdicts issued and other necessary information, and submit them to the headquarters in charge of enforcing the imam's decree. Any violations will be investigated.

The primary and secondary councils for reconstruction should closely follow the recent orders of His Excellency the Imam, in their investigations, verdicts and decisions. Any deliberate violation of the decree, even once, will result in the council being dissolved and the violators being prosecuted in accordance with the law and religion.

Before any fresh reconstruction, the councils should reconsider verdicts previously issued and [words indistinct]. It is also necessary to follow the imam's orders closely in the case of verdicts already issued.

By constantly reviewing and investigating the performance of the council and requesting dossiers, the supreme supervisory council should supervise the correct implementation of this order. Any violations will be investigated.

All suspension orders issued to government employees as a form of punishment are revoked. Documented suspension orders issued in accordance with Article 53 of the (?reconstruction) act are not included. In such cases the council which has issued the suspension order should, as soon as possible, or within 3 months of the date of issue of the order, issue the appropriate verdict on the matter. Otherwise, after the said date, the order will be automatically rescinded and the relevant organization should take steps to re-employ the said employee.

Suspension orders--which have been issued not as punishment and in accordance with Articles 116 and 117 of the State Employment Act, due to [words indistinct] and the dissolution of the relevant unit--are not covered by this order.

As stated in the imam's recent six-point decree, all selection teams throughout the country are dissolved and no other unit or official has the right to repeat the irreligious and unlawful deeds of the defunct teams. In this connection, especially the training departments of the Ministry of Education and Training, should not interfere in any way in the affairs of employees of the education department or the management of educational units. The managers of the various units should immediately report any violations to their superiors and this headquarters.

The authority for investigating offences committed by medical doctors in their various degrees of specialization is the medical register organization. No revolutionary or security establishment or judicial unit has the right to interfere in this matter. General offences by physicians will be investigated in public courts. In view of the sensitivity and sanctity of the medical profession, all responsible officials and security officers of the government and revolutionary establishments are dutybound to respect the regulations of the medical field and the medical profession. In gratitude to public respect and the respect of the responsible officials, and in return for the use of the country's resources during their studies and training physicians working in the Islamic Republic should also feel a responsibility for treating the sick. In so doing they should avoid a profit-seeking mentality, which has unfortunately been observed in some cases, and have sympathy with their patients, particularly with those who are unable to meet the heavy costs of medical treatment. In this way they can repay their debts to Islam, the Islamic Republic and the blood of our martyrs.

Those employees who are temporarily arrested or prosecuted by Islamic revolution tribunals in connection with the offences they have committed, should return to their previous employment after the termination of their detention. Their employers must pay all their wages and salaries up to the date their convictions are confirmed by the court. If in certain cases it is recognized that reinstatement of a worker is contrary to the public interest or the interests of his employer, then, in accordance with Article 53 of the reforms law, the relevant judicial authorities can declare him as suspended employee.

In view of the prestige attached to the honorable profession of teaching and training, university professors and lecturers, and teachers in primary and secondary schools should enjoy special respect and esteem. Officials in charge of the higher education institutes and offices of education departments and the responsible officials of the reform committees, when dealing with members of this hard-working strata, who are training makers of the country's future, should bear in mind their present records, overlook their past minor mistakes and should give them a chance to serve the republic. Under no circumstances are responsible officials permitted to use personal reasons or unnecessary criteria to endanger the status of teachers. The responsible officials who--God forbid--employ such criteria will be dealt with severely.

In return, professors and teachers are dutybound to strive to teach our youth the aim of making the country self-sufficient in various specialized fields. Teachers should seek assistance from the soul-saving principles and instructions of Islam and use the very rich source of Islamic culture to train our youth as symbols of faith, skillful in science and technology, and present them to society.

In view of Note 1 of Article 50 of the reform law, which stresses the country's need for experts, particularly in the fields of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and teaching, reform committees, when dealing with members of such professions, are dutybound to make sure that they are not obstructing their tasks in trying to serve society. As far as is possible (light punishments) should be employed if (an offence) is proven.

Previous and present purging committees have issued orders suspending or dismissing certain employees. Some of these cases have not been yet confirmed by review boards. In such cases, employers should refrain from implementing unconfirmed orders and should continue to pay employees until the order is made definite. If such employees have been suspended, they should then receive suspension salary. In the meantime, if it is contrary to the interests of an employer to reinstate a purged employee until confirmation of his case, the employee should be suspended in accordance with the regulations.

Accounts and personnel departments of state and other organizations affiliated to the government are strictly forbidden to stop payment of salaries and wages to employees except for cases confirmed by the relevant authorities. When cashiers and personnel officers receive orders from their superiors to stop payments to an individual employee, then they are dutybound to ask the superior officials for legal documents. If an order is contrary to the legal documents, the personnel officers and cashiers are dutybound to refrain from carrying out the order, or they should relieve themselves of responsibility and take action regarding the responsibility of their superiors and report the matter to the relevant authorities.

The police and gendarmerie are at the service of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, all their members are eligible for respect in return for their services. No official from state organizations or revolutionary establishments is allowed to interfere illegally in the affairs of the police or gendarmerie, and when dealing with personnel of these two organizations--who are shouldering the burden of very important combat and security responsibilities--the investigating officials are dutybound to observe Islamic codes and morals and value their services.

Religious minorities, zoroastrians, Jews and Christians, in their religious rituals and personal matters within the law, are protected and safeguarded by the Islamic Republic in accordance with Article 13 of the constitution. Neither of the revolutionary establishments and organizations of the Islamic Republic has the right to interfere in these religious and personal affairs except in cases determined by the law. Followers of the said religions are also expected to observe regulations of the Islamic Republic.

All authorities, officials, responsible sources and officers to whom the instructions of this circular apply are dutybound to study its details carefully and refrain from taking contrary actions. Offenders will be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the Shari'a and law.

In conclusion, it is necessary to ask the committed employees of state organizations, revolutionary establishments and the Muslim ummah to report offenders who violate the imam's decree--may his lofty shadow continue--to the headquarters in charge of enforcing the imam's decree. They are assured that the offenders will be dealt with decisively irrespective of their rank or status.

MODARRES LABELED AS 'TEACHER OF FREEDOM'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Dec 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] Today is the anniversary of the Ayatollah Modarres' martyrdom. May God bless him. How he was, how he left and his reason for being, should be learned by studying his birth lineage. These are lessons one should not hesitate to learn and teachers such as Modarres may never be forgotten.

As for Modarres, particularly after the revolution, his works, background, history he created and his holy face have been talked about. There is nothing new that could be said. But this is not a reason to forget him. No, that is not the case. Modarres needs to be defined. He could be compared to Abouzar. This name belongs to that freedom lover who appeared 14 centuries ago, created tales and then disappeared, leaving behind the term "Abouzar." Abouzar first appeared in Mecca. He searched for the truth and finally found it. There is a story about him that goes like this:

"He sat and waited in Mecca to find his lost cause. One day, two days and three days.... Finally a youth came to him and asked him how long he wanted to sit and wait there? Is it not the time, said the youth, to go home? Abouzar went home, to Mohammed's house. He had tears of desire in his eyes so he could not see everything but he heard what was said. He felt like a flying horse, like someone who was walking over the clouds. He thought he could not sit and watch the darkness. He could not be silent. In those days, repression was overwhelming and Mohammed's followers were being tortured, exiled or put in jail. Abouzar could not stand it any longer. He went to Kaaba, on a hill, and shouted: 'Bear witness to God, I bear witness to Mohammed as God's prophet.' The people did not understand him, so he was brought down and beaten up and his half-dead body was left behind. The next day he returned and again shouted, 'I bear witness to god...' and he was beaten up again. This was Abouzar, so is Modarres."

Those who have seen Modarres' picture might doubt that this wrinkled face belongs to a man with so much honesty and purity. It was the same person with his patched up outfit and turban who stood against powerful Reza Khan. It is rumored that one day Reza Khan grabbed his shirt and shouted: "Seyyed, what do you want from me?" Modarres, with a hopeful face said, "I wish you dead!" It is also rumored that on behalf of Reza Khan one night someone brought him 10,000 tomans and said: "Take this and be quiet." Modarres told the man, "Put the money under the

mattress and tell your master that this money will be spent against him up to the last penny. If he agrees, fine and if not come back here and take the money." It is said that when Reza Khan's hoodlums gathered in front of the Majlis and shouted "Death to Moddars," he said, "If I die, nobody will give you money anymore!"

When he died, he only had 24 tomans and like Abuzar he was wearing the same clothes he wore in the summer or winter. He believed a new outfit needed money and money brought dependence. He used to say that being in need ruins one's independence, beliefs and ideals. With his Isfahani accent, he used to say, "I am not one of those who takes under-the-table money. I want my sharp tongue to be free."

Modarres was another Abuzar but in his own time, not because of a few instances, but because of his real character. He stood against westernized people who wanted Islam to disappear. Today, everyone is determined to defend Islam. The importance of his efforts could be known if one realizes that when he rose up, he was alone. He came alone, stood up alone, made his efforts alone and left alone, exactly like Abuzar. How much difference is there between one who is swimming against the stream and one with the stream?

When the pens were writing and horns were being used in a campaign against Islam, Modarres did not surrender. Even though he was harassed, he did not quit. Consistency is rare to find among people. There are those who would not change directions. Ali was one of them. When Mohammed was called "an insane maniac," he stood by him. He did not pay attention to what people said. He did not fear criticism. He believed in what he said when he stood up in Kaaba and shouted, "I bear witness to God," like Abuzar and Modarres.

If an entire population believed in an untrue fact, he would not give in. Like Abuzar he read the Koran for those who had forgotten the book a few decades after Mohammed had died. Like Modarres, he would have opposed Reza's bid to become the Shah in the Majlis, where everyone else voted for him. He is not afraid of anyone but God. If he is told two people intend to kill him if he went to school the next day, he would say, "I will definitely go."

At the end of the day, they came after him, putting poison in his tea. He wants more time for his prayers. You will hear the sound "God is Great" in the sky. Abuzar has gone home. Even though he will resurrect in a little while.

CSO: 4640/103

MONTAZERI ON EXPERTS, EXPORT OF REVOLUTION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 pp 2, 3

[Text] Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent, has instructed top officials to identify well-educated Iranians living abroad and to give them incentives to return home.

"Find the experts who live abroad and make sure they do not belong to counter revolution," he said. "Then tell them they can return home; tell them they can work here."

Montazeri urged Islamic officials to be "generous in spirit" towards the experts.

"Forgive them for their minor sins," he said. "If they have neglected some Islamic rules, if their wives failed to wear the veil before, you should forgive them since what is important is their present conduct, which should be Islamic."

Montazeri said Iran needed trained manpower to run her industry. Therefore those who have left Iran, he said, should now come back and receive Islamic mercy.

"You may also recruit foreign experts from Third World and Islamic nations," he said. "Give priority to experts from African countries. Bring them here to work and when they leave they will export our revolution, which is of great importance to us."

Montazeri said teams must be sent abroad to disabuse Iranians of their idea that something "horrifying" was going on in the Islamic Republic.

CSO: 4600/285

SIGNS OF GROWING RIFT WITH MOSCOW

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 pp 3, 4

[Text] The Tehran government has withdrawn the accreditation of the Tass correspondent in Tehran and refused to accept a successor as signs grew that the traditional fear of Russian intentions and expansionist ideas has revived in Iran.

Although some editorialists in the Tehran press have obviously been pulling their punches in their writings there has been a steadily growing anti-Soviet campaign in the media. Tehran radio has reported prominently official warnings to the Soviets on their policy in Afghanistan and has reminded Moscow of Iran's firm policy against imperialism.

The permission given for demonstrations by Afghan refugees in front of the Soviet embassy and publicity given to the refugees also reflects the mood towards the Soviets.

Sources say the mullahs' attitude may reflect an awareness that suspected Soviet agents have managed to infiltrate the revolutionary organisations and the bureaucracy to a greater extent than had been suspected. Iranians have always taken it as read that the Russians have designs on Iran and, it is pointed out, it is only natural that there should be periodic expression of these fears, as happened in the days of the late Shah. In the last century Iran lost a lot of territory to the Czars during a period of political and economic weakness.

The Soviet decision to re-supply Iraq with arms is another obvious reason for Tehran's new animosity towards Moscow. This has presented Iranian propagandists with a poser. They have long alleged that Iraqi president Saddam Hussain was acting on behalf of American imperialism and Zionism; so it must have been hard for the mullahs to explain to their people why the Soviets were now bolstering their enemy.

France continues to be the subject of vilification in Tehran. Kuwait, another country which has been the subject of a campaign of criticism for several months, was castigated again this week for its French links. Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani reminded the regime in Kuwait that it was vulnerable.

In an interview with the Tehran daily Ettelaat, Rafsanjani also warned the West that if it tried to make the Persian Gulf insecure for Iran the latter would make the area insecure for the whole world. "I don't have to say what that means," he added. And those countries arming Iraq should know they could not get away with this and could not "breathe life into a dead corpse."

The mullahs are also accusing France of backing the opposition against Khomeini's regime.

CSO: 4600/285

KHOMAYNI'S AGENTS LIKENED TO HITLER'S FIFTH COLUMN

Paris QIYAM-E IRAN in Persian 29 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Text]

There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic has organized a fifth column outside the country.

In addition to certain available evidence and information, a simple reasoning would show this to be true.

Clergymen, in order to stabilize their power, have followed and are doing exactly what Fascist governments have done. As far as organization and methods of operation are concerned Khomeini's militias remind us of Mussolini's Black Shirts, and the storm troopers of Captain Rohm's and Himmler's SS in Germany. Offices of "Political Ideology" of clerical regime copies the "Information Ideologic" service of Schutz-Schafer in Hitler's days. A system of collecting and filing data on houses and their owners that was part of fascism is now part of the Islamic Republic. These and other examples indicate that terror and propaganda are two common phenomena of both the Islamic Republic regime and Fascism. So, why should this regime ignore the effectiveness of the Fifth Column?

In the days of the Civil War in Spain, General Emilio Mola used the phrase, "The Fifth Column has helped its masters tremendously". For us, a familiar example is Hitler's Fifth Column in Iran during World War II. In those days, among spies and terrorists, agents recruited from local residents were assigned the task of mentally preparing the population to accept the fact that Hitler was unstoppable. This would lead to the cooperation of local residents with the Nazi regime. It should be noted that most of the agents were chosen from the Mullahs. (Iranians whose age permits will remember that every now and then a mullah would dream of the final victory of Germany and attribute his dream to one of the prophets). Another story was that numbers were assigned to letters and the total numbers for "Hitler, representing the twelfth Imam" would be 1933 which happened to be the year Hitler assumed power. These stories were told in public prayer gatherings.) Mr. Khomeini, like his disrespected

predecessors, has dispatched a number of hoodlums overseas under diplomatic cover. These diplomats are punishing those opposing the regime. In contrast to the religious fanatics of "Hezb-Ollahis", this group is decent in appearance, dresses properly and has diverse jobs. Among them are military personnel, physicians, engineers, architects, government employees and businessmen. It is not surprising to find people who would do anything for money within any class or group of people. These are a minority who represent those serving the regime within the country. People like Colonel Atabaki, prosecutor of the Islamic Courts, Dr. Abbas Sheibani, member of the Majlis, and Mr. Gharazi, the regime's Minister of Oil, can also be found overseas.

One of the responsibilities of these agents is to spy on the activities of opposition groups. The more important job of these people is to disappoint the opposition. A campaign to vitiate the spirit of Iranians is not as strong among opposition groups overseas as it is within the country. The activities of opposition forces overseas have irritated the regime, and it is doing everything it can to prevent integration of these groups. What would be the best and easiest way? To deter them from any resistance. The clergymen realize how effective disappointment is so they have concentrated on a disappointment campaign. For this purpose, and to spread rumors, the regime has used agents and has given them the tools they need. These people, who had held high positions and were affluent in the past, have not been investigated or prosecuted.

Recognizing these agents is not an easy task. They are not average Iranians. They speak and reason well. They show up in gatherings and attack the regime by telling stories about what the regime has done to the country. They talk about the freedom they have lost. However, despite the negative aspects of the regime, they conclude by assuring you that the clergy have a solid position and will stay for years to come. In order to prove their point of view they reason, use sentimental tricks, and refer to history, saying that no regime enjoying such a power base has ever been overthrown by the people alone, without any foreign interference, and it appears that no foreign country wants to see the "Regime of Mullahs" gone.

They use evidence such as the BBC Commentary on the export of Iranian oil, recent observations of a relative who has just left Iran, the congratulatory cables from the Bulgarian and North Korean presidents to Mr. Khameni, Mr. Rafsanjani's prayers, the speech in which he threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz to the west, The Netherland's Ambassador's comments on future relations between the two countries, and many other instances.

They try to convince you that even our grandchildren will never see our homeland. At the end of gatherings they even use Iranian music and poems and sing: "Those who get stuck in a foreign land might end up only dreaming of the homeland."

These are Khomeini's paid agents and, sooner or later, their true identities will be revealed and they will have to answer to Iranians about their involvement with the crazy old man.

We are not talking to these people, but we are talking to those Iranians who unknowingly might participate in this 'hope killing' process. Those who are missing their country and her independence and freedom might still act against their country, unknowingly. This is an important matter.

Now that the country is in a delicate situation, we have a very important responsibility and promoting disappointment would be an unfaithful act and would not be forgiven.

We find it our responsibility to caution Iranians who deserve this name: do not sit back and watch this show. Do not just listen to what they say. Analyze what you see and hear but do not forget that the regime of mullahs is on the defensive. If they go through so much trouble to send these agents, it is because they feel threatened by the opposition within and without.

Of course, blood is still being spilled, they are still shouting. The democratic Presidents message is still being published and the Majlis speaker is still asking for challenge. But these efforts are made for their own self-confidence. It is like a lonesome and frightened dog who is barking and biting.

If you do not want to refer to history, try to remember recent events in the world and bloodshed and shouting by dictators who were near the end of their reign.

Iran needs your strength and your strength needs your hope. The mullahs are afraid of your power so they attack your hope!

Despite the claims of those agents, do not lose your hope and rest assured that we will return to our homeland walking over their graves.

CSO: 4640/99

'SPINE CHILLING STORY' TOLD BY IRANIAN PRISONER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 pp 7, 8

[Text] "It was 4 a.m. when they raided my house and arrested me. They were five revolutionary guards armed to the teeth. They beat me and my wife without any explanation. Less than an hour later I found myself in the notorious Evin prison sitting on a chair and tied up with one-inch electric cable. My wife was pregnant and she had a miscarriage."

This is how an Iranian whose name was given simply as Ahmad opened the tragic story of his 18 months in prison under the Khomeini regime when he recounted it in the pro-socialist Paris morning paper Le Matin de Paris on Monday. Aged 31 and a foreman by trade he was in Unit 325 at Evin prison and he gives some precise details of the treatment of prisoners there.

"It contained eight old-fashioned rooms, each 12 metres square, on two floors. The rooms contained up to 40 people, many of them," he said, "epileptics, suffering from nervous disorders or virtually insane as a result of what was happening to them."

Ahmad recalls that on the night that Bani-Sadr fell from grace the guards went mad, beating everyone without discrimination. "They beat me over three consecutive days, beating me on shifts, stopping only at noon for prayers and then to eat, and then continuing until 6 p.m...", he wrote. The guards were allocated whipping sessions by the head of the prison.

Among tortures Ahmad recorded as current during his stay at the prison were incisions on the testicles and penis. While they were carrying out these tortures the guards would sit on the victim making joking remarks to each other.

Evin, a prison which one entered with fear that one would never leave it alive, he said, contained many Bahais. The diet was mainly bread and rice but sometimes the rations would be cut for several days.

Again on the day that Beheshti died the guards again went on the rampage, Ahmad said, and several prisoners were in fact killed. Many more were beaten.

In some cells at the prison there were as many as 70 people, who had to sleep in shifts. The prisoners were allowed four minutes only to go to the toilet. It was difficult to sleep at nights because of the cries of people being tortured or beaten and between 200 and 250 shots were the average to be heard at nights. Twice prisoners were taken to public hangings.

Ahmad said a Mrs Dowlatabadi was forced to eat her own excrement. He also said that it was Evin prosecutor Lajevardi who arranged for 20 young women to be married to revolutionary guards the night before their executions because Islam forbade the killing of virgins.

Ahmad also gave details of life at the Qezel Hissar prison 50 kilometres west of Tehran. The chief of the guards there was a man named Sourì whom he described as half-crazy and a pimp. He was known to have violated a number of women prisoners.

When prisoners asked to be transferred from solitary confinement to other parts of the prison Sourì made them eat their own hair. "I saw two naval officers vomiting blood and hair after they had done this," he said. No protests were allowed, and anyone doing so was whipped in front of other prisoners. Among those who had committed suicide in the prison were a number who burned themselves to death. Among the suicides was a Khuzestani named Asghar Hemati who had refused to sign a letter for the prison administration. Head of the administration was Haj Davoud Rahmani, a former ironmonger; among the staff in his charge were prisoners, guards who had committed misdemeanours, who were still being paid their guards' salaries of around 370 pounds sterling a month.

Ahmad gave a number of names of prison staff with reputations for being particularly brutal. One of them had been arrested himself as he was about to kill a bazaari from whom he was trying to extort money, but had been given a post in the prison after being taken there. Ahmad painted a picture of many unbalanced and thuggish people who had acquired positions looking after the prisoners because of their toughness and cruelty. Some guards had admitted killing prisoners while taking them to prisons.

Extreme psychological pressures were exerted by Lajevardi and other prison authorities on prisoners to try to get them to repent, Ahmad said. He claimed Soudabeh Soudefi, a close aide of former president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, had given in after scorpions had been put in her cell and she had been forced to witness the executions of young girls.

On the other hand money could still gain concessions, he said. The system was corrupt and people had even bought their lives, as well as other concessions. His own wife had paid the equivalent of 350 pounds sterling to be allowed to visit him. Ahmad finally bought his freedom from Qezel Hissar and then paid the equivalent of 40,000 pounds sterling to get out of Iran to Pakistan.

CSO: 4600/288

TOUR IN 'PALACES OF VILENESS, TREASON' DESCRIBED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 30 Nov 82 pp 5, 10

[Text]

The residential complex and huge palaces of the Pahlavi family are a city within Tehran. A tour of these palaces reflects their mammonism and acts of plunder. Splendid palaces, expensive furniture and decorations, gold woven draperies and other luxury items which have been paid for by the blood of this oppressed nation, produced a place for them to hold drinking gatherings and obscene activities, while the people of this country were facing difficulties and suffering pain.

Each of these palaces belongs to a member of this family and each had its own style of decoration and construction. Indeed, after the revolution, a collection of fine art has been transferred to this Moslem nation. In every corner of these palaces, one can hear the complaining groan of thousands of men, women and children. In every corner there are expensive objects and one can see the people of this revolutionary nation staring angrily reminding you that what you see is the blood of our people sucked by blood-suckers. They stole our treasures and turned them into gold and silver and then hung them on the walls of their houses to crunch their endless thirst.

And we saw how dominance of these oppressed people over this Islamic land was proven and helpless plunderers who were beating on the weak bodies of Moslems were drawn in a sea of anger. Once they saw their dreams shattered and their efforts to resist fruitless, they ran off to the arms of their masters knowing the even soil of this Islamic land would not accept their filthy bodies.

The Saad Abad complex has now been converted to museums and cultural centers hoping that Iranians will learn something by visiting places they once were not welcome. One of these palaces, the Resurrection and Admonitory Museum, was

inaugurated yesterday by Mr. Khatami, Minister of Islamic Guidance, and other officials. What attracts one's attention the most is the Islamic Republic's officials' admirable preservation efforts of the contents of these complexes and prevention of the misuse of the very expensive items. Despite the fact that the old regime took with them as much as they could, what one sees in the Saad Abad Cultural Center is an indication of a great task done by the officials to preserve what is left. The importance of their job becomes clearer when we think of cultural and art works that were sent out of the country and sold to private collectors and world museums by the regime and the people of the Royal Court. These were the people who exported the most valuable works of art in order to set up exhibitions in other countries and ended up selling them.

Saad Abad Palace by itself is a city within Tehran. This endless city includes a complex of palaces where the fugitive royal family used to spend their lives drinking, gambling and other obscene activities, not knowing about the pain and suffering the society was going through. What is amazing is that each of the Saad Abad Palaces belonged to one of the members of the family. The Shah had his own; his wife, children, sister and mother each owned their own residential palace. Every single brick of these palaces was built from the skin, bone and blood of a nation. If one of the people of this nation fell sick one day, the entire family would have starved to death.

In those days, when the royal family was enjoying themselves and would get what they wished, there were many people who worked hard and would perform any job to make a living. At the same time, there were children in small houses who would fall asleep hungry and would only dream of his father coming home with a loaf of bread.

But, following the glorious Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, Saad Abad Palace was taken over by the people. And now these palaces, one by one, are becoming museums. The residential palace belonging to the Shah's mother which was inaugurated yesterday is a good example. Prior to the opening of the "Resurrection and Admonitory Museum", we visited this palace and what follows is our report.

After a briefing by Mr. Kiaras, Chief of Public Relations of Saad Abad Palace, we went to the Shah's mother's palace. We were surprised when looking at the expensive, luxurious and even unique objects. We were not surprised because such items existed in her palace, or what effect such a luxury might have on one's life style. But we were surprised by the fact that an old woman who did not have long to live could collect such items; items which belonged to the people of this nation. The

first floor of this crazy, old woman's palace consists of a large living room and several rooms. In the living room there are expensive foreign-made tables, chairs, lighting fixtures in the corners and a few chandeliers hanging from the ceiling.

Mr. Rahim Zadeh, the palace caretaker, pointing to a huge chandelier in the middle of the room said, "This unique chandelier is priceless. When you really think about it, they could have saved hundreds of families and built reasonable dwellings for them by selling this chandelier. But they were not thinking about this or spending the money to build productive projects such as factories, schools and hospitals." Another example was a date tree made of gold and silver which was kept in a glass cabinet. Everyone knows that there should be a use for everything in life. What is the use of a date tree in life?

Then, we went to the rooms built around the living room: the study, guest room, gambling room, etc. What was amazing were the signs of pleasure and obscene activities throughout, even in the study, backgammon tables could be seen. These are enough reasons to believe that this family did not have a simple, normal life. When a large family spends the night in one room, this old woman had a huge residence where several families could live.

This palace has a second floor which we also visited. On the second floor the same luxurious and expensive objects could be seen. In the lobby, there are foreign-made pieces of furniture which are unique and expensive. In one part of the lobby decorative weapons are kept which consisted of a Pakistani canon, antique pistols and swords, including a Mongolian sword priced at one hundred thousand toman. The Shah's mother's private room is located on this floor. In this room, her clothes which she could not take with her could be seen. The clothes are so expensive that each one could dress hundreds of naked children. Interesting enough, civilian and military clothes of Reza Shah, that slave of foreigners, could be seen next to her clothes. In the same place, his sword and other weapons are located. Continuing our visit, we went to her private dining room where there is a table about ten to twelve meters long. The dishes and glasses are crystal and the silverware is pure silver. There are some unopened bottles of liquor next to the dishes. We asked Mr. Rahim Zadeh about them. He said, "We have kept these bottles for a reason, this family had always claimed to be religious and decent, however liquor bottles and other evidence have rejected their claims."

When you compare this dining room with our own, ours is the same as our living room. Their table is that long and ours is a piece of plastic tablecloth put on the floor. These people

spent resources of this Islamic country to provide themselves with such luxuries. There is a big difference between our dining room and theirs and that is the warmth and closeness we find among deprived people which theirs lacks.

The furniture in the dining room is made by the Japanese in French Louis XV style. Long candle holders, tall mirrors with gold frames, china vases and many other objects have given this room an unreal pretty look. Unreal because what is gained by sacrificing the people's blood cannot really be beautiful. What is gained by denying others rights is, in fact, ugly. And we saw how God took care of them, and their dreams came to an end. They ended up running off to their masters hoping to last a little longer until it is time for their filthy bodies to be buried.

We then went to the basement. When we talk about a basement, one thinks of a storage room filled with junk, but that was not the case with her basement. In the basement, her private movie room was located with nice decoration and 40 to 50 expensive and comfortable chairs.* Our guess is and as one of the Palace's officials said, "This chair must have been hers because this family would never sit behind anyone." Their selfish attitude would not let them be behind someone else even if this would hurt their eyes. It should be pointed out that in this place certain movies were shown that we are ashamed to even talk about. These movies were confiscated by the representative of the Prosecutor's Office. There were also obscene and ugly posters on the walls whose spots can be seen.

At the conclusion of our visit to this palace, we went to Mr Kiaras' office to obtain some information. Concerning the idea behind this exhibition he said, "The only reason for the "Resurrection and Admonitory Museum" is for the nation to come and visit the past of a member of the royal family and gain some experience. Obviously, unlawful and unjust ways of life have no end but what you say in the royal family's future. This kind of baseless life is not continuous and lessons can be learned from it.

He then added, "For comparison purposes, we have provided pictures of poor people and the way they lived and intended to chance to see and realize that so much misuse and inhuman attitudes had no ending. Our nation will visit this palace and compare it with the way of life of poor people and peasants, who lack basic needs such as drinking water, electricity, health and schools, and will learn a lesson.

* On the front row, there was a tall and more comfortable chair that probably belonged to her.

CSO: 4640/100

NAVY CONSIDERED 'MARCHING ALONG ISLAM'S RIGHT LINE'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Nov 82 p 14

[Text] Hojat-ol-Eslam Elahi, Political Director of the "Political Ideology" Office of the Islamic Republic Navy, in an interview announced the specifics of the ceremonies marking Azar 7, the Navy day. He said, "On Azar 7, 1359 (28 November 1980) Morvarid operations with the supervision of the Bushehr Combat Group took place which was militarily very successful. Many of Iraq's air force and navy units were destroyed in Iraqi waters. Among them were several "Uza" gunboats equipped with missiles. This was a military setback for the Iraqis. These operations were also important economically. Two platforms with the capacity of loading eight oil tankers at the same time, called al-bakr and al-omieh, were destroyed and Iraq was not able to export oil from the Persian Gulf. These operations created a favorable political outcome for us and an unfavorable one for Iraq. Since the heroic Morvarid operations, the Iraqis were totally helpless and have not appeared at sea. However, recently they have reappeared after obtaining new equipment."

The hero of Azar 7 operations was Captain Hemmati and his men who heroically resisted and showed that dying has its own way and if the cause is for Islam and homeland, they are ready to lose their lives.

Hojat-ol-eslam Elahi added, "We have many plans for the seventh of Azar. Many students (around 200, four from each school) have been selected and will travel by bus to Bushehr and Bandar Abbas to familiarize themselves with the Navy. These students will visit gunboats, the sea and factories and meet personnel, and they will become interested. Hopefully in the future more and more dedicated people will join the Navy. We have also decided to send Navy personnel to school in order to explain to students the Navy's position, function and policies. Of course, there will be other programs such as speeches."

'Political Ideology' and Its Functions

Elahi then explained the duties of the "Political Ideology" and said, "The principal duty of this organization is to explain the general strategy of the Moslem people of Iran. At this point, our strategy is summarized in one word, 'Islam'. It is Islam which determines all directions whether military, cultural or economic.

During the war, naval forces concentrated on three subjects of training, maintenance and operation. We have both now and before the war done our duties along with specialized training. Our duty has been to explain general strategy. From a political point of view, we have worked on problems such as the constitution, political groups, and the policy of independence which is the philosophy of following neither the West nor the East, personnel familiarization concerning the policies of the superpowers, regional policies and domestic policies. Of course, to achieve these goals we have set up many classes, used the services of many instructors, and numerous educational texts have been written and given. As far as I can tell, the maximum possible number of personnel in the Navy have been covered by educational programs."

Lack of Clergymen

He added, "There is a shortage of clergymen in the Navy, the entire armed forces and the government ministries. There is a great demand for them and the supply is limited. The clergyman is not an item which can be imported. This shortage exists in the south in particular. Hardship, high humidity, lack of familiarity with regional culture and other problems make the south unattractive to them. We have tried our best. On occasions such as Ramadan and the month of Moharam there are 7 or 10 clergymen at the base in Bandar Abbas."

Ayatollah Montazeri and His Guidance

Concerning his meeting with the Ayatollah Montazeri, Hojat-ol-eslam Elahi said, "Ayatollah Montazeri had some advice which concerned education. He emphasized the effect of education and teaching. He cautioned us not to count on speeches by themselves, but to organize classes because their effectiveness is deeper and lasts longer. He reemphasized gradual involvement of military personnel in the teaching process. He said that they should reach a certain level of self-sufficiency in scientific, political and ideological matters so that they can become responsible for teaching. For this program, of course, efforts were made in the past and still continue."

It has been decided to introduce into the army a political ideology branch. That is, there would be schools and training centers where officers would receive an education in the area of political ideology. This way the problem of trained and educated officers would be resolved. Applicants would be selected both from within the army and outside. The role the clergymen would play would be generally supervisory and this branch will be used to maintain needed political ideology personnel.

Contact With Personnel and Commanders

Hojat-ol-eslam Elahi then talked about the organization of political ideology encountering Navy personnel and commanders and said, "Considering the past and present realities in the Navy, our encounter should have been sensitive and very careful and it should be the same now. We have faced personnel realistically not idealistically. We have not followed the policies of the past. While 'political ideology' is prejudiced towards Islam, the revolution and our leader, our attitude is not forceful and dogmatic. Our attitude is Islamic, human and realistic. One that you find in the Imam's speeches and Friday prayers of Ayatollah Rafsanjani.

We have had this policy from the beginning to attract individuals. Individuals with mental and physical capabilities who can serve the revolution. It is due to the importance of this group that our job is sensitive and accurate. As Beheshti used to say, 'Our policy should not be iron and scissors but an Islamic policy of logic, sincerity and Islamic education.' If you ask the personnel, I do not want to say that they are satisfied with the policies of 'political ideology,' but they are relatively satisfied with the way we come in contact with them."

Another subject is contact with commanders and this is the difference between the Navy and other forces. For instance, in other forces "political ideology" is accused of having problems and conflicts with commanders. But in our case it is the other way around. That is, if we are accused, it is for the lack of problems with commanders! We do not want to say we have no problem at all but what I mean is to explain our general policy and methods of dealing. According to what we perceive from the Imam's guidance and the Islamic Republic, our relation with those who accept responsibilities in the Navy is based on trust, confidence and sincerity. Of course, there should be control and supervision along with trust and confidence.

The Assistant Director of 'Political Ideology'

After Hojat-ol-eslam Elahi, Hojat-ol-eslam Najafi, the assistant director of "Political Ideology" of the Navy pointed to the direction of the revolution, the Imam's guidance and the movement of the masses and said, "The success of the Navy depends on the coordination with other revolutionary forces. So the Navy has invited the Sepah to join them. The ranking officers of the Navy have been assigned to train the Sepah personnel and a cite has been set aside (chosen) for this purpose. At the present time, a number of Pasdarans are being trained in the training camps in Rasht." He added, "As is the case with the Army, there is sufficient coordination between the Navy and Pasdaran. The Pasdaran have joined the personnel of the naval forces to defend the Islamic Republic in the Persian Gulf."

Hojat-ol-eslam Najafi said, "In the past, in order to provide specialists for the Navy, personnel would have to be trained in other countries. Now that the Naval Academy has been established, personnel will be trained in the Academy and this will be an honor for the Islamic Republic of Iran to train needed personnel within the country.

CSO: 4640/102

IRAN

SARCHESHMEH PLANT REPORTS INCREASED COPPER PRODUCTION

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 4 Jan 83 p 5

[Speech by Eng Mohsen Hashemian, steel mill manager, in conjunction with Unity Week celebrations; date and place not specified]

[Text] Kerman: Simultaneous with honoring Unity Week, with the efforts of the expert, engineers, employees and workers of the large Sarcheshmeh copper complex, the second converter furnace of this complex was put into operation and its production of copperplate has gone over 300 tons per day. According to a report, on the second day of Unity Week, in a ceremony in which the manager of the complex and a gathering of the employees participated in one of the factories of the large Sarcheshmeh copper complex, the production of copperplate increased two-fold, that is, from 145 to 300 tons per day. With the operation of this section at the capable hands of the committed Muslim employees of this complex, the production of copper increased from 35 percent to 70 percent, at a 99.6 percent purity.

Engineer Mohsen Hashemian, the manager of the steel mill, announced in these ceremonies that with the second converter furnace in operation, we were, in fact, able to take another step towards self-sufficiency and independence through the efforts of all the employees of this complex. He added: In the near future, with the operation of the third converter furnace, the production of copperplate will reach 100 percent output, that is, 450 tons per day.

Also, in an interview concerning the role and the importance of this young industry in the economy of our Islamic country, Engineer Hashemian said: With the victory of the magnificent Islamic revolution of Iran under the leadership of the imam of the nation and the removal of this great complex from the claws of the Great Satan, the criminal United States, and placing it in the able hands of the experts and employees of our country, a new chapter of a new parent industry has been established in the Islamic country of Iran. Today, we witness the blossoming of a

sound economy in the Islamic society. With the operation of the various sections, thus far, we have been able to take effective steps to increase production and improve the quality of copper.

Explaining the various stages of excavation and the reserves of copper ore in this mine, he said: With the excavations carried out thus far in this area, this mine contains about one-half billion tons of copper ore. At a maximum production capacity of 145,000 tons of pure copper per year, the useful life of the mine is projected to be 40 years. Hence, taking these figures into consideration, we can emphasize the necessity of more important facilities, including subsidiary industries, in this complex.

Responding to the question of whether the creation of subsidiary industries in the vicinity of this complex can contribute to industrial progress, he said: The government must try to create subsidiary industries next to this complex as soon as possible, because, this complex is on the crossroads of several commercial and trade routes and we will be able to produce a large amount of the processed copper in the subsidiary industries in the form of such things as copper bars, wire, sheets and pipes. In addition to providing for the needs of the domestic market, we will be able to export a significant amount to other countries and gain substantial monetary revenues. In addition, the concentration of an industrial complex in one location can lower production costs. For instance, according to the studies which have been done, in the area of transportation alone, compared to other provinces [as published], we can save about 920 million rials by doing so. Furthermore, the facilities for the employment of a large number of the deprived and oppressed people of this province will be provided. In conclusion, he said: With all the comings and goings of the national authorities and the meetings on this issue, the authorities of Kerman Province have announced many times their readiness to provide for all the necessary needs of these industries, including such things as electricity, water, telephones, construction materials and land. In addition, the University of Kerman, with 3,000 students, of whom 700 are studying technical fields, has announced its readiness to cooperate in supplying the needed personnel for these industries. We hope that the national authorities will carefully study the issue as soon as possible and provide the grounds for establishing these industries next to this complex.



In order to provide the water needed by the factory and the copper town in the Khatunabad area, located 45 km west of Sarcheshmeh, 15 wells, each 150 meters deep, have been dug. The water from these wells is collected in two large reservoirs. It is then sent through the pipes by a large central pump at 100 atmospheres of pressure. This pressure can send the water up to a height of 900 meters to the factory on its 45 km course.

10,000

CSO: 4640/87

BRIEFS

MINISTER SAYS NO CORRUPTION--Minister of Commerce Asghar Owladi has strongly denied reports that top officials of his ministry were under suspicion of corruption and embezzlement. In an interview printed in Tehran papers he said Islamic judges attached to courts dealing with corruption in the ministry had found no evidence of any irregularity among "committed brothers" there. Earlier, Mahmud Azizian, the top Islamic judge at the court for trading offences, had claimed widespread corruption at the ministry of commerce and among the merchants who have been licensed to deal in imported goods. Asghar Owladi said that merchants who were licensed to deal in imported goods were committed to the cause of the Islamic revolution. These merchants would levy surcharges on goods they sold, and would pay the money thus collected to the revolutionary institutions, he said. However, the minister agreed that an employee of the ministry, Sadegh Memarian, had been ordered flogged by the Islamic court on charges of bribery. He said this was an isolated case into which he himself had ordered an investigation. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 p 6]

PAKISTAN TO RETURN FLEEING IRANIANS--Pakistan has agreed to work with Iran to prevent "counter revolutionaries and smugglers" fleeing across their joint border, Interior Minister Nateq Nouri told reporters on his return from a visit to Pakistan. He met president Zia-ul-Haq while there. Pakistan had pledged to stop the flow of people out of Iran and to send back those who did escape, Nateq Nouri said. Reports have recently suggested that about 10,000 Iranians may be waiting in Karachi to make their way to other parts of the world. One report also said that one group of Iranians who left Pakistan some time ago believing their charter flight was taking them to Turkey or Europe were flown back to Tehran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 p 6]

EUROPEAN LAWYER FIRED--The Tehran regime was reported this week to have fired Christian Bourguet, the French lawyer who has been its main legal representative in the international courts. A statement said the decision had been made because of his "legal incapacity" and "imperialistic positions." Bourguet played a leading role during the hostage crisis in Iran. He is a former close friend of Qotbzadeh and ex-president Bani-Sadr and it was the latter who brought him in to the job as Iran's leading legal representative abroad. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 p 6]

TABATABAI ARRESTED--A West German magistrate ordered the detention of Sadegh Tabatabai, former close associate of Qotbzadeh and whose sister is married to Khomeini's son Ahmad, when he appeared before him to face charges of alleged drug smuggling. The magistrate said bail would not be allowed because there were fears Tabatabai might abscond. Tabatabai's friends have claimed the drugs found on him in Germany were "planted" by enemies in Iran and were part of political intrigue. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 105, 20 Jan 83 p 6]

CSO: 4600/285

INVESTMENT MISSION DUE IN APRIL

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 p 15

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Jan 27: The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has announced in Washington that it will sponsor an investment mission to Pakistan from April 21-29.

The investment mission is in response to growing interest within the U.S. business community in investing in Pakistan. It will also heighten recent efforts by the Government of Pakistan to attract foreign private participation in the continued economic development of this South Asian country.

During his recent State visit to the United States, Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq had pledged his Government's full protection for American investments in Pakistan. He also vowed to simplify

bureaucratic procedures and announced the formation of a commission to recommend further improvements in the investment climate in Pakistan.

The mission, which leaves New York on April 19, will begin its work in Islamabad with briefing by U.S. Ambassador Ronald Spiers and his staff, meetings with Pakistani Government ministers, and a courtesy call on President Zia. The mission will then spend five days in Karachi for private business appointments and additional briefings.

OPIC will also arrange business trips for individual mission participants.

The group will leave Karachi on April 29 to return to New York. — PPT

CSO: 4600/282

MAZARI CALLS FOR ELECTED GOVERNMENT

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 pp 1, 14

[Text]

Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, President of the defunct National Democratic Party (NDP) yesterday offered that he himself and his party would "step aside voluntarily" from the next elections under the 1973 Constitution, "if we are considered a stumbling block in the way of democratic process."

In an interview with "Dawn" he said, if this or that political party is regarded as "persona nongrata" and if its coming in to power is made an excuse for not holding the polls, then "we of NDP will show our honesty of purpose by not participating in the elections."

For, he contended, the NDP believes that any government formed by the elected representatives in pursuance of the 1973 Constitution would be "far better" than the present "unrepresentative setup."

Mr Mazari pointed out that although "we are reaching a point of no-return, even so, it is not too late to open our eyes to the harsh realities of the situation."

The point to note is that the people "should no more suffer denial of their fundamental rights simply because of certain imaginary fears about a couple of political parties," he said.

To a question he ruled out, "as a matter of principle," the defunct NDP's participation in the elections on the basis of pre-poll registration. "We do not assign to anyone the authority to demand registration of our party," he emphasised.

He, however, argued that if there is "concrete evidence," against a political party of having taken funds from the unwanted sources

or indulged in any subversive activity, the Government should bring the case to a court of law.

At the same time, he made it clear that such a court should function independently as envisaged in the 1973 Constitution and not as being influenced under the PCO (Provisional Constitutional Order).

Mr Mazari termed the appointment of "Wifaqi Mohtasib," (Ombudsman) as "just an eye-wash" on the ground that he would function in an advisory capacity and that his advice will not be binding on the Government.

In another context he reiterated his party's position that all agreements entered into under the present "unrepresentative setup," will be subject to review by the future elected assembly.

To him it appeared that the principles of Pakistan's non-alignment had been "compromised." He said, he did not believe "for a moment," that the aid given to Pakistan was without any strings. "At least, that has been our experience in the past," he pointed out.

He cautioned against letting Pakistan slip into the "pitfall of Super-Power confrontation."

Instead of getting entangled into the controversy as to legality or otherwise of the Karmal regime, Pakistan should seek a political solution of the Afghanistan issue, he observed — the "sooner, the better," he said.

Replying to a question, he rejected the idea of amendments in the 1973 Constitution, or introduction of a new political structure as

"morally indefensible and without lawful authority." When it is claimed that the 1973 Constitution remained intact, where lies the necessity of amending it "over the head of a future duly elected legislative authority," he argued.

MRD declaration

He said that before the defunct NDP signed on the MRD's Funding Declaration it had insisted on the inviolable position of the 1973 Constitution, as passed unanimously on

Aug. 14, 1973, and not of the later dates when amendments to it were brought about unilaterally by the previous Government. This stand of his party, he said, was accepted by the defunct People's Party also.

Mr Mazari criticised an alleged move to reserve 25 per cent vacancies for the employment of ex-servicemen in civil services and other public bodies.

It had caused "further frustration among the people of Sind and Baluchistan who already have negligible representation in the civil services."

He regretted that, despite such a long tenure, the Government has not been able to improve the lot of the common people. Their earning and purchasing capacity had been steadily eroded, while they were being additionally taxed by the establishment of public utilities in the name of development though the benefits accruing therefrom had been few and far between.

"All the ills — social and economic — exist because there is

no accountability, because the people feel isolated and are resigned to their fate", the NDP chief said, asserting that "a popularly chosen government would not dare riding roughshod over the people's wishes and aspirations".

He said that "a suspicion is lurking in the minds of the people of smaller provinces that by breaking the provinces and in the name of decentralisation, administrative divisions will be created.

Citing the case of One Unit which ultimately had to be undone, he said that any step taken by the bureaucracy unilaterally and without the consent of elected representatives will have "no legal or constitutional validity."

"Already there is frustration and resentment among the people for being elbowed out from the decision-making process of the Government", he reminded.

Mr Mazari said that, in spite of many odds, the MRD had emerged as the "only opposition democratic platform" and to that extent it has galvanised public opinion.

Those who criticise the MRD for its inaction do not realise that the MRD is not opposing a political, but a military Government. Besides, the MRD believes in a peaceful, democratic struggle, he emphasised.

CSO: 4600/284

LAND REFORM TERMED FIRST STEP FOR HELPING SMALL FARMER

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 7

[Editorial: "Helping the Small Farmer"]

[Text]

THE plight of the small farmers does attract the attention of the official policy-makers periodically and new plans are made off and on to improve their lot — some are implemented, some are consigned to the files. This time the policy-makers are envisaging the establishment of a permanent joint cell, consisting of five ministries concerned, for "one window" pattern of operation which would enable the small farmer to obtain loans, acquire agricultural implements and get exemption from various duties and taxes. In June last year, the Federal Minister for Food and Agriculture, Vice-Admiral

Mohammad Fazil Janjua, had unfolded another grand scheme for small farmers. This scheme had proposed floating of public limited companies in the agricultural sector for helping in the provision of finances, inputs and other services to small farmers. Farmers with small holdings have also been getting reasonable attention in the schemes implemented from time to time by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. Then there are the cooperative societies all over the country exclusively catering for the

needs of the small farmers. These societies among themselves have already consumed something like Rs. four billion in the past six years.

The schemes so far implemented and the plans being envisaged now do reflect a sincere desire on the part of the policy-makers to make the life of the small farmer a bit less pathetic. But past experiences have shown that under the existing conditions, these schemes have benefited only the big landlords and a handful of enlightened and enterprising medium-sized holders. This group somehow manages to siphon off the benefits meant for the small farmers, thereby getting richer and richer, while the small farmer has been sliding down the poverty line. As a result, some 30 per cent of total farm area which belongs to small farmers has turned almost barren in terms of productivity. Also, as a result, the land-man ratio in the farm sector has continued to deteriorate, accelerating the exodus from rural to urban areas and, consequently, adding to the complexity of the urban problems. On the other hand, the bigger landholders who possess

among themselves nearly 70 per cent of the total farm area but make up only 20 per cent of the farming population do not feel any irresistible pressure to

operate at their full capacity. They make so much of windfall gains out of the various schemes meant for agriculturists that they do not feel the need to bring under the plough all the land that belongs to them. This results in further loss of production potential. The subsistence farmer and the bigger landholder belong to a society whose value system is such that any benefit accruing to it automatically goes to the latter, while all miseries and tears fall to the lot of the former. Unless this iniquitous land system is changed through genuine reform, no amount of effort to improve the lot of the small farmer will succeed. Land reform in plain terms means redistribution of farm-land. Small economic units should be distributed among the farming community, with the tiller of the land claiming the first right.

None of the agricultural schemes in operation in Pakistan or those which are being envisaged now are original.

Most of these have been borrowed from countries where they have been seen to have worked wonders. But unfortunately, the point which is being consistently missed by our policy-makers is that these schemes work under particular conditions which do not obtain in Pakistan. So, the first step should be to create those conditions — which essentially means drastic land reform. After this any proven scheme will deliver the goods. Indeed, the scheme of public limited companies in the agricultural sector would be ideal to operate after the pattern of ownership of land has been restructured. As envisaged, the proposed scheme would institutionalise some of the farming operations. A company so formed could establish specialised departments dealing with specific functions like provision of improved seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, aerial and ground sprays, marketing and storage. These specialised agencies could go to rural areas and make available their services to the farmers at their doorsteps. The farmers would be required to pay a nominal fee for availing themselves of these facilities. The company could volunteer to lift the entire produce of the farmers and be responsible for its storage and marketing further up the line. An agricultural system so organised and assisted is bound to develop towards a much higher level of output, productivity and economic and social benefit than is the case now.

CSO: 4600/283

ENERGY CRISIS ANALYZED; WRONG ECONOMIC PRIORITIES BLAMED

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 12

[Text]

LAHORE. Jan 29: The wrong economic priorities, set for the allocation of funds at the Federal level and under the estimated projections for the public utility schemes, are the main reason for the existing energy crisis in the country.

Reports of experts, including foreign consultants, have claimed untapped huge reserves of oil and gas, on the one hand; and the wastage of a major portion of available resources of water for irrigation and electricity generation, on the other.

These observations were made and the Government claims and figures were challenged at national seminar on "Energy Crisis", which was organised here on Thursday by the panel of economic and planning experts "Group 83". The seminar was also attended by a number of former officials and representatives of the Federal Planning Commission.

Four separate papers were presented on the subjects of electricity, water, gas and oil. The seminar was presided over by Mr Khadar Posh and was conducted by Mr Kardar.

Electricity

Regarding electricity, Mr Imtiaz Ali Qizilbash, who is a former Director of WAPDA, quoting official figures and various international agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF, claimed that the increase in the percentage of total installed capacity in Pakistan over the last 20 years was the lowest among the equally under-developed countries of the world.

In case of Pakistan, it was only 72 per cent megawatt as against the second overset figures of India which was 83 per cent. The highest figures of 500 per cent was that of the Republic of Korea.

The studies had shown that the main gorge of the river Indus, between Tarbela and Skardu, alone could provide 30,000 megawatt from at least eight dam sites. The studies further revealed that dams and reservoirs upstream Tarbela would add to the life of Tarbela dam. Similarly, with the increase in the water storage capacity, the winter deficits could be controlled. Moreover, with other sites on the River Indus, together with hydroelectric power dams on the rivers Kunhar, Swat, Abul Coa, Jhelum, etc. additional electricity between 3,000 and 4,000 megawatt could be produced every year.

With a total installed capacity in 1982 of 4,878 MW and with a population of 85 million, Pakistan had less than 54.4 watts per capita i.e. just 13 per cent of the under-developed countries.

At present only 20 per cent of our total population was provided with electricity.

It was also revealed that at the end of 1980, Pakistan marginally reached the figures of 3,000 MW leaving a gap of 25,000 MW between supply and demand — as against the projected official figures of about 6,000 MW.

Hydro-power

Similarly, about the hydel-power potentials available in Pakistan, the Kalabagh Dam would have

1,760 MW and River Jhelum at Kohlal, over 3,000 MW.

A case for small scale hydroelectric generation was also discussed at length including the hydropower stations using the low heads.

The study concluded that about 15,000 MW additional capacity for power generation would be required for the next few years together with other sources, including the solar, nuclear, wind-thermal etc.

The study proposed an investment of about 11 million dollars for this purpose, which would be recovered in four years and the revenue would be to the tune of about Rs 40,000 million.

With this increased capacity Pakistan would be saving about 40,000 million dollars in terms of labour service followed by industrialisation.

Water reserves

Regarding available water reserves in the country, a paper was presented by another former high official of the Federal Government, Mr Ahmad Hassan Sheikh. According to reports, about 30 million acre-feet of river water was wasted every year and flowed out into the sea. Out of the average river flows of 140 million acre-feet, the existing canal uses were about only 104 million acre-feet.

The question of Indus Water Treaty between Pakistan and India was also raised following which Pakistan had withdrawn its claim on the waters of Rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi.

The paper further added that due to water mismanagement, more than four million acres of fertile land were lying barren in the country. As against this, the additional waters of Tarbela were being pushed into the existing canal system as no new canals had been constructed in time to expand the irrigation system to productively use Tarbela waters and the other 30 million acre-feet of waters going waste every year.

Such "mismanagement" had aggravated the waterlogging problem, specially in southern Punjab and the whole of Sind.

Gas, oil reserves

About gas and oil reserves, staggering figures were revealed by a former Managing Director of the Sui Northern Gas, Mr A.U. Loan.

Discussing the gas crisis in the light of both the proven and the possible gas reserves, the paper revealed that a team of Canadian consultants, under UNDP sponsorship, carried out a detailed study of the available geological data and assessed the recoverable potential of Pakistan at 36 billion barrels of oil and about 140 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The consultants had expressed the view that a bold exploration programme, providing for the drilling of about 600 exploratory wells spreading over a period of about 15 years with a total investment of about 3.5 billion dollars, could lead to the half of this potential. As against the recommendations, only 29 exploratory wells had

been drilled since 1975 — the year of the study. Of these, five had shown presence of movable hydrocarbon in commercial quantity. The success ratio, therefore, was one by six as compared to the international average for the success of every well against the number of 10 wells drilled for the purpose. This high ratio of the success of the wells in itself was the answer to the actual reserves of oil and gas in Pakistan which were still lying untapped owing to "official negligence".

Therefore, the clarification about gas and oil crisis, which was made by the Federal Minister for Finance, was termed "imaginary".

The paper concluded that the accelerated exploitation of the already discovered oil and gas resources must be given top-most priority and the investment in them would ultimately considerably improve the foreign exchange situation.

The panel of economists also noted that for the last three to four years, some of the proven oil-wells were not even touched for further drilling. The participants asked the official quarters concerned to answer as to why the nation was being kept in the dark.

The House also expressed concern over the fact that none of the ministries from Islamabad except the Planning Commission, sent representatives to answer the questions and to place facts and figures as requested by the "Group 83" through proper invitation.

SKEPTICAL VIEWS ON SIXTH PLAN EXPRESSED

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 Economic & Business Review pp I, IV

[Article by M. Ziauddin]

[Text]

WHILE the outlines of the Sixth Five-year Plan are being finalised, a section of informed public opinion has raised some pertinent questions. The six-point charter for the plan which was spelled out by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission Dr. Mahboobul-Haq, as soon as he took up his assignment at the Secretariat's 'P' Block, has been the main topic of discussion all these past few weeks.

It is assumed that the forthcoming Plan is being prepared on the guidelines provided by this charter. But informed circles point out that the charter lacks the backing of a mandate. They ask who has approved this charter? Has any section of society endorsed it? What is the attitude of the Federal Cabinet towards this charter?

Of course, no one has so far challenged the merits of the charter. But independent economic planners term it as too comprehensive to be of any value for a mid-term plan preparation. The guidelines flowing out of this charter, they warn, would tend to lend a measure of unrealism to the whole exercise of mid-term planning.

Fate of Fifth Plan

The next question which is being increasingly asked, concerns the fate of the current Five-Year Plan. To what extent has the Fifth Plan succeeded or failed to achieve the targets promised by its authors, independent economists ask. What were the causes of failures and shortfalls? Was it because the targets were too ambitious or was it the failure of the implementing machinery? What part was played by the resource constraint factor in the failure? Will the people responsible for the failure of the Plan be made accountable to the nation?

Explaining the reasons for raising these questions at this juncture, when the Plan is yet to be completed, these experts said that accountability at this stage was necessary because that would put the fear of God into the authors of the forthcoming Plan and they would approach their job with the knowledge that they would have to answer for what they were doing now.

Elaborating the point they said that in the past those responsible for planning were wont to make any number of irresponsible promises and then disappear in the Secretariat or take up a foreign job at the end of the Plan period to be replaced by a new set of planners who would repeat the promises

knowing very well that they would not be around when the Plan reached its conclusion to answer for their failures.

Another reason for the need to analyse the current Five-year Plan at this point, they explained, was to put the development process in the correct perspective. They said the nation should know in what stage of development the country was at present so that it could plan realistically for the next five years.

It is said that in real terms the current Plan fell short by 30 per cent. It is suspected that when the final figures come in, the real shortfall would be in the vicinity of 50 per cent. If this is so, then the new Plan will have to provide for this 30 or 50 per cent shortfall, before it made attempts to meet new targets.

Labour policy

Another question which is rankling in the minds of knowledgeable circles is that of the absence of a labour policy. It would be unrealistic to launch the next Plan without first having formulated a new labour policy or reactivating the old one.

Throughout the current Five-Year Plan it was assumed that the industrial production stagnated because of labour indiscipline and in order to discipline the labour force, many extra-legal measures were

adopted which proved to be counterproductive. Experts apprehended that the assumption would be accorded continuity in the next Plan period and again the results would be as disappointing.

The supply and demand situation of labour in Pakistan, they say, has drastically changed in favour of labour since the Middle East boom. This reality should be faced by official planners wishing an accelerated growth in industrial production. They say planners should first find out why Pakistani labour is considered as highly productive in foreign countries while it is regarded undisciplined in its own.

Presenting their own theory on this subject, these experts point out that labour responds to management. If management is inefficient, labour is bound to be inefficient. They concluded that industrial production in Pakistan has been stagnating not because labour was undisciplined but because management was grossly inefficient.

The fourth question relates to agriculture. Agricultural economists ask whether the Planning Commission exactly know what is the land-man ratio in the farm sector? They say most of the statistics concerning agriculture are out of date. Even these statistics were gathered unscientifically. In their opinion the government computes its figures for agricultural production on the basis of fertiliser offtake and consumption of seeds. This methodology, they said, was unrealistic and was bound to throw up misleading results.

Commission, how equipped

The fifth question brings into sharp focus the Planning Commission's own competence. Independent planning experts thought that the Commission was too inadequately equipped to do justice to the task assigned to it. Most of the base figures being used by the Commission are said to be lacking in authenticity and relevance.

Surprisingly enough, the Commission does not even possess a computer worth its name to test various development models. There is said to be no central data bank in the Commission. When a professional in the Commission is assigned to do a study on a subject, he has to go through all the files and compile, collate and compute

the data manually and complete his report, more often than not, on the basis of figures and projections computed by the rule of thumb.

This lack of modern planning hardware in the Commission is resorted to have affected the competence of the Commission's professionals and they find it difficult to produce reasonably authentic studies, reports and analyses which are necessary for planning work. With only typewriters and calculators they can hardly produce anything that could pass even the elementary tests.

Professionals vs generalists

Those who have watched these professionals at work from close quarters also find them lacking in motivation. The reason for this, informed circles said, was their sense of deprivation vis-a-vis the generalists. Their pay-scales and promotion opportunities are so out of balance with those of the generalists that their complaint that they were being treated shabbily by the Government, appears really genuine.

At times, it is observed, junior generalists with no idea about planning and having less than rudimentary knowledge about economics are posted in the Planning Commission above highly educated and extensively experienced professionals killing all motivation in them.

As for the generalists, junior as well as senior, they hanker after a stint in the Planning Commission because this helps them decisively when and if they seek a job in the World Bank or other related international agencies.

Instead of removing their grievances and providing them with proper hardware for planning, the government has allowed the Commission to appoint consultants, foreign as well as local, to help it acquire ready-made studies on various problems which cannot be tackled by the personnel of the Commission. For this the government has reportedly allocated them a budget of Rs.50 million.

Studies by consultants

The Commission is reported to have awarded contracts to as many as two dozen consultants, foreign as well as local, for studies on subjects ranging from savings trends, popu-

lation growth to energy development. These studies had to come in much before the finalisation of the Sixth Plan outline. But for one reason or the other most of them are reportedly still with the consultants.

The contracts are said to have been awarded along with specific terms of reference, a specific time frame and 25 per cent down payment on the contracted fees. In some cases even 50 per cent down payment was said to have been made in advance.

According to informed circles, consultants were required first to comply with pre-qualification rules which included submitting of a list of personnel of their staff and their past experience. However, even those consultants were awarded contracts who allegedly did not comply with these rules. Two consultants, who reportedly mentioned the name of the same person in their lists of staff, were awarded two different study contracts. One consultant, who for some time conducted a UN programme, was reportedly awarded a study which did not relate to his past experience.

The professionals in the Commission, reportedly do not grudge this business because, more often than not, when the consultants fail to submit their studies in time or when their studies are declared as sub-standard the Planning Commission loans its professionals to help these consultants complete their task in time or improve it, whatever may be the case.

This allows the professional an opportunity to spend some time in some foreign country or in local private organisation which mostly looks after him, during the period of deputation, with extra care. Recently one such professional was sent to Vienna where he helped complete the job and brought it back for consideration for the Sixth Plan. Another was sent earlier to Japan on a similar mission.

Informed public opinion has been demanding answers to all these five questions. Independent experts emphasise that in the absence of answers to these questions, it would be very difficult to assess the value of the forthcoming Plan

GOODS TRANSPORT--RAILWAYS' SHARE SEEN DECLINING

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 Economic & Business Review pp I, IV

[Article by Salim Alvi]

[Text]

PHENOMENAL increase in road mileage, extending to remotest corners of the country, and an equally enormous increase in the number of heavy duty trucks have steadily diverted the goods traffic to road transport. Railways, which in pre-independence days were the main carrier of goods, have lost that position.

A comparative study of the two for the last few years shows a steady decline in the case of railways and a spiralling upward climb in the case of road transport. The induction of the National Logistics Cell (NLC) to handle the transport of essential commodities is symptomatic of this change in the mode of transport.

The reasons for this far-reaching change are many. The railway system in the post-independence period found itself ill-equipped to cope with the enormous increase in goods traffic created by development needs and enhanced production of agricultural commodities. The road carrier, on the other hand, provides an easier door-to-door



service — prompt, readily available, ensuring safe delivery of goods at the destination.

Why the switch-over

The main reasons for the switch-over are:

(1) the annual growth rate of traffic, according to the Pakistan government statistics, is 7.9 per

cent in the case of freight and eight per cent in the case of passengers;

(2) the railway network inherited from the British has remained more or less static. Except for the Kot Addu-Kashmor link through Dera Ghazi Khan on the western side of the Indus river, or some minor additions here and there, the length of the rail track has remained the same.


(3) Not much has been done to increase the handling capacity of the railway system to cope with the increasing volume of goods traffic of post-independence era. According to a government survey report, the railways have been suffering because of worn out assets including rolling stock, track, bridges and signalling system.

On the other hand, Pakistan's road mileage has increased manifold. The main arteries have been widened and new highways through Sind Kohistan, the Baluchistan hills and mountains of the Northern Areas have been completed. Then there are rural roads, built in the 1960s and now being pushed through local bodies, which have linked remote village with mandis, market towns and the main commercial and industrial centres.

It is true that construction of many such roads has very often been dictated by political consid-

erations for the local elite rather than commercial requirements. But despite such flaws the development of highways and rural link roads is impressive.

There has been a tremendous increase in the annual allocations for



road development in all the four provinces while the Federal Government contributed towards the development of the Super Highway between Karachi and Hyderabad, the RCD Highway from Karachi to Quetta and the Karakoram Highway through Gilgit. No less than six bridges, including the latest Dadu-Moro bridge, now span the mighty Indus and two more near Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan are under construction.

New roads linking Karachi with Jiwani near the Iranian border along the Makran coast, Khuzdar with Sukkur, through Kirthar range, and Dera Ghazi Khan with Sibi across the Sulaiman range, have been constructed. The process of completion is opening up new road transport providing access to many hitherto neglected and secluded areas.

No comparable effort

No comparable effort has been made, however, to expand the railway system which must form a vital link in the economic development and as a bulk carrier of goods. As it is, despite being heavily engaged in carrying goods between the port city of Karachi and the upcountry,

for exports and local consumption, Pakistan Railways can hardly cope with the needs. They run two to three goods train daily but this is obviously inadequate and leaves scope for road haulage.

Pakistan Railways have not been able to provide a double track all the way from Karachi to Peshawar. The gaps existing in-between cause serious bottlenecks. Good use is also not being made on the track on the western side of the Indus, from Hyderabad to Dera Ghazi Khan and onwards to Peshawar via Mianwali. If fully utilised, this route could take away much of the congestion on the main line through Lahore.

Trucks fill the gap

With more roads available and the railways not capable of lifting the full load of goods traffic, road transport has inevitably filled the gap. According to Mr Abdur Razzak Khalid Butt, the president of the Karachi Goods Carriers Association, trucks plying between Karachi and Peshawar or between Karachi and Quetta carry 500 to 600 tons of goods every day.

Mr Butt could not give the exact number of trucks engaged in the business but according to him the total number of registered trucks stood at 1.4 million. The total includes trucks which being worn out, ceased plying and might have been scrapped, and also those which have been withdrawn from long distance duties and put on the work of supplying gravel and cement for road and building construction. Still the number, and especially those of doing long haulage, remains large.

The private transporters although organised in an association are an individualistic lot and their office, in a congested area, does not appear to have records or statistics which could give a clear picture of their mode of operation or problems confronting them. But their president, Mr Khalid Butt seems to have the relevant information on his finger tips.

Mr Butt thinks there was no need to have the National Logistics Cell. Private carriers could have handled the goods traffic overflowing from the railways and now the exclusive privilege of the NLC.

He also refutes the allegation that private carriers became tools in the hands of businessmen to

create artificial shortages or congestion at the Karachi Port. But the fact is that since 1974 Karachi Port had been congested and shipping was subject to freight surcharges at varying rates.

Enter NLC

In 1978, Pakistan experienced serious shortfalls in wheat, fertiliser, edible oil and cement and 2.5 million tons of wheat, 1.5 million tons of fertiliser and one million tons of cement had to be transported on an emergency basis to upcountry areas. It was to cope with this situation that the National Logistic Cell was established under the supervision of the Pakistan Army.

The NLC has a fleet of over 1,300 load carrying vehicles including tankers. Each of its trucks covers over 70,000 km per year. The NLC fleet had covered a total 221,225,025 km by June 30, 1982.

It was also at its disposal earth moving equipment and construction machinery. It has developed its own support organisation to maintain its fleet of heavy duty Mercedes Benz, Ford, Hino, Bedford, Fiat and Saviem trucks. It has a modern base of overhaul workshops located at Karachi and Gujranwala. Enough mobile equipment is also available to attend to repairs and maintenance in far-flung areas. It has set up staging stations at Hyderabad, Khairpur, Bahawalpur, Sahiwal, Faisalabad and Soan Camp at Rawalpindi.

Comparative freight

It would be interesting, in terms of the changing pattern of goods transportation, to compare the freight charges of railways and trucks. A goods trucks, with a capacity of 10 tons, generally charges Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 6,000 for one-way trip between Karachi and Lahore, depending on the market situation. A railway wagon with a capacity of eleven tons would generally cost Rs. 5,500.

Railways rates consignment-wise are, however, different for different commodities. From Karachi to Lahore or vice versa, bales of cloth are charged at the rate of Rs. 206.10 per metric ton while the rates for iron bars are Rs. 309.15 per metric ton. This works out to be cheaper

than road transport. But despite being cheaper, railways appear less attractive to many people than trucks.


A leading businessman, when asked why he preferred a truck to railways for transporting his goods, said that the foremost consideration was that while the truck would reach Lahore at the most in three days, a goods train might take a week or 10 days. Sometimes it is even more.

Poor handling by the railways and absence of fool-proof arrangements against pilferage, he said, are other factors that work as deterrent against using railway facilities for transporting their merchandise.

In view of the recent increase in the prices of petroleum products, the cost of transporting goods in trucks might go up but, the businessman added, that too would not make railways popular for goods traffic. In fact, railway freight charges have also been increased, making it, perhaps, even

less competitive.

In an overall view, it would appear that railways, which should have been the basic means for country-wide transportation, have remained neglected both in terms of long-term planning and day-to-day operations. And now, it seems, the private sector trucks as well as the public sector NLC are eroding even its basic viability.



PAKISTAN'S EXPORTS: FACTS, FIGURES DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Jan 83 Supplement pp VII, VIII

[Article by Azmat Ansari]

[Text]

THE fact that a small country like Hong Kong earns twice as much as Pakistan does through its entire global exports serves to remind us that the country has yet to exploit its export potential to the full.

According to the figures released by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, earnings from exports from June-July 1981-82 stood at Rs.26,042.223 million. The country earned through exports Rs.29279.489 million during the corresponding period in 1978-1980.

Exports of cereal preparations, cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, fruit and vegetables, rubber and leather goods, fish and fish preparation, cigarettes, petroleum products, guwar and guwar products, tobacco, raw wool and animal hair, tents and canvases, cotton waste, readymade garments, chemicals, spices, sports goods, oil-seeds, salt, crude fertiliser increased during 1981-82 compared with the corresponding period last year.

Exports of raw cotton, rice, carpets and rugs, molasses, animal casings, cotton bags, art silk and synthetic textile, towels, hosiery, footwear and surgical instruments declined during last year.

Exports of raw cotton declined by 43.53 per cent, and 28.86 per cent in terms of quantity last year.

Export of cotton yarn has shown an increase of 1.22 per cent in value and 0.40 in value during the period under review. The average FOB unit price during July-June 1981-82 has risen to Rs.21.70 per kilogram from the last year's price of Rs.21.53 per kg.

Export of cotton cloth has shown an increase of 23.41 in terms of value and 16.65 during June-July 1981-82 compared with June-July 1979-1980.

During the period under review exports of leather increased by 20.18 per cent in terms of value of fish and fish preparation by 41.24, of petroleum and petroleum products 2.21, of gawar and gawar products 6.48, of readymade garments 61.24.

The table below shows the share of imports of Pakistani goods and decrease or increase of the share of these countries in the country's export trade.

A study of the items exported and the destinations they go to is in itself fascinating. I have selected a few items from a whole list of exports which readers may find interesting, both the countries themselves and the items exported:

We exported to Greenland — a country, which is under ice for almost the entire year and where the population is sparse — three thousand Kg. of "kinos" valued at 10,000 rupees in 1980-81. In the

same year we sent to Greenland carpets worth 85,000 rupees.

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Panama, Bolivia bought surgical instruments from Pakistan in 1980-81 and 1981-82 — valued at twenty-five lakh sixty-nine thousand rupees a fact that goes to show that the new and smaller surgical instruments which are widely have won wide acceptability in South and Central America.

A country, as far away as Nicaragua, which most of us may think may never have entered into trade with Pakistan imported twenty thousand nine hundred and fifty-two metric tons of rice valued at sixty-nine thousand two hundred and ninety-three thousand rupees. Brazil bought one hundred and eighteen thousand three hundred and fifty-six (118,356) thousand tons of rice. Mexico bought 25,545,000 tons of rice from Pakistan in 1980-81. Colombia, Peru, Paraguay all bought rice in different quantities in the last two years from Pakistan.

It may come as a pleasant surprise to readers that countries like Canada and Netherlands, too, buy rice from Pakistan. French West Indies buys musical instruments and Belgium, France, Germany and one or two other countries buy sausage casings from Pakistan. France bought plants, seeds and flowers worth 4,493,000

Value in million rupees				
Countries	July-June 1981-82	%share	July-June	%share
Japan	2221.72	8.53	1877.25	6.41
Saudi Arabia	1937.46	7.44	1742.78	5.95
U.S.A.	1897.14	7.28	1769.59	6.04
China	1559.39	5.99	3570.83	12.19
U.K.	1350.31	5.19	1163.20	3.97
Hong Kong	1209.69	4.64	1141.00	3.90
Germany Fed. Rep. of	1017.65	3.91	1260.25	4.30
Dubai	1011.39	3.88	948.21	3.24
Italy	073.29	3.35	750.11	2.56
Iran	823.35	3.16	2294.52	7.84
Bangla Desh	707.85	2.72	645.61	2.20
Iraq	652.31	2.50	537.16	1.83
Singapore	624.73	2.40	554.86	1.90
Canary Island	618.59	2.37	873.98	2.98
Cameroon	618.57	2.38	873.98	2.98
France	606.82	2.33	623.25	2.13
Yemen Dem. Rep. of	597.64	2.29	N.A.	0.37
Kuwait	534.58	2.05	510.04	1.74
U.S.S.R.	484.83	1.86	447.69	1.53
Abu Dhabi	457.04	1.75	519.49	1.77
Other countries	6237.87	23.95	7067.68	24.14
Total	26042.22	100.00	29279.49	100.00

Courtesy Federal Bureau of Statistics.

rupees in 1981, and Belgium worth 6,000 rupees. Denmark bought in 1981 animal stomachs for 65,000 rupees.

Pakistani precious stones seem to be making their way in foreign markets. In 1981, Germany imported from Pakistan precious stones worth two thousand four hundred and twenty-two rupees.

Irish Republic bought fruit vegetables, surgical and musical instruments worth 64,02,000 rupees in 1979-80, apart from seventeen or more distinct items that it imported from Pakistan.

Henna leaves and musical instruments were two of the 66 and more items that U.K. imported from Pakistan in 1980-81.

Sausage casings, rice, fruit and vegetables, animal glands — possibly for use by the pharmaceutical or the chemical industry were only some of the 24 items imported by Austria from Pakistan in the last two years. The total imports to Austria stood at 6,16,41,000 rupees.

Electrical machinery valued at 286,000 rupees was among the 15 or more items that Finland imported from Pakistan. The total exports to Finland in 1980-81 stood at 22,158,000 rupees.

Norway imported eighteen metric tons of rice valued at one hundred and forty-one thousand rupees from Pakistan in 1980-81. Sweden apart from one thousand tons of rice, imported surgical and musical instruments, fruits and vegetables and twenty-seven or more items from Pakistan.

These are only some of the one hundred and sixty-seven countries with which Pakistan entered into export trade in 1981 and 1982. Exports to almost all of them can be increased if our businessmen concentrate a little more on quality control procedures. Experience in the past has shown that some small units when they sent their products abroad, after some time got such unusually large orders that those were beyond their capacities to

process. Instead of turning down the offers or passing them on to larger units, they accepted them, and invariably compromised with the quality of the product. A small unit can maintain the quality of its product upto a certain limit. If it tries to produce more than what it is established for, the quality of its product deteriorates. I, personally know, of so many persons who ruined their businesses in an attempt to produce more than they were established for. People in the T-shirt and towel business were the worst affected. Some of them got large orders. They tried to expand their factories overnight, recruited untrained labour, and pushed their machines and labour to the utmost limits in order to fulfil the contract, and they almost invariably failed.

MINISTER RULES OUT NEW PRESS LAWS

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Text] Rawalpindi, Jan. 27--Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq has said the present laws governing the Press were much better than any other new law which might create difficulties and complications for the working journalists. "Efforts should be made to remove lacunae in the present laws and to improve the same to make them more effective and easy," he pointed out.

Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq was replying to a demand made earlier by Mr Nawaz Raza, Secretary-General of the Rawalpindi Union of Journalists (RUJ) to repeal the Press and Publications Ordinance, censorship on journals and other such laws, at the installation ceremony of the newly elected office bearers of the RUJ, held here this evening.

The Information Minister was the chief guest, while Mr Majeed Nizami, Editor, Nawai Waqt presided over the function.

The Information Minister said, the Press bench as suggested by some quarters would create new and more difficulties for the working journalists. He pointed out that there is no provision for action against any working journalist in the Press and Publications Ordinance. Instead, he added, it was only against the printer and publisher of the newspapers.

In reply to another demand to dissolve the Press Trust, the Minister said, the financial position of the workers of such institutions was far better as compared to any

other newspaper. He said, only last year, daily Mashriq, a Trust paper, distributed Rs 18 lakh as bonus amongst its workers. "This is the largest amount ever distributed among the workers as bonus in the newspaper industry," he added.

He said the employees of Trust papers do not want that the Trust should be dissolved as they know it would be against their personal interests. He declared that any decision in this regard would be taken keeping supreme the interests of the workers of such institutions.

Similarly, regarding Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), the Information Minister said, it was a national news agency which has at present contracts with news agencies of 32 countries. Such a big organisation, he pointed out, cannot be handled by one person. He said, the employees of the said Organisation had requested the Government to give this institution the status of a Corporation as in the case of Radio and Television. He said the suggestion is under consideration of the Government.—PPI.

OMBUDSMAN'S APPOINTMENT DISCUSSED; ANY QUICK RESULTS RULED OUT

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 p 15

[Editorial: "Enter Mohtasib"]

[Text]

COMING in the wake of heightened public expectations, the promulgation of the order establishing the office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib — Ombudsman — and the appointment of Mr. Justice Sardar Mohammad Iqbal to the post should prompt some sobering thoughts about the nature and scope of bureaucratic corruption in the country and the urgency of redressing complaints of administrative abuse. Initially, of course, the launching of the office of the Ombudsman calls for general approval. That nineteen months have elapsed since the idea was first mooted by the President in his address to the nation in June 1981 indicates the problems that must have been encountered in laying the foundation of what may be called the concept of accountability for our bureaucracy and also in selecting a suitable person to perform the challenging task. During this time, the idea has been processed through extensive public debate. A draft law providing for the institution of Ombudsman was released for eliciting public opinion in August 1981. The draft was then introduced in the first session of the Federal Council and was con-

sidered by the Council in April last year. Finally, the selection of a suitable person was reported to have taken some time after the draft law was considered by the Cabinet and approved with some amendments. All the preparatory stages having been crossed, we now have the Wafaqi Mohtasib — the Ombudsman — to "diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through maladministration". In due course of time, Justice Sardar Mohammad Iqbal will assume the office that allows him considerable powers to look into specific cases of bureaucratic lapses and prescribe remedial measures. He will be responsible to the President and as such should be able to resist pressures from the high priests of our bureaucracy.

How effective an instrument can this office be against corruption and bureaucratic lapses? This question acquires a sharp edge in the context of the widespread and massive irregularities that have rendered our administrative structure inefficient. It has been conceded, at the highest level that corruption is rife in the country. Ordinary citizens suffer its rigours

in their daily encounters with the establishment. The sickness is seen to have become so critical that ordinary measures are not likely to arrest its cancerous growth. Indeed, a number of official agencies have been engaged in the task of dealing with and investigating complaints about corruption and irregularities. But it has been demonstrated that a proliferation of such agencies can be counter-productive. Against this background, the responsibilities of the Mohtasib become really awesome. Judging from his Press interviews, Sardar Iqbal is fully conscious of the seriousness of the challenge. People, perhaps mistakenly, would expect him to perform a miracle. Yet something quite close to being a miracle would be required to fully institute the mechanism of accountability in the working of our bureaucracy and establish justice and fairplay in the administration's dealings with the citizens. Our apprehensions in this regard flow from the rather unusual circumstances in which the Ombudsman is obliged to operate. It has to be pointed out that the concept of the accountability of the executive authority is an

umbilical extension of the political accountability of the rulers. Permanent officials become answerable to Parliament through Ministers who head the different departments. Then there are public accounts committees which can call into question the financial conduct and dealings of public officials or of the executives of autonomous public agencies. The question hour is another well-recognised means of, among other things, questioning the working and conduct of officialdom. The modern concept of the office of an ombudsman was born in a democratic setting. Originating in Sweden in early nineteenth century, the ombudsman who is appointed by the legislature serves to mediate between the executive and the individual. Most democratic countries have similar constitutional arrangements for investigating complaints of bureaucratic abuse. The holder of such an office has to be independent of the executive in all respects. We do not have a democratic dispensation in the country at the moment and this might reflect, to some extent, in the performance of the Ombudsman. This is not to suggest that he has not been vested with sufficient powers. In the absence of a legislature and other democratic institutions, the President has to act on the Ombudsman's advice and decide how to deal with defiance of the Ombudsman's recommendations. The President also has the authority to exclude "specified matters, public functionaries or agencies from the operation and purview of all or any of the provisions" of the Ombudsman Order. It seems understandable that the Ombudsman will not

have any jurisdiction to investigate matters which are sub-judice, or relate to the external affairs of Pakistan or are concerned with the defence of Pakistan, including matters covered by the laws relating to the Armed Forces.

In the wider sense, the performance of the Ombudsman will be seen as part of the present Government's endeavours to establish Islamic values in society. This is not the occasion to review the Islamisation process and its impact on administrative norms and standards. There has, of course, been considerable stress on the religious obligation to earn "Rizq-i-Halal". An Islah-i-Mulashra campaign was also launched in August last year. What is relevant here is to point out that the concept of accountability in statecraft is an integral feature of the Muslim society. Justice is the divinely ordained right of every citizen. The Government will have to make a special effort to inculcate the moral and ethical principles of Islam in the members of its administration. Lack of accountability has allowed the bureaucracy to acquire a sense of immunity from popular or political pressures. Often in collusion with powerful interest groups, the bureaucracy has retained its supremacy during far-reaching political upheavals. It might resort to subtle means to negate the great potential of the Ombudsman to investigate administrative wrongs and institutionalised discrepancies. We sincerely hope that the Ombudsman will be able successfully to negotiate the inherent snares in this domain. The task is delicate and difficult. Perhaps the

very existence of the Ombudsman may lead to caution on the part of the bureaucracy. As for the large expectations of the people that the new institution will soon demolish the high edifice of corruption, it might be necessary to convey to them that a clean administration calls for radical measures of political and social renovation. Such renovation is not brought about easily.

GHAFOR CRITICIZES OMBUDSMAN'S APPOINTMENT

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 14

[Text]

Prof Ghatoor Ahmad, Naib Amir of the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami, said in Karachi yesterday that in the light of past experiences, the "Wafaq Mohtasib" (Ombudsman) would not be in a position to produce any "significant results", and would add to the expenditure of the already top-heavy administration.

In a statement, he pointed out that corruption was rife in every walk of life, and it had become very difficult to seek redress.

To appoint a "Mohtasib" now, after a five-and-a-half years, is tantamount to conceding the bureaucratic failures as well as the Government's inability to remove economic disparities.

When the Government, with all powers at its command, had not succeeded in weeding out corruption and other anti-social evils, how could a "Mohtasib", with his sphere of jurisdiction limited, do justice to his job?, he wondered.

Prof Ghatoor pointed out that the Government could declare any establishment as outside the jurisdiction of the "Mohtasib" and,

besides, if a public complaint was received through the President, he could merely submit his findings and not take any decision himself.

The Naib Amir of JI emphasised that the country's state of affairs could not be set right by "dispossessing the people of their right of involvement or by suspending the basic democratic institutions."

He said that a measure like the appointment of "Mohtasib" might have "some outward charm" for the time being, but its effect could not be lasting.

CSO: 4600/284

STUDENTS OCCUPY UNIVERSITY BUILDING FOR 2 HOURS

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 p 16

[Text]

A group of university students occupied the main Administration Block at the campus for over two hours yesterday.

The students, belonging to the Islami Jamiat Tulaba, did not allow anybody to enter the building during that period. They took control of the building at 9 a.m. by locking the main gate which remained closed till 11 a.m.

The university employees and senior officials who came after 9 a.m., waited outside the building for more than two hours, and those who had reached there, remained under virtual confinement.

Earlier, the IJT workers distributed handbills saying that the Administration Block would remain occupied in support of their demands which included release of students held during the firing incident and continuation of the Honours classes and the semester system.

When contacted the Gulshan-i-Iqbal police said they had received no formal complaint about the incident.

A Press release issued from the office of IJT, claimed that a group of University students disrupted the railway traffic on railway level-crossing in Quaidabad area by deflating tyres of two KTC buses.

But the railway authorities and Quaidabad police refuted the claim.

Concern voiced

The Consultative Committee of Karachi University expressed concern over the two-hour lockout.

A University Press release said that the Committee, which met yesterday under the Chairmanship of the Vice-Chancellor, felt that such incidents affected the teaching and academic environment at the university, and appealed to parents and citizens to advise students to remain peaceful and refrain from indulging in such acts.

CSO: 4600/282

STUDENTS LOCK UNIVERSITY BUILDING

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 8

[Text] The supporters of Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba locked the Administration Block of Karachi University for over three and a half hours yesterday after asking the employees to leave the building.

They removed the lock at about 12.30 p.m. to enable officials to make arrangements for the distribution of question papers etc. at the examination centres for the degree classes examinations.

The Vice-Chancellor was not in his office at the time of the locking of the Administration building.

The students had also locked the Administration building for two hours on Thursday.

Officials said the disbursement of salaries to the employees might be delayed because of the continued locking of the Administration building.

Protest Meetings

Diploma engineers and the students of Government College of Technology (SITE) held protest meetings on the 12th day yesterday to press the demand for release of convicted students of Rawalpindi Polytechnic, Grade 16 for diploma engineers, and to treat B. Tech (Hons) degree at par with B.E., says a Press release.

The Karachi General Secretary of defunct Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Mr Naheed Afzal Khan, has also supported the demand of the Polytechnic students.

USM Resolution

The Working Committee of the United Students Movement (USM) through a resolution, expressed concern over the re-investigation of Qadeer Abid murder case, says a Press release.

The USM's Committee, by another resolution, demanded the arrest of the remaining persons involved in the case and called for exemplary punishment.

CSO: 4600/283

STUDENTS DISRUPT TRAFFIC

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 1

[Text]

A group of University students disrupted vehicular traffic at least at 10 different places in the city yesterday by deflating the tyres of seized buses.

The students, belonging to the Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) spread all over in groups seized buses and deflated the tyres at important intersections.

As a result, the vehicular traffic on Rashid Minhas Road, Shareef Faisal, Karimabad Bridge, Super Highway, near Sohrab Goth, near the State Bank Building, Garden Road, Regal Chowk, Empress Market, Guru Mandir, Tariq Road and Federal 'B' Area was disrupted.

The students also blocked the level-crossing near Charibabad causing traffic jams at some places and serious bottleneck on the adjoining roads.

A Jamiat press release claimed that its two members sustained injuries. Syed Farooq was admitted to the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital after he was hit by a teargas shell. Another student, Athar Jilani, received minor injuries as a result of lathi-charge.

The Press release alleged that the police resorted to firing teargas shells near Guru Mandir when the students refused to abandon the vehicles they had seized to deflate their tyres.

It claimed that four students, Ahsan Gilgati, Ayaz Afsar, Farasat and Habibullah Ismail had been arrested.

Official sources denied that any student had been arrested or that the police had resorted to teargas shelling or lathi-charge near Guru Mandir.

Police sources said no case had been registered against the students who disrupted the vehicular traffic.

Earlier, IJT members held a meeting at campus and demanded release of the detained students.

CSO: 4600/284

THREE MORE CEMENT PLANTS PLANNED

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 9

[Text]

LAHORE, Jan 29: Cement production in the country will swell by over one million tons when three new cement plants, being installed by the State Cement Corporation, go into production during the next three years.

With the increase in domestic production, cement imports - ranging between five to 10 lakh tons a year - are likely to be brought to an end. Domestic production at present is estimated at 40 lakh tons.

Of the three new plants, one is being installed at Kohat, at a cost of Rs.600 million, and is likely to go into production soon.

It has an annual production capacity of 3 lakh tons.

Another cement plant is being set up at Dera Ghazi Khan, costing

about Rs.1100 million, with an annual capacity of six lakh tons. It is expected to be completed by the end of 1985.

The third cement plant will be built at Dawood Khel at an estimated cost of Rs.400 million. Some machinery of this plant is being imported from China while the remaining will be manufactured at the Heavy Mechanical Complex, Texila.

This plant will have a capacity of 170,000 tons and is expected to go into production by the end of 1984.

It may be mentioned here that at present, cement is on Free List and importers are allowed to import any quantity of the item according to requirements of the country.—

PPI

CSO: 4600/283

PUNJAB TO SPEND 104 MILLION RUPEES ON RURAL EDUCATION

Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 9

[Text]

LAHORE, Jan 29: The Punjab Government has released a sum of about Rs. 104 million for an action plan prepared for the elementary education in the rural areas.

Under a special development programme for education chalked out by the Federal Planning Commission for the year '82-'83 about 8,370 mohalla and mosque schools are scheduled to start functioning in the province from Feb 1 this year.

This was stated by the provincial Minister for Education Mr Hamid Nasir Chatha, while addressing a Press conference in the committee room of the Civil Secretariat here today.

For this purpose about 14,000 teachers, including Imams and

Pesh Imams and female teachers, have been appointed and the mosques and mohallah schools have been selected. Children from class one to three would be admitted in these schools while students from class four to five would remain in their previous schools, already working in the respective areas.

The scheme envisages opening of new schools, removal of overcrowding in the existing schools by using mosque and mohallah schools and consolidation of the existing primary schools.

On an average about 4 lakh students would be enrolled in these schools every year, he said, adding the number of these schools would be increased gradually.

CSO: 4600/283

PLAN TO EXPLORE BALUCHISTAN COAL RESOURCES APPROVED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 7

[Text]

QUETTA, Jan 30: The Federal Government has approved a scheme to explore and evaluate Baluchistan coal resources to meet increased demand of coal for energy purposes.

According to Geological Survey of Pakistan, there are about 83 million tons of coal reserves in the Sore Range, Degari and Sharigh coal fields in Quetta, Kalat and Sibi Divisions, where mining by private and public sectors is already in progress.

There are indications of more coal reserves in these and Dukki areas of Lora Lai District.

To start with, the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation has

decided to undertake coal exploration work in Degari coal field areas of Kalat district.

The Corporation has already set up a coal washing plant at Sharigh, another coal field area, where medium coking coal is available.

According to feasibility studies, carried out by the foreign experts, Sharigh coal could be used for the production of metallurgical coke by Pakistan Steel Mills. The Rs 27 million coal washing plant is designed to produce about 75,000 tons of washed coking coal for the manufacture of metallurgical coke. As a result of this plant, the country could save Rs 52 million annually through import substitution.—PPI

CSO: 4600/284

NEGLECT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 9

[Editorial: "Saving Our Heritage"]

[Text]

EVERY time a function is held to celebrate the significance of an archaeological site, one is assailed by the dark thoughts of the general depredation of our historical and cultural heritage. But such is the importance of preserving our monuments and archaeological ruins that even an opportunity to discuss the matter generally evokes a warm response. The international seminar on 'Mansura', held on Thursday near the ruins of the city believed to have been founded by the Arabs during the eighth century A.D., also prompted familiar responses. Inaugurating the seminar, the Sind Governor said he would request the Federal Government for more funds to enable the Department of Archaeology, Hyderabad, to take proper care of historical monuments within its jurisdiction. The present allocation, he pointed out, was not enough for this purpose. The Governor also made a valid point by stressing that the preservation of monuments and archaeological assets was mainly the responsibility of Pakistan rather than of

the United Nations or any other international agency. This should bring to mind the story of the struggle to preserve our invaluable ruins of Moenjodaro, threatened by a rising water table. Not doing enough on our own, we have constantly been looking towards UNESCO and international financial support to save the endangered treasures. Even though the land we inhabit has been a cradle of old civilisations, making us heir to a long process of evolution, popular awareness of the value of our antiquities is deplorably deficient. Lack of funds for the preservation and continued excavation of our archaeological treasures is of critical importance. But equally dismal has been our lack of educated interest in cultural affairs. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the task of conservation suffers greatly because of the absence of adequate legislation and administrative machinery. A number of sites have simply been left unattended. There was the sorry spectacle of villagers digging for treasure at Pattan Minara, near Rahimyar Khan. Similarly,

precious antiques have constantly been stolen from Swat and smuggled abroad. It is hoped that the concern expressed and pledges made at 'Monsura' will enhance official interest in preservation. Excavations at 'Mansura', situated in Sanghar district near Tando Adam, have been continuing since mid-sixties, leading to some exciting discoveries. Yet the site was discovered by an Englishman in 1854. Sind abounds in such treasures and it is unfortunate that the story of preservation in this province is particularly dismal.

BRIEFS

SHARIAT COURTS TO START--Sargodha, Jan 27--President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq on Thursday said that over 150 Shariat Courts will start working in the country within six weeks. Talking briefly to Pressmen at Sargodha Airbase after the re-equipment ceremony of No. 11 Squadron with F-16s, he said that selections would be made out of three categories of people. (1) From the existing judicial system people with integrity, honesty and knowledge of Islamic Law and Shariat, (2) Out of those who have completed courses on Shariat and Fiqah and (3) From religious madressahs. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 p 1]

PLEA FOR ENQUIRY--Lahore, Jan 27--Pakistan's first Ombudsman Justice Sardar Mohammad Iqbal, has been requested by a group of economic experts and planners to immediately conduct an inquiry, as his first assignment, into the oil and gas crisis. This suggestion was made by the "Group-83", here today at the end of a seminar on "Energy Crisis." Summing up the seven-hour discussion at the seminar the Convener of the Group Mr Masud Khaddarposh maintained that the present crisis was "imaginary," and in fact the nation was being deprived of the facilities provided by Nature only due to ill-planning and wrong use of public funds by the Government. It was requested that inquiry should be conducted in the larger national interest and also for upkeeping the principles of justice in Pakistan. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 28 Jan 83 p 18]

COEDUCATION ENDS IN SIALKOT--Sialkot, Jan 29--City Education Board has announced the scrapping of co-education in all the education institutions under its control with immediate effect. This was declared by Mian Rafiuddin, Chairman of the Board, here on Thursday. Addressing an oath-taking ceremony of the old boys City Public School, he said that the Board has taken this decision in view of the long outstanding demand of the parents and citizen. Mian Rafiuddin said that co-education was introduced by the Britishers with the explicit aim to introduce moral disintegration in the society. The Britishers, he added, also wanted to infuse hatred among the Muslims by keeping them away from the teachings of Islam and this system helped them a long way in achieving their nefarious purpose. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 4]

TRADE DEFICIT WISE REPORTED--Pakistan's trade deficit during the first months of the current fiscal year has increased by about 21 per cent over the deficit during the same period last year. According to the official sources, Pakistan's imbalance in trade during the July to November 1982 period, swelled to Rs. 5,846.3 million as against Rs. 13,117.7 million during the same period last year. Export earnings during the first five months of 1982-83 have been estimated at Rs. 9,746.8 million while the import bill during the same period shot up to Rs. 25,593.1 million. As against this the export earnings realised during the first five months of last fiscal year amounted to Rs. 8,711.5 million, while imports were worth Rs. 21,829.2 million. Exports during the five months of the current fiscal year showed a rise of about 12 per cent, while the import bill increased by more than 17 per cent.--PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 30 Jan 83 p 8]

REMITTANCES 2.4 BILLION RUPEES--Pakistanis working abroad are remitting nearly Rs 2.4 billion annually of which only a small fraction goes towards savings and capital formation, which could be most useful for the development of economy. This is an area where bankers can play their part in mobilising rural savings, said Mr. M.R. Khan, Chairman, Pakistan Banking Council, during his inaugural address at Allied Bank's Executives' Conference, 1983, held in Karachi at a local hotel. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 10]

PPP LEADER AILING--Mr Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, a leader of the defunct People's Party, suffered a stroke of angina on Saturday night and was rushed to the Cardio-Vascular Institute where he is under coronary intensive care. Doctors attending him said last night that his condition is improving. A few days back Mr Pirzada had sent letters to Federal Minister for Interior and the Sind Governor, along with the doctors' report, seeking permission to go to USA for coronary bypass surgery. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 31 Jan 83 p 14]

CSO: 4600/282

POLICE PERSONNEL ATTRACTED TO JOBS IN MIDDLE EAST

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 25 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by B.C. Perera: "Big Exodus of Cops to ME on 'French Leave'"]

[Text]

A top-level Police report submitted to Government states that inspite of the best-possible salaries and welfare facilities to Police Personnel in Sri Lanka, many of them go on "French Leave" to take up employment in the Middle East.

The report adds that some of the best officers have left the service without even a "by your leave" notification to the Department. Many of them owe thousands of rupees to the Government as well as to various lending organisations such as the Lady Lochore Fund etc.

Policemen arrange their overseas jobs secretly and "sneak out" of the country, without informing the Department. If they were to inform about their wish to leave the island, they must go through the rigorous resignation procedures and also pay back all the loans that they have obtained from the Department and the lending organisations, it is stated.

According to the report well-trained Police Officers from the

country's major educational institutions, were given Middle-East jobs promptly.

It says that there is a certain hesitency on the part of the more intelligent students from the universities and schools to apply for positions in the Police service despite attractive salary scales and welfare facilities.

The Police service is therefore, now left with the choice of selecting its personnel from below—average candidates. This is causing serious concern in the top rungs because in the next few years, some of the most efficient officers would retire and the void they leave would be difficult to fill. This, the report says, is because "The police service appears to have lost its glamour".

However, the report states that in reality this is not so. For instance, under the Sri Lanka Police Central Welfare Council Benefit Scheme, the following sums of compensation were payable: Death of officer Rs. 20,000/, loss of two limbs Rs.

14,000/, loss of one limb Rs. 7,000/. In the case of accidents or illness Rs. 50/ per week will be paid.

In addition there were insurance schemes which provided for any type of accident or bodily injury. The Government has also authorised special provision for officers of the Armed Services and the Police who have been killed or permanently disabled as a result of terrorist attacks while on duty, to be handsomely compensated.

The report states that many categories of police officers have had their salaries increased by "well over 100%". Some instances are: Inspectors of Police from a maximum of Rs. 8040 in 1977 to Rs. 15,600 in 1982, Sub-Inspectors from Rs. 7,320 in '77 to Rs. 25,240 in '82, Police Sergeants from Rs. 6,660 to Rs. 12,840 and Police Constables from Rs. 5,448 to Rs. 9,600.

The report added that the Police service must reverse the present trend and attract the cream of the country's youth.

CSO: 4600/275

MOST OFFICIALS TO DISCLOSE ASSETS, LIABILITIES

Colombo SUN in English 27 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Kenneth Amarasekera and Delrine Viljeratne: "More Persons Under 'Bare Assets' Law"]

[Text]

The scope of the Assets and Liabilities Law is to be enlarged to bring in more persons enjoying public confidence.

Cabinet spokesman Ranil Wickremasinghe told the weekly press briefing that government agreed to this in principle.

Other than Ministers and MPs, those who will be brought under the ambit of the law will be members of all bodies, judges, secretaries to ministries, chairmen and members etc of statutory bodies and corporations, office-bearers of trade unions and political party candidates, nominated for elections, proprietors, editors and members of the editorial staff of newspapers and other media.

Various suggestions were made. Among them was that any declaration made by any of these persons could be applied for by a citizen on the payment of a fee. But certain safeguards had to be taken to prevent frivolous applications.

If a citizen does not agree with the declaration he can contest it in Court. If the charge is proved false then such citizen will have to face heavy penalties.

This matter will be studied further before a final decision is taken.

Other Cabinet decisions announced yesterday were:—

A Draft Convention for the prevention of double taxation between Sri Lanka and Norway and Korea was approved.

The Norway Convention was entered into in 1964 but it was renegotiated. These two conventions have been now negotiated and drawn up in keeping with the objectives of government, namely the provision of incentives for incoming flow of foreign capital, rates and taxation of dividend interest and royalties offered. The benefits of lower taxation to accrue to the investor himself and not to the exchequer of a government.

Shipping profits are to be taxed in the country of source with a reduction of 50 per cent. In the case of airline profits tax will be from source.

Cabinet approved the five-year trade agreement between Sri Lanka and China negotiated between Trade and Shipping Minister Lalith Athulathmudali and the Vice-Premier of China.

The annual protocol provides for barter on rice for rubber and exchanges of other commodities and items. The 1982 agreement provides for payments in convertible currency.

for other items and provides for joint trade committees for the implementation of the agreement and for the promotion and development of trade between the two countries. The schedule in the agreement identifies 20 items but does not exclude others.

The Minister of Transport M. H. Mohamed presented a report by a committee appointed to inquire and report on the Railway Security Service.

The main recommendation is to that the service should be a subdepartment under the General Manager with a Director as its head.

One thousand two hundred security personnel are to be recruited with a decentralisation of the service. They are to be given limited police powers. There are to be changes in the method of recruitment and in the salary structures. Training of security personnel in the use of modern weapons, communications and transport is to be undertaken. Certain amendments to the Railway Ordinance will have to be made.

The implementation of these recommendations will be made in consultation with the Treasury and the Ministry of Public Administration.

CSO: 4600/274

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

feb 28, 1983